

NAA: A1838, 173/11/31 PART 3

Series number: A1838

Control symbol: 173/11/31 PART 3

Barcode: 1551784

Number of pages: 185

Title: Iraq - Relations with Iran

Copies of this record are provided for research or study purposes. Before making use of the material for other purposes (for example publication) please refer to information on copyright obligations and citing archival records available on our website at www.naa.gov.au.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

17/7/79

PART No. 3

OFFICE/POST

C.R.

173/11/31 3C

TITLE

IRAQ - RELATIONS WITH IRAN

173/11/31

RELATED FILES

PREVIOUS PAPERS

Pt. 2

FILE No.

TITLE

DATE COMMENCED

14-2-72

DATE FINISHED

20-6-79

SUBSEQUENT PAPERS

ARCHIVAL ACTION

Signature

DFAT ARCHIVES
FILE NSUS
JUN 1988

Folio No.	Referred to	Date	Cleared-Initials and date	Folio No.	Referred to	Date	Cleared-Initials and date	Folio No.	Referred to	Cleared-Initials and date
1/6	P.A.	28/4	H 28/4							
7	Truelove	29/4	H 29/4							
	Mr SPENCER	1/5	S 2/5							
11	P.A.	2/5	H 2/5							
14	Truelove	5/5	H 5/5							
	Mr BATTENSON	15/5	H 15/5							
	P/A	16/5	R							
	AME	22/6	H							
	PA	25/6	H							
	W.A.	13/7	H							
	PA	25/7	H							
	NAMIN	17/7	H							

CONFIDENTIAL



FILE NO. 173/11/31
PART No. 3

Australian Archives
DOCUMENT REMOVAL ADVICE

Folio/s numbered see below
has / have been removed from this item.

Series/Accession No.: A1838/348 Item No.: 173/11/31 Pt. 3

Document description: docs dated 1972-1977
ff. 23-24, 49, 57, 136, 138-139, 146, 157, 196, 203-204, 208-209,
217, 221

Reason for removal: 33(1)(a) + (b) of the Archives Act 1983

A copy/expunged copy has been inserted in place of folio/s 49, 57, 217, 221

Number of folios removed: 16

Removed documents now controlled as:

Removed by: Karen Cheri Position No. 1A/84 Date 6/1/05
Pink - Item copy Yellow - Document copy Blue - Register copy



Australian Government
National Archives of Australia

**STATEMENT OF REASONS UNDER SECTION 40 OF THE ARCHIVES ACT
1983**

Series: A1838/348
Item: 173/11/31 Pt 3
Title: Iraq – Relations with Iran

DECISION: The folios listed below are wholly/partially exempt under sub-section 33(1)(a) and (b) of the Archives Act 1983

23-24, 49, 57, 136, 138-139, 146, 157, 196, 203-204, 208-209, 217, 221

FACTS ON WHICH THESE DECISIONS ARE BASED:

The exempted folios contain one or more of the following:

- The exempted folios contain intelligence/information the release of which could cause damage to the security of the Commonwealth
- intelligence/information the release of which could cause damage to the security of the Commonwealth.

RELEVANT SECTIONS OF THE ACT:

33(1)(a) '...a Commonwealth record is an exempt record if it contains information or matter... the disclosure of which under this Act could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security, defence or international relations of the Commonwealth'.

33(1)(b) '...a Commonwealth record is an exempt record if it contains information or matter...communicated in confidence by...a foreign Government...to the Government of the Commonwealth...being information or matter the disclosure of which under this Act would constitute a breach of that confidence'.

REASONS FOR THESE DECISIONS:

The folios contain information which reveals the capability, methods, objectives, sources, areas of interest, or operations of an Australian intelligence agency, the release of which could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security of the Commonwealth within the meaning of s33(1)(a) of the Archives Act.

A foreign government has asked that the information not be released to the public. The release of this information would therefore constitute a breach of confidence owed to that foreign government within the meaning of s33(1)(b) of the Archives Act.

International relations are dependent upon the adequate flow of information between one country and another. If disclosure would lessen the confidence of another country in the Government of Australia, that is sufficient grounds for a finding that disclosure could reasonably be expected to damage international relations under s33(1)(a) of the Archives Act.

Decision maker:	<i>Laurie Chern</i>
Position number:	<i>RTS</i>
Date:	<i>6/1/05</i>

Department of Foreign Affairs

RE8.

File Number

Part Number

FILE CLOSED

This part opened on/...../.....

This part closed on/...../.....

Subsequent correspondence on Part/File Number



DO NOT OPEN

This acid-free mask contains 1 cms folios
with the date range 1975 - 1979

The contents of the mask are:

☐ Exempt from public access under
paragraph(s) of the *Archives
Act* 1983. You have a statutory right to seek
a review of the exemption.

☒ Not in the open period as defined
by the *Archives Act* 1983.

Date mask applied: 6/1/05

NAS 1061 (SEPT 1999)

Series no:

Item no:

151
181
⑦ 173/11/31

WE EXPECT FURTHER CLASHES BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF BAGH-
DAD AND TEHRAN, AS IRAN CONTINUES ITS SUPPORT IN ORDER TO HELP
THE KURDS STOP THE IRAQI PRE-WINTER OFFENSIVE. THE THREAT, THERE-
FORE, OF A MAJOR IRAQI-IRANIAN BATTLE ~~COULD BE~~ PERSISTS. (SECRET)

UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

S/11494
6 September 1974

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 4 SEPTEMBER 1974 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO
THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government and with reference to the letter of the Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations of 28 August (S/11476), I have the honour to inform you, Mr. President, that Iraq continues to be bound by the provisions of Security Council resolution 348 (1974). As a proof of its adherence to the said resolution and its good intention in implementing its provisions, Iraq took the initiative in calling for a meeting of the Iraqi and Iranian sides in order to prepare the necessary arrangements for the implementation of the provisions of resolution 348. The Istanbul meeting of 12 August 1974 of the two parties was a direct result of the Iraqi initiative. However, at the same time the two parties were talking, the Iranian authorities continued to amass its troops on the border and furthermore committed a number of flagrant violations against the Iraqi borders. The premeditated attack of the night of 23/24 August, which I referred to in my letter of 27 August (S/11472), is but one of a series of such attacks, violations, and infringements on Iraq's territorial sovereignty by Iran. I am taking the liberty to enclose an annex giving details of the Iranians' violations and infringements that occurred during the month of August alone.

The Government of Iraq had at an earlier occasion, reaffirmed its good faith and its earnest determination to solve the outstanding problems between the two countries, by asking the Iranian Government to form a joint commission to lay down the necessary arrangements for the withdrawal of the concentration of troops from the border area in conformity with paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 348 (1974). Iran as yet has not replied to this initiative.

My Government categorically denies all the false accusations appearing in the letter of the Permanent Representative of Iran and we express our regrets that he saw fit to send such a letter at a time when the two sides in Istanbul were able to reach a preliminary agreement on points to be discussed later at a higher level. We believe that this agreement can be a positive starting point towards solving the outstanding problems.

Iraq's reaffirmation of its strict adherence to Security Council resolution 348 (1974) and its intention to implement its provisions fully and in good faith also entails that Iran too should in its turn be bound by the said resolution and in the same spirit. Iran's position must not be one of casting doubts on the provisions of the resolution and it should not embark on actions that can only

74-23539

/...

create difficulties in the face of the concrete efforts for the solving of the outstanding problems between Iraq and Iran, which is the aim of Security Council resolution 348.

I would kindly request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Karim AL-SHAIKHLY
Permanent Representative

/...

A list of detailed
against Iraqi frontier a

1. On 1 August 19
encampment at
Heavy material
2. On the night
launched a pr
Mortar and 82
was killed wh
3. On 26 August
attack on Al
4. On the same
forces launc
Karboolah Be
5. Iranian for
27 August a
used.
6. On the same
carried out
7. On the mor
artillery
Al Semood
8. On the mor
launched y
Al Semood
attack on

Annex

A list of detailed account of violations committed by Iranian armed forces against Iraqi frontier and police posts during the month of August 1974.

1. On 1 August 1974 at 1800 hours local time Iranian forces shelled the Iraqi encampment at Qarrto Too in Deiyalah area, using heavy artillery. Heavy material damage was sustained.
2. On the night 23/24 August at 2100 hours local time Iranian armed forces launched a premeditated attack on the Iraqi border post of Al-Qa'qa. Mortar and 82 mm calibre field guns were used. One Iraqi policeman was killed while several were wounded.
3. On 26 August at 1800 hours local time Iranian forces resumed their attack on Al-Qa'qa post. This time mortar and light weapons were used.
4. On the same day (26 August) at 2000 hours local time Iranian armed forces launched a premeditated attack on the Iraqi border post at Karboolah Beljfet.
5. Iranian forces resumed their attack on the same post once more on 27 August at 1430 hours local time. This time heavy artillery was used.
6. On the same day (27 August) at 1430 hours local time Iranian forces carried out yet another attack on Al-Qa'qa post.
7. On the morning of 27/28 August at 0500 hours local time Iranian artillery shelled the outlying perimeter of Al-Qa'qa post as also Al Semood post.
8. On the morning of 29 August at 0130 hours local time, Iranian forces launched yet another premeditated and treacherous attack on Al-Qa'qa, Al Semood and Tal Al Wasat posts. Two policemen were wounded in the attack on Al Semood post.

173/11/31 178

Aug 30 00 04 74

LEG49781
TNL893 1652 29

O.TN534
ROUTINE

POPDK GINMX BZSLK COUMW ZRUXH

O.TN534 1400 29.4,.74 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/794

RP.
RR U.N. NEW YORK/301 GENEVA/302 BEIRUT/303

FM. TEHRAN / FILE 221/5/9

CONFIDENTIAL

IRAN-IRAQ : BORDER CLASHES

THE IRANIAN-IRAQI BORDER SITUATION CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE AS THE TWO COUNTRIES, WHICH BEGAN ON 12 AUGUST, CONTINUE IN ISTANBUL.

THESE WERE MEANT TO PAVE THE WAY FOR A MEETING BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS, NOW AN UNLIKELY POSSIBILITY.

2. SINCE 14 AUGUST THE IRANIAN PRESS HAS INCREASINGLY REPORTED MAJOR IRAQI ARTILLERY ATTACKS EVERY TWO OR THREE DAYS ON IRANIAN BORDER SETTLEMENTS.

THE CLASHES EVIDENTLY BEGAN ON 4 AUGUST.

ONE INCIDENT IN THE NAFTE SHAH AREA WAS SAID TO HAVE INCLUDED IRAQI TANKS.

EXCEPT FOR FIVE CIVILIANS AND ONE IRAQI INFILTRATOR KILLED, NO OTHER CASUALTY DETAILS ARE KNOWN.

BAGHDAD HAS REACTED BY SENDING NOTES ABOUT IRANIAN TROOP CONCENTRATIONS AND BORDER ATTACKS TO ALL FOREIGN MISSIONS IN

BAGHDAD AND, WE UNDERSTAND, HAS SENT A PROTEST NOTE TO THE UN.

*Mr. [unclear]
Disturbing in
chief, and
partly
also in respect
of the
manner [unclear]*

IN ISTANBUL.

THESE WERE MEANT TO PAVE THE WAY FOR A MEETING BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS, NOW AN UNLIKELY POSSIBILITY.

2. SINCE 14 AUGUST THE IRANIAN PRESS HAS INCREASINGLY REPORTED MAJOR IRAQI ARTILLERY ATTACKS EVERY TWO OR THREE DAYS ON IRANIAN BORDER SETTLEMENTS.

THE CLASHES EVIDENTLY BEGAN ON 4 AUGUST.

ONE INCIDENT IN THE NAFTE SHAH AREA WAS SAID TO HAVE INCLUDED IRAQI TANKS.

EXCEPT FOR FIVE CIVILIANS AND ONE IRAQI INFILTRATOR KILLED, NO OTHER CASUALTY DETAILS ARE KNOWN.

BAGHDAD HAS REACTED BY SENDING NOTES ABOUT IRANIAN TROOP CONCENTRATIONS AND BORDER ATTACKS TO ALL FOREIGN MISSIONS IN BAGHDAD AND, WE UNDERSTAND, HAS SENT A PROTEST NOTE TO THE UN.

3. MEANWHILE, THE IRAQI KURDISH PROBLEM HAS ESCALATE WITH INCREASED MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS AND INCREASED IRANIAN VERBAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR THE REBELS.

ON 27 AUGUST IT WAS SUDDENLY ANNOUNCED THAT 72,380 IRAQI KURDISH REFUGEES HAVE FLED TO IRAN AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS SPENT DOLLARS US 100 MILLION ON RELIEF AID.

THE UNHCR HAS BEEN ACCUSED OF INACTION.

4. OF MORE INTEREST ARE STRONGER INDICATIONS OF SOVIET DISENCHANTMENT WITH BAGHDAD AND IN PARTICULAR ITS HANDLING OF THE KURDISH PROBLEM.

FOR EXAMPLE, ON 13 AUGUST RADIO MOSCOW, COMMENTING ON THE TALKS, SAID, "THE CLASH BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ IS A HERITAGE OF THE COLONIAL PERIOD AND A REMNANT OF THE TIME WHEN IRAQ WAS UNDER THE PROTECTION OF BRITAIN....

AT THE TIME OF SIGNING THIS (SHATT-AL-ARAB) AGREEMENT DUE TO THE FORCE OF CAPITALIST RULE, IRAN COULD NOT ESTABLISH HER VIEWS ON HER RIGHTS AND THAT IS HOW THE BORDER AGREEMENT WAS ARRANGED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE COLONIALISTS".

THIS SUPPORT FOR IRAN OVER THE SHATT-AL-ARAB DISPUTE WILL CAUSE NO JOY IN BAGHDAD.

5. FOR CANBERRA:

PLEASE PASS Y BAG TO LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON.

XC. TN534 1400 29.8.74 794 301 302 303
21/5/9 12 2. 14 4 3. 27 72380 100 4.
13 SHATT-AL-ARAB 5.

CM.

*These articles
will be
damaging
to
Shatts.*

Mr Flanagan

*it would make
change from dragging
people through the streets
behind cars.*

NK 3/8

*the "big
merry" pipe"*



AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
NEW DELHI 269/10
In reply quote No. 269/2
Memorandum No. 1013

177

5 August 1974

173/11/31

ENCLOSURES ATTACHED

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA

Parliamentary Question :
India's Mediation to solve disputes between Iran and Iraq

On 1 August in the Lok Sabha, the Minister
of External Affairs was asked:

ENCLOSURES ATTACHED (a)

whether Government's attention has been drawn
to the news item appearing in a local English
daily dated the 13th May, 1974 regarding India's
mediation to solve disputes between Iran and
Iraq; and

(b) if so, Government's reaction thereto?

2. In his reply, the Minister of State in the
Ministry of External Affairs, Mr Surendra Pal Singh said:

(a) & (b): Yes, Sir. The Government have seen a report
in the Times of India published from New Delhi, dated
13.5.74, to the effect that India is mediating between
Iran and Iraq to settle various disputes between them. The
report is entirely baseless; Government of India is not
engaged in any such mediation.

(T. Shand)
First Secretary

*Mr Kuper - yours / think.
RS 20/8*

*H. Acton
Mr. [unclear] copy of memo to. OVO
E Mc 21/8*

1. Name of Paper ... **New Delhi.**
 2. Published at ...
 3. Dated **13 May 1974** Page

India mediating in Iran-Iraq disputes

By K. K. SASTRY
 "The Times of India" News Service

BEIRUT, May 12.

INDIA is mediating between Iran and Iraq to settle various disputes between them, the Beirut newspaper, "As Safir," said today.
 Quoting diplomatic sources, the newspaper said the efforts had reached a point where a visit by the Iraqi Vice-President, Mr. Saddam Hussein, to Teheran had become a possibility. The Soviet Union, it is stated, had suggested to Iraq that it should seek the good offices of India. The matter was apparently taken up during Mr. Hussein's visit to India in March and Mrs. Indira Gandhi's recent visit to Teheran. India's relations with Iran have improved in the past few months. Its ties with Iraq have always been

good.
 Iraqi-Iranian relations, never very good, suffered a major setback in 1969 over the Shatt-Al-Arab estuary. Iraq broke off diplomatic ties in 1971 after Iranian occupation of three Arab-claimed islands in the Persian Gulf.
 In October last, Iraq offered to resume relations and the Shah's assurances over border security enabled Iraq to send some of its armed forces to the aid of Syria during the Arab-Israeli war. This stage did not, however, last long, and there have been repeated border clashes this year. The renewal of the Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq and the Shah's help to the rebels strained the relations further.

173/11/31

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Naf sm/E 175

Distr.
GENERAL

S/11329
8 July 1974

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 5 JULY 1974 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ
TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL

Upon instruction from my Government and with reference to the letter addressed to you by the Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations dated 25 June 1974 (S/11325), I have the honour to inform you that the Government of Iraq wishes to state that it shall not comment on the Iranian interpretations of the consensus adopted by the Security Council on 28 February 1974 and of resolution 348 (1974). The decisions of the Council are clear and unambiguous and Iraq has stated its position thereof on several occasions. What is important, as far as the Government of Iraq is concerned, is that all efforts should be directed towards the implementation of the resolution adopted by the Council. Iraq is ready to exert its efforts to implement that resolution.

The Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations, and indeed the international community as a whole, are well aware of which party is responsible for the present state of affairs existing between Iraq and Iran. The Government of Iraq does not wish to enter into new arguments which would not be in the interest of the implementation of the decisions and the agreements which Iraq is determined to fulfil.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Karim AL-SHAIKHLY
Permanent Representative of
Iraq to the United Nations

Handwritten signature
F

74-18291

173/11/31

174

Iraq

31. Criticism of Iraq's treatment of the Kurds continued, with allegations of atrocities and use of napalm.
32. The report of the Secretary General's Special Representative, which said that Iran and Iraq had agreed to prompt and simultaneous withdrawal of troop concentrations and the setting up of a new joint border delimitation commission, was acceptable to Iran.

Tehran Super

11.6.74

0-52151



173

173/11/31

Relations with Iran

The report of the U.N. Secretary-General on the Iran-Iraq border dispute, issued on 21 May, indicated that Iran and Iraq have agreed to open negotiations on the causes which led to the border clashes between them last February.

The agreement was barely noted in the Iraqi press which continues to speak in very unfriendly terms about Iran.

Iraq *[signature]*

G. 6. 74

O. BT 1144

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



173/11/31
172
Distr.
GENERAL

S/11323
19 June 1974

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 JUNE 1974 FROM THE DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVE OF
IRAQ ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, and with reference to the letter of the Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations contained in document S/11313 and enclosing a statement of his Government concerning Security Council resolution 348 (1974) of 28 May 1974, I have the honour to inform you and the members of the Council that, upon the adoption of that resolution, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq promptly notified the Secretary-General of the Iraqi Government's acceptance of the resolution and its readiness to implement all the provisions of the resolution with sincerity and goodwill. Further confirmation of Iraq's positive response was circulated in document S/11306 dated 31 May 1974.

The Iranian Government's statement, to our regret, is unco-operative and clearly contradicts the letter and the spirit of the decisions of the Security Council. In the consensus adopted by the Council on 28 February 1974 (S/11229), paragraph 2 stated that the Security Council "believes that it is important to deal with a situation which could endanger peace and stability in the region". The consensus thus confirms the fact that the dispute is a matter of primary concern to the Security Council. In resolution 348 (1974), the Council welcomes an early resumption of conversations with a view to a comprehensive settlement of all bilateral issues, "without any preconditions". It is to be noted that the Iranian Government's statement constitutes in itself a precondition for the acceptance of resolution 348 (1974) by Iran.

Iraq still hopes, however, that the Iranian Government, in declaring its acceptance of the resolution, will fulfil its obligations under that resolution in a spirit of goodwill and co-operation.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Wissam ZAHAWIE
Deputy Representative of Iraq
on the Security Council

He Adnan
74-16828
P.

173/11/31

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

171

O.1N089 JCB6
TUR 0614 30.5.74

O.1N089 1730 29.5.74 CLA

TO.
PP AUSTUNAT NEW YORK/154

RF.
PP CANBERRA/406

FM. TEHRAN / 221/5/9 REF O.UNI65

R E S T R I C T E D

IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE

NADIM, UNDER SECRETARY, FOREIGN MINISTRY, TOLD ME
TODAY THAT IRAN WOULD REJECT OUT FIGHT THE SOVIET ADDITION TO
PARA 4 OF THE RESOLUTION. IRAN IS NOT PREPARED TO DEPART
FROM THE STRICTLY BILATERAL APPROACH LEST THERE BE A POSSIBILITY
OF INTERFERENCE BY A THIRD PARTY.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
J10
PM AND C
PM'S

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

ACTION: UNIA/WAME

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO STE FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA) NA WAME
FAS(PW) PC ECSA FASDEF) DP IC DGA ICH FAS(10) FAS(MS)

BELGRADE JAKARTA LONDON MOSCOW OTTAWA RANGOON WASHINGTON

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

173/11/31

176

O.TW089 JCB6
10R 0614 30.5.74

O.TW089 1730 29.5.74 CLA

TO.
PP AUSTINAT NEW YORK/154

RP.
PP CANBERRA/406

FM. TEHRAN / 221/5/9 REF O.UNI65

R E S T R I C T E D

IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE

NADIM, UNDER SECRETARY, FOREIGN MINISTRY, TOLD ME
TODAY THAT IRAN WOULD REJECT OUT FIGHT THE SOVIET ADDITION TO
PARA 4 OF THE RESOLUTION. IRAN IS NOT PREPARED TO DEPART
FROM THE STRICTLY BILATERAL APPROACH LEST THERE BE A POSSIBILITY
OF INTERFERENCE BY A THIRD PARTY.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
J10
PM AND C
PM'S

Not passed

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

ACTION: UNIA/WAME

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO STE FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA) NA WAME
FAS(PW) PC ECSA FASDEF) DP IC DGA ICK FAS(IG) FAS(MS)

BELGRADE JAKARTA LONDON MOSCOW OTTAWA RANGOON WASHINGTON

M. Jester

M. Kuper
M. Green

INWARD CABLEGRAM

173/11/31 169
O. UN 180 KDD 8
TOR 1502 29.5.74

O. UN 180 1835 28.5.74 UNC

TO.
RR CANBERRA/875RP.
RR TEHRAN/04 BEIRUT/48

FM. NEW YORK UN / FILE 152/1 REF O. UN 165

U N C L A S S I F I E D

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE

AS EXPECTED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR DID NOT PRESS HIS AMENDMENT TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN OUR 832 WHEN HE OPENED DEBATE IN THE COUNCIL THIS AFTERNOON. HE INDICATED THAT HE WOULD NOT MOVE FORMAL AMENDMENT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION BUT WOULD SUPPORT IT IN ITS PRESENT FORM ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS ASKED FOR ASSISTANCE HE WOULD AGREE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF THAT ASSISTANCE.

2. THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED BY 14 VOTES IN FAVOUR, NO NEGATIVES OR ABSTENTIONS, ONE DELEGATION (CHINA) TAKING NO PART IN THE VOTING.

3. ALL OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS SPOKE BRIEFLY ALONG WITH IRAN. STATEMENTS WERE LARGELY CONFINED TO EXPRESSIONS OF SATISFACTION WITH THE AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ AND TO THE HOPE THAT OUTSTANDING BORDER ISSUES WOULD BE SETTLED PEACEFULLY BETWEEN THEM. THE U.K. STRONGLY REFUTED SOVIET UNION ASSERTION THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS REQUIRED TO SEEK COUNCIL AGREEMENT TO THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF ANY FURTHER ASSISTANCE HE MIGHT BE ASKED TO LEND BY THE PARTIES. U.S.A. AND WE OURSELVES SAID LESS FORCEFULLY THAT WE WOULD EXPECT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO KEEP THE COUNCIL INFORMED OF ANY REQUEST FOR HIS ASSISTANCE AND HOW HE PROPOSED TO RESPOND.

...MCINTYRE

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
J10
PM AND C
PM'S

ACTION : UNIA/WAME

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO STE FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA) NA FAS(PW)
PC ECSA FAS(DEF) DP IC DGA ICR FAS(10) FAS(MS)

BELGRADE JAKARTA LONDON MOSCOW OTTAWA RANGOON WASHINGTON

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

F: 173/11/31⁶⁸

O.UN129 MAL10

O.UN129 1710 22.5.74 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/831

RP.
RR BEIRUT/45 TEHRAN/01

FM. NEW YORK UN /

R E S T R I C T E D

SECURITY COUNCIL - IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE

IN MY TELEGRAM O.UN93 REGARDING UN MEMBERSHIP FOR BANGLADESH I REFERRED IN PARA 2 (C) TO POSSIBLE RECONSIDERATION OF THIS DISPUTE BY THE COUNCIL BEFORE THE END OF MAY.

2. UNDER MY MEMO 925 OF TODAY'S DATE 22 MAY (DDSPATCHED BAG 559 ON 24 MAY) I HAVE FORWARDED A COPY OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT COVERING PUBLICATION OF THE REPORT OF AMBASSADOR WECKMANN-MUNOZ, THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE APPOINTED IN MARCH TO INVESTIGATE THE DISPUTE.

3. AS ALREADY INDICATED, BOTH PARTIES ARE SATISFIED WITH THIS REPORT AND HAVE ACCEPTED ITS MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS. THEY HAVE NOW AGREED ON THE TEXT OF A DRAFT RESOLUTION TO BE PUT BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL (SEE MY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM).

4. SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT HAS CALLED FOR PRELIMINARY INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WITH ALL COUNCIL MEMBERS ON MORNING OF FRIDAY 24 MAY TO DETERMINE WHAT PROCEDURE SHOULD BE FOLLOWED IN DISPOSING OF THE ITEM. UNLESS UNEXPECTED DIFFICULTIES ARISE IT CAN BE EXPECTED THAT THE COUNCIL WILL APPROVE THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WITH MINIMAL DISCUSSION AT A BRIEF MEETING SOME TIME NEXT WEEK, WITH CHINA PROBABLY NOT PARTICIPATING IN THE CONSENSUS.
...MCINTYRE

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PM AND C
PMS

ACTION: UNIA/WAME

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO STE FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA) NA FAS(PW) PC ECSA
FAS(DEF) DP IC DGA ICR FAS(IO) FAS(MS)

BELGRADE JAKARTA LONDON MOSCOW OTTAWA RANGOON WASHINGTON

M. Jackson A letter to *McIntyre*! Srd/s

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

67

O.UN130 MAL10

O.UN130 1710 22.5.74 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/832

RP.
RR BEIRUT/46 TEHRAN/02

FM. NEW YORK UN / REF O.UN129

R E S T R I C T E D

SECURITY COUNCIL - IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT REFERRED TO IN OUR TELEGRAM 831.

BEGINS:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL (UNDERLINED)

RECALLING (UNDERLINED) ITS CONSENSUS ADOPTED ON 28 FEBRUARY 1974 (S/11229),

1. TAKES NOTE WITH APPRECIATION (UNDERLINED) OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT, WHICH WAS CIRCULATED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 20 MAY 1974 (S/11291)..

2. WELCOMES (UNDERLINED) THE REPORTED DETERMINATION ON THE PART OF IRAN AND IRAQ TO DE-ESCALATE THE PREVAILING SITUATION AND TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE FACT THAT BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE AGREED THROUGH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, WHO WAS ACTING IN THE EXERCISE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S GOOD OFFICES, TO THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) A STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE 7 MARCH 1974 CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT..

(B) PROMPT AND SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF CONCENTRATIONS OF ARMED FORCES ALONG THE ENTIRE BORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN ARRANGEMENT TO BE AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES..

(C) THE CREATION OF A FAVOURABLE ATMOSPHERE CONDUCIVE TO ACHIEVING THE PURPOSE STATED IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH, BY REFRAINING TOTALLY FROM ANY HOSTILE ACTIONS AGAINST EACH OTHER..

.../2

RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

INWARD CABLEGRAM

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2 - O.UN130 MAL10

(D) AN EARLY RESUMPTION, WITHOUT ANY PRECONDITIONS, AT THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL AND PLACE, OF CONVERSATIONS WITH A VIEW TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF ALL BILATERAL ISSUES.,

3. EXPRESSES THE HOPE (UNDERLINED) THAT THE PARTIES WILL TAKE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT REACHED.,

4. INVITES (UNDERLINED) THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO LEND WHAT EVER ASSISTANCE MAY BE REQUESTED BY BOTH COUNTRIES IN CONNEXION WITH THE SAID AGREEMENT.

ENDS.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PM AND C
PMS

ACTION: UNIA/WAME

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO STE FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA) NA FAS(PW) PC
ECSA FAS(DEF) DP IC FAS(IO) DGA ICR FAS(MS)

BELGRADE JAKARTA LONDON MOSCOW OTTAWA RANGOON WASHINGTON

INWARD CABLEGRAM

O. UN165
TUR 0936

PM6
25.5.74

O. UN165 1810 24.5.74 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/863

RP.
RR BEIRUT/47 TEHRAN/03

FM. NEW YORK UN / REF O. UN129 O. UN130

R E S T R I C T E D

SECURITY COUNCIL - IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE

I SHOULD HAVE KNOWN BETTER THAN TO EXPECT AMBASSADOR MALIK TO PASS UP AN OPPORTUNITY TO PURSUE HIS TRADITIONAL CAMPAIGN AIMED AT CIRCUMSCRIBING THE FREEDOM OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. AS A CONSEQUENCE THIS MORNING'S INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS, WHICH WERE GENERALLY EXPECTED TO BE BRIEF AND PURELY PROCEDURAL, TURNED INTO A PROTRACTED ARGUMENT OVER OPERATIVE PARA. 4 OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION.

2. AFTER THE PRESIDENT (KENYA) HAD INDICATED THAT IF ALL MEMBERS AGREED WITH THE DRAFT TEXT HE PROPOSED TO CALL A COUNCIL MEETING ON THE MORNING OF TUESDAY 28 MAY TO ADOPT IT, WITH ANY EXPLANATIONS OF VOTE TO FOLLOW, MALIK PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL SENTENCE TO PARA. 4 : "THE NATURE AND THE SIZE OF SUCH ASSISTANCE WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS (PROPOSAL) OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL". THIS BROUGHT IMMEDIATE PROTESTS FROM THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM, BOTH OF WHOM POINTED OUT THAT THE DRAFT TEXT WAS THE RESULT OF LENGTHY AND DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE AMBASSADORS OF IRAQ AND IRAN AND THAT TO REOPEN THESE WOULD INEVITABLY DELAY COUNCIL ACTION AGAINST THE WISHES OF THE TWO PARTIES. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD PARA. 4 HAD BEEN THE POINT OF GREATEST DIFFICULTY IN REACHING AGREEMENT. AUSTRIA ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE TEXT BE ACCEPTED AS IT STOOD. IRAQ THOUGHT THAT SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVAL OF ANY ASSISTANCE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MIGHT BE ASKED TO RENDER WAS IMPLICIT IN THE TEXT, BUT BELIEVED IT WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCEPT THE SOVIET ADDITION, WHICH WAS IN ANY EVENT A MATTER FOR THE COUNCIL TO DECIDE.

3. A SUGGESTION THAT IRAN BE INVITED TO JOIN THE CONSULTATIONS AND GIVE ITS VIEWS ON THE SOVIET AMENDMENT WAS RESISTED BY THE UNITED STATES. MALIK SAID THAT IF HE COULD NOT GET AGREEMENT TO HIS DRAFT AMENDMENT HE WOULD INSIST ON CALLING A COUNCIL MEETING ON TUESDAY AND PUTTING IT TO THE VOTE IN OPEN SESSION. NO OTHER COUNCIL MEMBER SPOKE. THE PRESIDENT WOUND UP THE DISCUSSION BY PROMISING TO RESUME HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE TWO PARTIES AND ASKING FOR LATITUDE ABOUT THE TIMING OF A COUNCIL MEETING.

.....2

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

164

2. O. UN165

4. IN DISCUSSION AFTER THE MEETING AMBASSADOR HUEYDA MADE IT
CLEAR THAT HE WOULD NOT FIND THE SOVIET AMENDMENT ACCEPTABLE. IT
REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER MALIK DECIDES TO PRESS IT., ON PRESENT
INDICATIONS IT IS UNLIKELY TO ATTRACT ENOUGH AFFIRMATIVE VOTES.
...MCINTYRE

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PM AND C
PM'S

ACTION: UNIA/WAME

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO STE FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA) NA FAS(PW)
PC ECSA FAS(DEF) DP IC DGA ICR FAS(IG) FAS(MS) DDU

BELGRADE JAKARTA LONDON MOSCOW OTTAWA RANGOON WASHINGTON

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

173/11/31 163

O.UN130 MAL10

O.UN130 1710 22.5.74 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/832

RP.
RR BEIRUT/46 TEHRAN/02

FM. NEW YORK UN / REF O.UN129

R E S T R I C T E D

SECURITY COUNCIL - IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT REFERRED TO IN OUR TELEGRAM 831.

BEGINS:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL (UNDERLINED)

RECALLING (UNDERLINED) ITS CONSENSUS ADOPTED ON 28 FEBRUARY 1974 (S/11229),

1. TAKES NOTE WITH APPRECIATION (UNDERLINED) OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT, WHICH WAS CIRCULATED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 20 MAY 1974 (S/11291)..

2. WELCOMES (UNDERLINED) THE REPORTED DETERMINATION ON THE PART OF IRAN AND IRAQ TO DE-ESCALATE THE PREVAILING SITUATION AND TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE FACT THAT BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE AGREED THROUGH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, WHO WAS ACTING IN THE EXERCISE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S GOOD OFFICES, TO THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) A STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE 7 MARCH 1974 CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT.,

(B) PROMPT AND SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF CONCENTRATIONS OF ARMED FORCES ALONG THE ENTIRE BORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN ARRANGEMENT TO BE AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES.,

(C) THE CREATION OF A FAVOURABLE ATMOSPHERE CONDUCTIVE TO ACHIEVING THE PURPOSE STATED IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH, BY REFRAINING TOTALLY FROM ANY HOSTILE ACTIONS AGAINST EACH OTHER.,

.../2

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

162

2 - O.UN130 MAL10

(D) AN EARLY RESUMPTION, WITHOUT ANY PRECONDITIONS, AT THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL AND PLACE, OF CONVERSATIONS WITH A VIEW TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF ALL BILATERAL ISSUES.,

3. EXPRESSES THE HOPE (UNDERLINED) THAT THE PARTIES WILL TAKE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT REACHED.,

4. INVITES (UNDERLINED) THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO LEND WHAT EVER ASSISTANCE MAY BE REQUESTED BY BOTH COUNTRIES IN CONNEXION WITH THE SAID AGREEMENT.

ENDS.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PM AND C
PMS

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

ACTION: UNIA/WAME

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO STE FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA) NA FAS(PW) PC
ECSA FAS(DEF) DP IC FAS(IO) DGA ICR FAS(MS)

BELGRADE JAKARTA LONDON MOSCOW OTTAWA RANGOON WASHINGTON

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

O.UN93 JL8
TOR 1105 17.5.74

O.UN93 1945 16.5.74 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/800

RP.
PP DACCA/04 NEW DELHI/20 ISLAMABAD/02
PP PEKING/02

FM. NEW YORK UN /

C O N F I D E N T I A L

BANGLADESH : UN MEMBERSHIP

YOUR 824

SINCE DESPATCH OF MY 787 WE FIND OURSELVES IN AN INCREASINGLY FLUID SITUATION IN WHICH WE SHALL NEED THE TACTICAL DISCRETION CONFIRMED IN YOUR TELEGRAM, FOR WHICH I AM GRATEFUL.

2. THE SECURITY COUNCIL FINDS ITSELF AS OF NOW WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF FOUR COMPETING DEMANDS ON ITS TIME THROUGHOUT THE REST OF THIS MONTH - AS FOLLOWS:

(A) RENEWAL OF UNFICYP MANDATE (UNDERLINED): THIS IS ALREADY FORMALLY SCHEDULED FOR 29 MAY AND SHOULD NOT OCCUPY MORE THAN ONE MEETING (SEE MY 792).

(B) MIDDLE EAST (UNDERLINED): SINCE YESTERDAY'S MA'ALOT MASSACRE EVERYONE HERE HAS BEEN WAITING FOR THE INEVITABLE ISRAELI RETALIATION, WHICH ACCORDING TO LATEST NEWS REPORTS HAS RESULTED IN SOME 80 DEAD AND 300 INJURED FOLLOWING AIR RAIDS ON NEIGHBOURING PALESTINE GUERRILLA VILLAGES IN LEBANON. THOUGH THE LEBANESE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE HAS TOLD ME THIS AFTERNOON THAT THERE IS STILL NO INSTRUCTION FROM BEIRUT TO REQUEST A COUNCIL MEETING (AND HE HOPES PRIVATELY THAT NONE WILL COME SINCE HE DOES NOT BELIEVE IT WILL ACHIEVE ANYTHING), IT HAS TO BE EXPECTED THAT THE COUNCIL MAY FIND ITSELF BEGINNING A DIFFICULT EXERCISE, POSSIBLY OVER THE COMING WEEKEND.

(C) IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE (UNDERLINED): THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVE (CORRUPT GROUP. REPEAT REQUESTED.) HAS BEEN RECEIVED AND WILL PROBABLY BE PUBLISHED TOMORROW 17 MAY. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT ALTHOUGH BOTH PARTIES WERE REASONABLY SATISFIED WITH IT, THEY HAD DIFFERING VIEWS ABOUT HOW THE COUNCIL SHOULD DEAL WITH IT, AND MIGHT WANT IT TO BE CONSIDERED URGENTLY. HOVEYDA HAS ASKED TO

..2

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

2 - O.UN93

SEE ME TOMORROW. MEANWHILE, EL-SHIBIB HAS TOLD ME THIS AFTERNOON THAT THEY ARE STILL TRYING TO REACH AN AGREEMENT THAT COULD BE ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS. IN ANY EVENT IT LOOKS AS IF THIS MATTER COULD WITH LUCK BE POSTPONED UNTIL LATE JUNE.

(D) THIS LEAVES THE BANGLADESH (UNDERLINE ONE) APPLICATION FOR UN MEMBERSHIP. YESTERDAY BANGLADESH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE KARIM WROTE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ASKING THAT THE APPLICATION OF 8 AUGUST 1972 BE REVIVED. AMBASSADORS HOSSAIN ALI (FROM WASHINGTON) AND KARIM CALLED ON ME THIS MORNING AND PRESSED HARD FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION AND RECOMMENDATION BEFORE THE END OF MAY. THEY SAID THEY WERE PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO HAVE THIS DONE UNDER THE PRESIDENCY OF KENYA, A COMMONWEALTH MEMBER AND A CLOSE NON-ALIGNED FRIEND. WHEN I SPOKE ABOUT SHORTAGE OF TIME AND THE DESIRABILITY OF MEETING PAKISTANI AND CHINESE WISHES FOR DELAY UNTIL THEY COULD ACCORD THEIR FULL ACCOLADE, THE BANGALESE IMMEDIATELY SUSPECTED PAKISTANI-CHINESE COLLUSION IN AN ATTEMPT TO EXTRACT SOME FURTHER BILATERAL CONCESSION FROM BANGLADESH. THEY BOTH URGED THAT PAKISTAN'S RESERVATIONS SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. PAKISTAN WOULD HAVE PLENTY OF TIME TO PREPARE ITSELF TO WELCOME BANGLADESH'S FORMAL ADMISSION BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. AS FOR THE CHINESE, WHO WERE APPARENTLY SAYING THEY WERE STILL WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, HOSSAIN AND KARIM WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT IF NECESSARY THE PROSPECT OF CHINESE NON-PARTICIPATION IN THE VOTE IN THE INTEREST OF GETTING A DECISION BEFORE THE END OF MAY. THEY EXPRESSED REPEATEDLY THEIR FEARS LEST DELAY MIGHT CONFRONT BANGLADESH WITH FURTHER PRESSURES AND PROBLEMS.

3. IF THE COUNCIL SHOULD BE CONFRONTED WITH ANOTHER DIFFICULT DEBATE OVER MALOT THE COUNCIL'S CALENDAR FOR THE REST OF MAY COULD WELL HAVE TO BE REARRANGED. BUT IF THIS DOES NOT HAPPEN IT IS POSSIBLE TO ENVISAGE A SCENARIO WHICH COULD ACCOMMODATE BOTH BANGLADESH AND PAKISTAN/CHINA. THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT (AMBASSADOR MAINA OF KENYA), WHO ON FIRST MEETING SEEMS ROBUST AND UNFLAPPABLE, HAS ARRANGED INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS FOR TOMORROW MORNING. SECRETARIAT OFFICIALS HOPE THAT AS A RESULT HE WILL AGREE TO REFER THE BANGLADESH APPLICATION TO THE COMMITTEE ON ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS WITHOUT A PRIOR COUNCIL MEETING. THIS WOULD ENABLE THE CHINESE TO EXPLAIN THEIR POSITION IN PRIVATE. IF THEY SHOULD INSIST ON DELAYING A DECISION BY THE COUNCIL, FURTHER ACTION MIGHT HAVE TO BE HELD OVER UNTIL LATE JUNE. IF ON THE OTHER HAND THEY ARE PREPARED TO LET THE MATTER GO FORWARD TO THE COUNCIL, THERE COULD STILL BE TIME FOR A COUNCIL DECISION AND RECOMMENDATION BEFORE THE END OF MAY. THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF DOES NOT ATTACH MUCH WEIGHT TO PAKISTAN'S REASONS FOR REQUESTING DELAY, NOR ON PRESENT INDICATIONS WILL MOST OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS.

4. I SHALL KEEP YOU INFORMED AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPS.
...MCINTYRE

..3

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

3 - 0,UN93

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PM AND C
PM'S

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: UNIA/WAME

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO STE FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA) NA
FAS(PW) PC ECSA FAS(DEF) DP IC DGA ICR FAS(IO) FAS(MS)

BELGRADE JAKARTA LONDON MOSCOW OTTAWA RANGOON WASHINGTON

158

173/11/31

7. Border Clashes with Iran

The simmering border issue which flared up in January continued during February and March but has eased off (as of end of March). Iraq submitted a complaint to the Security Council on Iran provocations and attacks and requested that a special representative elected by Kurt Waldheim be sent to investigate the Iran/Iraq border dispute and report his findings to the Security Council as soon as possible. It now remains for both parties to agree to the provisions which will delineate the boundaries of their respective territories.

RESTRICTED

Berit Lynn " (IRAQ)
13/4/74

→ North Africa - Middle East Section
(Orig. on 907/10/8)
Jm Pul. 14/3

CABLE ADDRESS
AUSTUNAT, NEW YORK

TELEPHONE
212-421-6910

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

173/11/31

156

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
885 SECOND AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

7 March 1974

Memo No: 494/74

File No: 152/1

De Gier
de Gier
Fj

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA,
A.C.T.

Security Council: Iran/Iraq Dispute

The Council considered the Iraqi complaint of aggression by Iran over three meetings on 15, 20 and 28 February, the request for Council action having been unceremoniously thrust on the President at a luncheon for Council members on 12 February.

2. The Council had before it document S/11216 containing the Iraqi request for a meeting and the substance of the Iraqi allegations, and document S/11218 containing a note forwarded by Iran to Iraq concerning Iran's charges of aggression by Iraq. The substance of these two documents formed the basis of statements by the representatives of the two countries at the first meeting of the Council on 15 February.

3. The positions of the two sides as presented in those statements was briefly as follows. The Iraqi representative (Mr Talib El-Shibib, former Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations) complained of a series of Iranian incursions on Iraqi territory beginning on 10 December 1973 and culminating in an early morning attack on 10 February by Iranian armoured units against Iraqi border posts at Al-Daraji and Al-Suder. He then proceeded to trace the history of the present border with Iran from its origin in the Constantinople Protocol of 1913, through the changes ratified by both parties in the 1937 bilateral boundary agreement and to the subsequent and, as Iraq would have it, illegal abrogation of that agreement by Iran in 1969. Then followed a lengthy quotations from the 21 May 1973 issue of Newsweek magazine detailing Iran's armament program, which El-Shibib used in support of his contention that Iraq was confronted by an ambitious, expansionist and expensively armed war machine aspiring to play the part of a super-power. The problem has proved itself insoluble, El-Shibib said, for two reasons: first, Iran's refusal to renounce its territorial claims against Iraq and second, Iraq's determined refusal to cede any part of its territory to the Iranian intruders.

4. In his statement Ambassador Hoveyda, Iran's Permanent Representative to the United Nations (and, incidentally, the younger brother of the Iranian Prime Minister) largely avoided history and concentrated on the Iranian version of the incidents along the border. This consisted of a catalogue of alleged Iraqi attacks on Iranian frontier posts and frontier guards beginning on 15 December and ending with a major attack on 10 February. Iraq, said Hoveyda,

CONFIDENTIAL

.../2

left behind on Iranian soil 14 dead and much ammunition and weaponry, which must constitute irrefutable proof of violation of Iranian territory. Hoveyda argued that Iraqi territorial incursions were but one aspect of a wider Iraqi policy whose basic aim was the subversion and overthrow of the Iranian Government. But Iran, he said, did not want confrontation and invited Iraq to avail itself of the newly opened diplomatic channel between them to negotiate directly on the questions at issue.

5. Members of the Council studiously avoided any comment on the merits of the cases presented by the two parties. All except Iraq found themselves in much the same situation as Australia in that they had developing or established relations with both countries which they had no wish to impair by taking sides. American intelligence reports apparently favoured the Iranian interpretation of the events on and leading up to 10 February, but the United States Mission kept this information pretty much to itself and maintained a low posture throughout the Council's deliberations. The Soviets similarly were seen but not heard, and the Chinese, obviously with an eye to the possible parallel that might be drawn for the solution of problems on its own borders, maintained from the outset the attitude that the dispute was a matter for the two countries themselves to resolve, without Security Council interference. It was evident, from the initial informal consultations held by the President after receiving the Iraqi request, that members agreed with reluctance to having the dispute brought before the Council.

6. Both El-Shibib and Hoveyda made known their views on what action they expected of the Council in a series of meetings with individual members prior to and immediately following the first Council meeting. Thus on the morning of 15 February El-Shibib told the Ambassador (record of conversation attached) that a simple appeal to both parties to resolve their dispute bilaterally would not be acceptable to Iraq. Iraq realised that it could not get a condemnation of Iran from the Council, but what it wanted was a call for the withdrawal of forces, an appeal for the renunciation of force, a request that both parties strictly respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and an appeal to them to abide by their obligations arising from international agreements (which would constitute a thinly veiled call on Iran to reaffirm support for the 1937 border agreement with Iraq). El-Shibib also indicated that Iraq wanted a fact-finding mission despatched to the area, either a special envoy of the Secretary-General or a group comprising members of the Security Council.

7. In a meeting with Sir Laurence on 19 February (record of conversation attached) Ambassador Hoveyda indicated that Iran too could accept a fact-finding mission provided this was a decision of all Council members; but on no condition could Iran agree to accept any resolution. (An Iraqi resolution incorporating the points El-Shibib had made to the Ambassador had surfaced the same day in a meeting El-Shibib had held with non-aligned members of the Council).

8. The battle lines were thus largely drawn: Iraq urging the adoption of a comprehensive resolution; Iran, maintaining that if the Council was required to take some action, which Iran doubted, it should be in the form of a simple and straightforward consensus. Both sides put Council members on notice that failure to support their respective positions would have a bearing on their bilateral relations. It quickly became evident to the Iraqis, however, that sentiment in the Council was running against a resolution and that the best they

.../3

CONFIDENTIAL

154

13. generally respected around the United Nations. The draft could achieve would be a consensus incorporating some if not all of the points in their draft resolution (see record of conversation between the Ambassador and Adnan Raouf of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry on 20 February). Iran on the other hand was faced with the prospect of a consensus with a little more bite to it than Hoveyda was at that stage willing to entertain.

9. A further meeting of the Council was held on 20 February at which the recognisable small-part players in the Persian Gulf theatre, Democratic Yemen and the United Arab Emirates acted out their lines in support of Iraq or of their own claims against Iran, with Libya joining in for good measure, no doubt at the prompting of Iraq. Some of the language was vituperative and provoked Hoveyda, in Iran's defence, into an acrimonious exchange involving numerous rights of reply. As at the previous meeting no members of the Council spoke, apart from Iraq.

10. On the following day the President circulated a draft consensus statement based largely on the preamble and operative paragraphs of the Iraqi draft resolution. As such it was totally unacceptable to the Iranians, who professed to be surprised and angered by what they regarded as blatant French support for the Iraqi position. Nevertheless, the French action paved the way for further drafting and negotiation, with the French themselves, by this time irritated by the Iranian reaction, looking to other Council members for help.

11. Since none of the permanent members were showing any disposition to offer suggestions, and in order to try to break a threatened impasse, we tried our hand at a draft consensus and gave it to the President on the afternoon of 22 February. On the following day (Saturday 23 February) we amended our draft following a further call by Hoveyda on the Ambassador and we put this into the President's hand on Monday, 25 February, and authorised him to make any use of it he saw fit. Our draft sought to tidy up the language of the President's own draft and to find a formula which would overcome Iranian objections to the specific French references to Chapter VI of the Charter and to the duties of states to fulfil their obligations deriving from international agreements.

12. On the afternoon of 25 February the non-permanent members of the Council met together on the initiative of Indonesian Ambassador Sani, took as a basis those portions of the President's draft which both sides were said to accept, worked out a new draft and deputed Indonesia, Byelorussia and Australia to sell it to the two parties. By this time our own draft had had some catalytic effect; the United Kingdom Ambassador, for example, had been in to bat for it with both El-Shibib and Hoveyda and had reported to the President that it had seemed to narrow the gap between the two sides. As a result the three deputies acting for the non-permanent members were able, through some blending of the French and our own drafts, to move the two parties towards substantial agreement on a common formulation. It was left to the President to iron out remaining minor difference, which he succeeded in doing despite various last-minute objections. The finally agreed statement was read by the President and accepted by the Council, to the apparent satisfaction of both sides, at a short meeting on 28 February.

13. The negotiations preceding the final agreement were frustrating rather than difficult. Ambassador Hoveyda, whose competence is

CONFIDENTIAL

.../4

generally respected around the United Nations, complicated matters by seeming to agree with a textual amendment on one day only to reject it on the next. Other Council members as well as the President were bothered by his tendency towards arrogance and occasional petulance. The Iraqis by contrast gave at least the appearance of greater flexibility.

14. We have referred above to some of the points of difficulty between the two sides, e.g. the references to Charter principles and to the obligations of states to abide by their obligations arising out of international treaties. These were eventually resolved by adopting wording, (paragraph 2 of the consensus) based largely on our own draft which made a general reference to Charter principles and referred obliquely to obligations arising out of international treaties by reaffirming the duty of all states to fulfil their obligations under international law. The subsequent reference to the Declaration on Friendly Relations Between States was added at the request of Iran, and readily accepted by Iraq.

15. The other main point of disagreement arose over how to describe recent happenings on the border - as "incidents", or "events", or "the situation"? The Iraqis wanted to widen the implications of the consensus, and thus the scope of the special representative's investigation, to include the historical root causes of disagreement over the entire border, including the Shatt-el-Arab, and they accordingly preferred "the situation". The Iranians wanted to narrow all implications, and thus to restrict all references to "the recent incidents". After strong persuasion both settled for "the events referred to in the Iraqi complaint" (consensus paragraph 2).

16. A last-minute hitch arose over paragraph 6 of the consensus, included at the insistence of the Chinese and spelling out China's dissociation from the Council's action - in contrast to previous occasions (e.g. during last October) when Ambassador Huang Hua merely dissociated China without comment. This threatened to create difficulty for Iraq, but El-Shibib was eventually persuaded to accept it.

17. Finally, a fear that the Soviet Union would insist that the selection of the special envoy by the Secretary-General should be made "with the agreement of" or at least "in consultation with" the President of the Council proved unfounded. At the informal meeting of members prior to the final session of the Council, Ambassador Malik indicated that although the USSR would have preferred a reference along these lines - as there had been in the earlier drafts - he was not going to press for its inclusion.

18. Though both sides have undertaken to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General's special representative, his terms of reference have been left vague and it is not easy to see what he can do apart from trying to produce a factual report on what happened in the border area concerned between 10 December and 10 February last. Perhaps his value may lie in El-Shibib's comments to us that there is a need to show that the Council, and through it the United Nations, is taking some action and that this in itself contributes to a lessening of tension. Meanwhile, the Secretary-General has only just returned from his safari through Africa and has yet to make the appointment. When the idea was first mooted he is said to have had in mind his representative in Dacca, M. Lacoste, but more recently the name of Sir Robert Jackson has been bandied about by the Secretariat.

.../5

CONFIDENTIAL

J.B. Campbell

Record of Conversation with Mr Adnan Raouf of Iraq

on 20 February 1974

CONFIDENTIAL

152

19. We are sending copies of this memorandum to Teheran, Beirut, of
Officers Washington and London.
Australia to the United Nations
J.B. Campbell, First Secretary, Australian Mission
to the United Nations

MAIN SUBJECT (S)

Dispute between Iran and J. B. Campbell
First Secretary

Documents

- S/11229 1. Amb Consensus statement request, met with the
Ambassador and gave him the attached draft resolution.
- S/PV.1762 2. } Provisional verbatim records of the
S/PV.1763 } meetings on 15, 20 and 28 February
S/PV.1963 } respectively.
3. Ambassador Raouf said that the draft resolution had been
given to the non-aligned yesterday. Iraq had pointed out that
had tried to make it as unbiased and balanced as possible. In
their view it was a very history draft which contained no con-
demnatory paragraphs. He explained that the fifth paragraph
had originally read: "deeply concerned over the
incursions of the Iranian forces into Iraqi territory", but
as a result of the meeting with the non-aligned had been changed
to: "deeply concerned over recent incidents along the Iraqi/
Iranian border".
4. Ambassador Raouf said that the non-aligned members of the
Council were also like to avoid a resolution and claimed that
Iraq itself was not insisting on what form Council action should
take. Iraq was prepared to agree to a consensus if it incor-
porated the points in the Iraqi draft resolution. He said,
however, as the resolution had only just been circulated among
members, until members had received instructions from their
governments, it was too early to talk about a possible consensus.
5. Ambassador Raouf said that the draft resolution did
appear, on first glance, to be balanced but said that in the
end Iraq would probably be faced with a consensus incorporating
most of the points in the draft. A resolution he thought would
probably obtain a less than satisfactory result. Australia
wanted to avoid being put in the position of taking any action
which would affect its developing relations with either country.
6. Ambassador Raouf said that it was not Iraq's intention
to embarrass anybody and he fully understood the Australian
Government's position.

CONFIDENTIAL

Distribution:

Distribution

Following Posts:

Report prepared by

Report prepared by

J.B. Campbell

Record of Conversation with Mr Adnan Raouf of Iraq

151

on 20 February 1974

Officers present

Sir Laurence McIntyre, Permanent Representative of
Australia to the United Nations
J.B. Campbell, First Secretary, Australian Mission
to the United Nations

MAIN SUBJECT (S)

Dispute between Iran and Iraq

1. Ambassador Raouf, at his request, met with the Ambassador and gave him the attached draft resolution.
2. Sir Laurence indicated that he did not know what his government's position would be, but said that it had hoped to avoid a resolution coming before the Council. He wondered what results Ambassador Raouf had from the soundings he had made for it seemed to Ambassador McIntyre that there was a general preference among Council members to avoid a resolution.
3. Ambassador Raouf said that the draft resolution had been given to the non-aligned yesterday. Iraq had pointed out that they had tried to make it as unbiased and balanced as possible. In their view it was a conciliatory draft which contained no condemnatory paragraphs. He explained that the fifth preambular paragraph had originally read: "deeply concerned over the incursions of the Iranian forces into Iraqi territory", but as a result of the meeting with the non-aligned had been changed to: "deeply concerned over recent incidents among the Iraqi/Iranian border".
4. Ambassador Raouf said that the non-aligned members of the Council would also like to avoid a resolution and claimed that Iraq itself was not insisting on what form Council action should take. Iraq was prepared to agree to a consensus if it incorporated the points in the Iraqi draft resolution. He said, however, as the resolution had only just been circulated among members, until members had received instructions from their governments, it was too early to talk about a possible consensus.
5. Ambassador McIntyre said that the draft resolution did appear, on first reading, to be balanced but said that in the end Iraq would probably be faced with a consensus incorporating most of the points in the draft. A resolution he thought would probably obtain a less than satisfactory result. Australia wanted to avoid being put in the position of taking any action which would effect its developing relations with either country.
6. Ambassador Raouf said that it was not Iraq's intention to embarrass anybody and he fully understood the Australian Government's position.

Distribution:

Distribution:

position of Iraq.

Following Posts:

Report prepared by

Report prepared by

J.B. Campbell

The Security Council

- Having Considered the agenda contained in document S/Agenda/....
2. Having noted the contents of documents S/11216, and S/11218
3. Having heard the statements made by the representatives of Iraq and Iran
4. Recalling the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations contained in the General Assembly Resolution 2625(XXI) of 24 October, 1970,
5. Deeply Concerned over *recent incidents along the Iraqi-Iranian borders,* ~~the incursions of the Iranian forces into Iraqi territory,~~
6. Affirming the sanctity of valid and duly ratified treaties and the duty of every State to fulfill the obligations emanating from international agreements and specially treaties delimiting boundaries of States,
1. Regrets the loss of life.
 2. Calls upon the two parties to cease forthwith all military operations and to withdraw their forces in strict respect to their sovereignty and territorial integrity.
 3. Calls upon both parties to fulfill their obligations under the provisions of the Charter and the relevant international agreements.
 4. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint a special representative to investigate the Iraqi-Iranian dispute and to report on the results of the investigation as soon as possible but not later than one month from the date of the adoption of this resolution.

Distribution:

position of Iraq.

Report prepared by

J.B. Campbell

Following Posts:

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

149

Record of Conversation with H.E. Mr. Talib El-Shibib, Senior Adviser, Permanent Mission of Iraq to the U.N.
on 15 February 1974

Officers present

Sir Laurence McIntyre, Permanent Representative;
J.B. Campbell, First Secretary, Australian Mission
to the U.N.; Mr. W. Zahawie, Deputy Permanent
Representative of Iraq to the U.N.

MAIN SUBJECT (S)

Dispute between Iraq and Iran

Ambassador Shibib had requested to see the Ambassador to outline the Iraqi position on the dispute between Iraq and Iran currently before the Security Council. Ambassador Shibib began by tracing the history of the present border between Iraq and Iran from its origins in the Constantinople Protocol of 1913, through the 1934 dispute which went before the League of Nations, to the 1937 bilateral Border Agreement (in which Iraq ceded some 7 kilometres of water on the Shatt-al-Arab) and finally to the unilateral abrogation of that agreement by Iran in 1969.

2. Ambassador Shibib claimed that Iran in 1969, not satisfied with the waterway it obtained in 1937, now had revised its claims. Attempts by Turkey, Jordan and other Arabs to mediate between the two countries in recent years had failed. During that period Iran had built guard posts on the border and had frequently encroached on Iraqi territory. This had provoked many incidents but the Iraqis had remained patient.

3. The most recent incident was sparked by Iranian cartographers who with military escort, had encroached on Iraqi territory on 10 December. Iraq had pushed the intruders back into Iran but the latter had launched subsequent attacks on Iraqi border posts in two major incidents on 4 and 10 February. These attacks had involved Iranian infantry and tanks. Ambassador Shibib claimed that in order to expel the Iranians they would need to retaliate in kind with tanks and aircraft but they were reluctant to escalate the dispute in this way. As a result they had turned to the Security Council as a party which had suffered from aggression. Iraq realised that it could not get a condemnation of Iran from the Council but what it wanted was a call for the withdrawal of forces, an appeal for the non-use of force and a request that both parties strictly respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other.

4. Ambassador Shibib said that Iraq also wanted a fact-finding mission, either a special envoy of the Secretary-General or members of the Security Council. This would provide a breathing spell which would allow tensions to subside. He warned that if the Council did nothing and simply appealed to both parties to resolve the issue this would give Iraq a licence for war and there would almost certainly be a fight.

5. The Ambassador said that the Australian Government, mindful of its developing relations with both parties to the dispute, was anxious to find a solution that would be acceptable to both Iraq and Iran. He thanked the Ambassador for his explanation of the position of Iraq.

Distribution:

Report prepared by

Following Posts:

J.B. Campbell

148
AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Record of Conversation with H.E. M. Fereydoun Hoveyda, Permanent Representative
of Iran to the United Nations
on 19 February 1974

Officers present Sir Laurence McIntyre, Permanent Representative
of Australia to the United Nations
J.B. Campbell, First Secretary, Australian Mission
to the United Nations

MAIN SUBJECT (S) Dispute between Iraq and Iran

Ambassador Hoveyda called at his request. He began by saying that the latest information available to the Iranian Government provided proof that the Iraqis had started the incident on 10 February. The Iranian Embassy in Baghdad had reported that films of the incident were shown on Iraqi television the day after it had occurred indicating that the television team knew beforehand when the action would take place.

2. The Ambassador said that it was not clear to him or his government why Iraq should mount such an outrageous orchestrated campaign against Iran. He could only speculate that the incident was designed to divert public attention in Iraq away from the country's internal economic problems.

3. Concerning the incident itself Ambassador Hoveyda said that during the meeting of the Security Council last week frontier guards of both sides had met and Iraqi dead, numbering 29 in all, (two officers and 27 privates) were returned. The Iraqis took the bodies but would not sign any verbatim record of the meetings that were held to arrange the hand over. The Ambassador emphasized that all the Iraqi dead were on Iranian territory and that there were no Iranian dead found on Iraqi territory. This was further proof of who had begun the incident.

4. Ambassador Hoveyda said that he had instructions from Teheran to inform Council members that Iran could not accept any resolution of the Security Council. It could accept, however, the formation and despatch of a fact-finding mission, whether of Council members or a special envoy from the Secretary-General, providing that this was a decision reached by consensus by all Council members. Ambassador Hoveyda said that Iran was hoping that Australia, as a friendly country, would insist on a consensus. If this did not prove possible and a resolution was brought to the vote Iran would expect Australia to abstain. Ambassador Hoveyda said that Australia's actions in this regard would have a bearing on Australia's bilateral relations with Iran.

5. Sir Laurence said that from what he knew of the attitude of other members of the Council a resolution seemed unlikely. Ambassador Hoveyda broke in to say that Iraq was still insisting on a resolution but he pointed out that they could not get a unanimous result. Although they were likely to get nine votes in favour, there would be six abstentions (Ambassador Hoveyda did not say which countries would

.../2

Distribution:

Report prepared by

Following Posts:

abstain). He said Iran might reconsider its willingness to accept a fact-finding mission if a resolution was brought before the Council.

6. In answer to a question from Sir Laurence, Ambassador Hoveyda said that Iran abrogated the 1937 agreement with Iraq because of Iraq's failure to enter into a convention, as called for by the agreement, which would establish a joint commission to organise the administration of the waterway. Ambassador Hoveyda went to some lengths to emphasise the overtures Iran had made at senior Ministerial level to Iraq to come to some agreement on the disputed border between them. The act of abrogation of the treaty had followed an Iraqi ultimatum in 1969, that if Iranian ships continued to navigate on the Shatt-al-Arab flying Iranian flags the Iraqis would have no alternative but to take the flags down by force. Iran could not accept this threat and renounced the treaty. As the situation therefore stood at the moment Iraq insists that the 1937 agreement exists and, Iran insists that it does not. In these circumstances the only alternative is for the disputing parties to meet together and conclude a technical convention on navigation rights on the waterway and then to set up a joint commission to look at the rest of the border.

7. The Iranian Ambassador went on to say that Iraq was not a problem for Iran, it was more "a running sore". If Iran wanted to take Iraq it could occupy Baghdad in a matter of hours. He said few other Arabs would support Iraq who openly opposed present regimes in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman.

8. Ambassador Hoveyda wondered what the fact-finding mission could come up with. What could they put in their report? In Hoveyda's view the only logical conclusion to a fact-finding mission could draw would be that the two parties concerned should get together and negotiate. Sir Laurence said he too had questioned the Iraqis on what a fact-finding mission could usefully do.

9. In conclusion Ambassador Hoveyda asked Sir Laurence to impress on other members of the Council that any Council action should be designed to de-escalate the issue and that this would not be achieved if a resolution was brought forward. He claimed that his government's willingness to accept a fact-finding mission showed that it had nothing to hide and represented a conciliatory gesture on the part of his government. He invited members of the Council to tell him if there was any other action the Iranian Government should be considering, he was fully prepared to report members' views and advice to Teheran.

Report prepared by : J.B. Campbell

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



173/11/31
173/11/31

173/11/31
S

145

Distr.
GENERAL

S/11233
12 March 1974

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 12 MARCH 1974 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ
ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions of my Government, and with reference to the two letters dated 6 March 1974, addressed to you by the Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations and circulated on the same date as documents S/11230 and S/11231, I have the honour to bring the following to your attention for the information of the members of the Security Council.

1. On 3 March, from 0800 hours Baghdad local time and until the morning of 4 March, and again at 1700 hours Baghdad time on the same day, Iranian forces opened concentrated fire with heavy and medium artillery and mortar against Iraqi border forces in the region of Zain Alqaws and the areas surrounding the Iraqi border post of Muhammed Khedher. On 5 March, at 0200 hours Baghdad time, the Iranian forces opened fire again on the Iraqi border forces in the areas referred to above. Against these premeditated acts of Iranian aggression, which resulted in the death of three Iraqi soldiers and in the wounding of one officer and eleven other soldiers, the Iraqi forces had no alternative but to return the fire in defence of the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Iraq.

2. On 6 March, at 2000 local time, an Iranian military force composed of a commando unit and two army companies supported by tanks and mechanized units launched an armed attack aimed at occupying border heights lying within the territory of the Republic of Iraq, again in the same Iraqi areas of Zain Alqaws and Muhammed Khedher border post, hence violating Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Iranian medium-range artillery and mortar units opened heavy fire to pave the way and support this armed attack, which lasted for two-and-a-half hours. This act of aggression resulted in the death of four Iraqi soldiers and in the wounding of seven others.

3. These premeditated acts of intrusion and aggression indicate a clear determination on the part of Iran to violate the sovereignty of Iraq and its territorial integrity. Accordingly, the Iraqi forces, in self-defence, repulsed these attacks.

The latest Iranian acts of aggression confirm the fact, already stated by Iraq before the Council, that Iraq's complaint was not related to isolated border incidents but was, rather, the result of a continuous Iranian policy of encroachment and aggression.

74-06242

/...

It is obvious that since Iran unilaterally abrogated the Boundary Treaty of 1937 which confirmed the delimitation of the frontiers, the Iranian Government has tried to challenge the existence of the historically and legally established boundary and to put forth new claims by the use of force. Iran is following this policy of encroachment all along the frontier.

As to the allegations contained in the letter of the Permanent Representative of Iran against Iraq, it is not surprising that his Government should pretend to find the whole situation incomprehensible, since its allegations against Iraq make no sense and are baseless. The Permanent Representative of Iran knows full well that it was Iraq which brought the complaint before the Security Council and it was Iraq which requested the Council to take action on the border complaint.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Talib EL-SHIBIB
Representative of Iraq
on the Security Council

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

173/11/31

144

KASG

I.41253

FROM

TOD 21.3.74...1753 LT

AUSIRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

TOR 22.3.74...0840 LT

387 UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 387 REPEATED BEIRUT 26 TEHERAN M177

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE

OUR 322.

SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS NOW ANNOUNCED APPOINTMENT OF LUIS
WECKNANN-MUNOZ AS HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE "TO CONDUCT AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE EVENTS THAT HAVE GIVEN RISE TO THE COMPLAINT
BY IRAQ CONCERNING INCIDENTS ON ITS FRONTIER WITH IRAN".

MCINTYRE

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PM'S

ACTION: UNIA

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO MR BODY STE FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA) NA WAME
FS(PW) PC EGSA DP IC MR LOVEDAY ICR FAS(IO) EP UNIA FAS(CL) LT
FAS(MS)

BELGRADE CAIRO HONG KONG JAKARTA LIMA LONDON MOSCOW NAIROBI NEW DELHI
PARIS PEKING TEL AVIV VIENNA WASHINGTON WELLINGTON

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

S/11229
28 February 1974

ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH



173/11/31
RAPORTE M3

Debut
de Groux

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

At its 1764th meeting held on 28 February 1974, the Security Council resumed its consideration of the complaint by Iraq concerning incidents on its frontier with Iran (S/11216). At this meeting the President of the Security Council read the following text representing the agreement of the members of the Council:

1. Following the complaint presented on 12 February 1974 by the representative of Iraq, the Security Council met on 15 February and 20 February. The President of the Security Council has had consultations with all the members of the Council and with the Permanent Representative of Iran. As a result, the President has found that there exists within the Council a consensus in the following terms.
2. The Security Council, having heard the statements of the representatives of Iraq and Iran regarding the events referred to in the complaint by Iraq, believes that it is important to deal with a situation which could endanger peace and stability in the region. It deplores all the loss of human life; it appeals to the parties to refrain from all military action and from any move which might aggravate the situation. The Council reaffirms the fundamental principles set out in the Charter regarding respect for the territorial sovereignty of States and the pacific settlement of disputes and the duty of all States to fulfil their obligations under international law, as well as the principles referred to in the declaration on principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
3. From the information available to the Council, it appears that the cause of the events lies, *inter alia*, in the fact that the legal basis for the delimitation of the boundary between the parties is contested.
4. The Council has noted the recent exchange of ambassadors between the two States and hopes that this could constitute a channel through which problems affecting relations between the parties might be resolved.
5. As additional information is required, the Security Council requests the Secretary-General
 - to appoint as soon as possible a special representative to conduct an investigation of the events that have given rise to the complaint by Iraq and
 - to report within three months.

74-05404

/...

6. The above-mentioned consensus was reached by members of the Council with the exception of China, which dissociates itself from it; the Chinese delegation made the following statement:

"The Chinese delegation hopes that Iran and Iraq will arrive at a fair and reasonable settlement of their boundary dispute through negotiations in accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. Therefore, the Chinese delegation does not favour United Nations involvement in any form in a boundary dispute. In view of this position, the Chinese delegation dissociates itself from the above consensus of the Security Council."

CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIA - TESSY TEHRAN

142

Record of Conversation with Mr Sadiq Sadriah, Director General (Political) Asia/Africa
On Division of the Foreign Ministry AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
10 March 1974 TEHRAN

Officers Present: [illegible] In reply quote No. 221/5/9

Subject: 173/11/31 Class between Iraq and Iran
Prospects for a Middle East Memorandum No. 141

11 March 1974

ENCLOSURES ATTACHED



Mr White began by inviting Mr Sadriah's comments on the renewed border incidents between Iraq and Iran and that it was not understood. This was the more incomprehensible as the Department of Foreign Affairs played a leading role in the Secretary-General's initiative of the Secretary-General to

2. Mr Sadriah observed that it was his belief that the answer was to be found in Iran's Kurdish problem. On 11 March, Kurdish autonomy was granted. Relations between Iraq and Iran. Attached is a Record of Conversation between the Ambassador and the Director General (Political) of the Asia/Africa Division of the Foreign Ministry. Copies of this memorandum and its attachment have been sent to the Embassies at Beirut and Cairo.

3. The recent Ba'ath Party Congress was well aware of these problems and had probably decided that it was necessary. What better solution than border clashes?

(A C Wilson)
First Secretary

4. There was the added element of the Kurdish problem and rumours of plots which bedevilled Iraq, a country which had not yet achieved national unity. The older politicians could not accept that the present leadership was composed of what were, in their opinion, Johnny-come-latelies.

5. Iran was confident that, given the quiet which had been observed over the last two days, the issue would be resolved through the recently re-established diplomatic channel.

6. Turning to the Middle East situation, Mr Sadriah said that since Syria had adopted a hard line in which Gromyko had been successful, Iran supported Syria's claim that the Golan Heights should be evacuated by the Israelis. Iran supported his own political problems and could scarcely adopt any other attitude. The Syrian temperament was different from that of the Egyptians, who were a peace-loving people.

7. In answer to Mr White's question, Sadriah said that, were fighting to break out on the Syrian front, he did not consider that the Egyptians would require fighting on the southern front.

Mr Jackson 15/3
First Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY TEHRAN

CONFIDENTIAL

221/5/9

141

Record of Conversation with Mr Sadiq Sadrieh, Director General (Political) Asia/Africa
On Division of the Foreign Ministry
Officers Present 10 March 1974
Subject: Border Clash between Iraq/Iran
Prospects for a Middle East Settlement

The Ambassador* complete there and Sadat would not wish to sacrifice this gain. As the Egyptian front was however marked by Mrs Moir, a measure of political unity, would Prospects for a Middle East Settlement suffer too unpredictable and "only time will tell".

Mr White began by inviting Mr Sadrieh's comments on the renewed border incidents between Iraq and Iran, observing that it was hard to understand. This was the more incomprehensible as the Security Council debate had concluded with the appointment of a representative of the Secretary-General to visit the area.

2. Mr Sadrieh observed that it was his belief that the answer was to be found in Iraq's Kurdish problems. On 11 March, Kurdish autonomy was to be proclaimed, the result of an agreement reached with Barzani, their leader, some two years ago. But the "autonomy" to be granted was Baghdad's version of the agreement which Barzani did not accept. The greatest point of contention was the definition of the extent of the Kurdish area, with the consequent issues of where the Iraqi army would be stationed and whether the Kurds were to be disarmed. Barzani would never agree to the latter. Equally, if not more, important was the Kurds' claim to Kirkuk and its oilfields, which, of course, Baghdad rejected.

3. The recent Ba'ath Party Congress was well aware of these problems and had probably decided that a diversion was necessary. What better solution than border clashes with Iran?

4. There was the added element of the plots and rumours of plots which bedevilled Iraq, a country which had not yet achieved national unity. The older politicians could not accept that the present leadership was composed of what were, in their opinion, Johnny-come-latelies.

5. Iran was confident that, given the quiet which had been observed over the last two days, the issue would be resolved through the recently re-established diplomatic channel.

6. Turning to the Middle East situation, Mr White asked for Mr Sadrieh's assessment of prospects for a settlement. He thought these were "shaky" since Syria had adopted a hard line in which Gromyko had signified Soviet concurrence. Iran supported Syria's claim that its occupied territories should be evacuated by the Israelis. President Assad had his own political problems and could scarcely afford to adopt any other attitude. The Syrian temperament was very different from that of the Egyptians, who were a peaceful people.

7. In answer to Mr White's question, Sadrieh said that, were fighting to be resumed on the Syrian front, he did not consider that the Egyptians would resume fighting on the southern front.

Prepared by: *A.C. Wilson*
(A C Wilson)
First Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

140

Troop disengagement was now complete there and Sadat would not wish to sacrifice this gain. The northern front was, however, marked by heavy troop concentrations. He did not think that Mrs Meir, although she had now achieved a measure of political unity, would wish an outbreak of hostilities: Israel would suffer too much in the process. The Syrians, however, were unpredictable and "only time will tell".

CONFIDENTIAL

173/11/31 137

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

GMJ3

1.35245

FROM

TOD 11.03.74...1045LT

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO
THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

TOR 12.03.74...0202LT

RESTRICTED

322 RESTRICTED

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 322, REPEATED BEIRUT 25, TEHRAN OP.162

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE (UNDERLINED)

OUR 280, PARA. 5.

AS HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO INVESTIGATE THE RECENT
BOUNDARY DISPUTE WALDHEIM HAS SUBMITTED TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS
THE NAME OF LUIS WICKMAN MUNOZ, MEXICAN AMBASSADOR IN BONN.
WICKMAN WAS AMBASSADOR IN VIENNA WHEN WALDHEIM WAS AUSTRIAN
FOREIGN MINISTER, AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS HAD HIM IN MIND
FOR THE CYPRUS APPOINTMENT IN SUCCESSION TO OSORIO-TAFALL.

2. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE IRAQIS ARE NOT ALTOGETHER HAPPY.,
THEY WOULD PREFER A MORE WIDELY KNOWN AND SPECTACULAR FIGURE.

MCINTYRE.

(

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
J I O
PM'S

ACTION : UNIA/WAME

SEC DEP SECS EX MCO FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA) NA WAME FAS(PW)
PC ECSA FAS(DEF) DP IC MR LOVEDAY ICR FAS(IO) EP UNIA FAS(CD)
FAS(CL) LI FAS(MS)

BELGRADE CAIRO HONG KONG JAKARTA LIMA LONDON MOSCOW NAIROBI
NEW DELHI PARIS PEKING TEL AVIV VIENNA WASHINGTON WELLINGTON

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

173/11/31

135

RESTRICTED

SGL3

I.32136

FROM

TOD 05.03.74...1315LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHERAN

TOR 05.03.74...2153LT

RESTRICTED

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 209
REPEATED AUSTUNAT NEW YORK OP 100 BEIRUT OP 101

IRAN/IRAQ: BORDER DISPUTE

YESTERDAY THERE WERE FURTHER CLASHES, REPORTEDLY HEAVIER THAN THAT ON 30 FEBRUARY, BETWEEN IRANIAN AND IRAQI TROOPS IN THE AREA OF QASR E SHIRIN, THAT IS ABOUT 100 MILES NORTH OF MEHNAH.

2. IRANIANS CLAIM MERELY TO HAVE RETURNED THE IRAQIS' FIRE. ATTACKS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE BEGUN AT 3 AM AND CONTINUED INTERMITTENTLY UNTIL EARLY AFTERNOON. UNLIKE THE PREVIOUS CLASH, IT APPEARS THAT ONLY HEAVY ARTILLARY HAS BEEN ENGAGED.

3. SO FAR THE IRANIANS HAVE PLAYED DOWN THE INCIDENT, POSSIBLY IN THE HOPE THAT PUBLIC FEELING WILL NOT BE ROUSED TO THE EXTENT THAT THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE EXPECTED TO TEACH THE IRAQIS A LESSON (AN EXPRESSION THAT HAS BEEN USED PREVIOUSLY). THIS ASSUMES, OF COURSE, THAT THE IRAQIS FIRED THE FIRST SHOT.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PM'S

RESTRICTED

ACTION WAME

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO MR BODY FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(MWA)
NA WAME FAS(PW) PC ECSA FAS(DEF) DP IC ICR UNIA FAS(IG)
FAS(CL) LT FAS(MS)

Mr. *For Greenham*
1. *R up*
3. *File Iraq/Iran.*

173/11/31

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



*1. Mr. G. G. G. G.
2. E. E. E. E.*

Distr.
GENERAL

S/11224
20 February 1974

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 FEBRUARY 1974 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL

Pursuant to our letter dated 12 February, I have the honour to inform you that since 16 February, Iran has further increased its troop concentration along the frontier. These troops have now been put under full alert. There have been more clashes in the Khanagin area, north of Badra (as shown in the map annexed to this letter). The Iranian authorities are obviously trying to escalate the confrontation. In spite of Iraq's efforts to maintain its self-restraint, it may nevertheless be compelled to take the necessary measures in self-defence and to ensure the respect of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Furthermore, the Iranian authorities have refused to hand over the bodies of the Iraqis killed in action unless the Iraqi authorities agree to accept the Iranian claim that the dead had fallen in Iranian territory.


I would kindly request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Talib EL-SHIBIB
Representative of Iraq on the
Security Council

74-04697

/...

133





RESTRICTED

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHRAN

132

173/11/31

In reply quote No. 221/5/9

Memorandum No. 113

25 February, 1974.

ENCLOSURES ATTACHED

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA.



IRAN/IRAQ

Please refer to our telegram No. 161, paragraph 5.

..... Attached is the text of the statement made by
Tajbakhsh, Under-Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to
the Arab Heads of Mission.

2. Copies of this memorandum, with attachment,
are being sent to the Australian Mission to the United Nations
New York and the Australian Embassy Beirut.

H.D. White
(H.D. White)
Ambassador

Lee JB
the Greenhouse

RESTRICTED

Mo Tamsa 5/3



Unofficial translation

Feb. 13, 1974

Gentlemen,

I am grateful for your presence in this meeting, and I would like to inform you that the reason for us to be here today, is to fully inform the honourable representatives of the Arab Countries at the Imperial Court of the frontier incidence and recent acts of aggressions committed by Iraq.

Of course the modality of the recent border clash and the Iraqi aggression on the frontier of the Iranian Empire have been covered by the press, and you have been accordingly informed of these events through local press and foreign news agencies.

Since it is very likely that this information, particularly the parts reported by the news agencies, may not be in a comprehensive or precise fashion, it was deemed expedient to communicate the details of the fact to you gentlemen, in this session.

The honourable ambassadors of the Arab Countries are well aware of the fact that the Imperial Government of Iran



IMPERIAL MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

130

is constantly seeking to establish good neighbourly relations with all its neighbours including Iraq, and has continually invited that country to resolve the existing differences on the basis of internationally recognized procedures and principles with due respect for the sovereignty of both parties on the basis of fairness and justice.

The Iraqi recommendation in last October, for the resumption of diplomatic relation with Iran was welcomed on this basis by the Imperial Government and it was hoped that a favourable climate, conducive to the settlement of disputes between the two countries, would be created, and thus the clouds of glum and turbidity would not reappear in the horizon of both countries' relationships.

Regretfully, as of that date the actions of the Iraqi Government on various occasions are not attuned whatsoever, to the terms and conditions of the two countries' new relations.

The spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a press conference held on December 4th. 1973, gave an



IMPERIAL MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

29

account of the moves taken by the Iraqi Government, to the public. Therefore, there is no need to repeat them here, again. Thenceforth the Iraqi intrusions and provocations against Iran are being continued, and the recent border clash with Iran is the culmination and climax of their hostilities.

The precedent of this recent border conflict can be traced to approximately two months ago.

In order to facilitate and improve communications between different Iranian frontier posts, a group of topographers from the Plan Organization were dispatched in the latter part of Azar this year (November) to "Mehran" region for the establishment of certain roads along the borderline. This group was confronted with the assembled Iraqi frontier guards and armed elements who had taken entrenched positions.

At three thirty in the afternoon of 24th. Azar 1352, the Iraqi guards positioned in Iraq's "Kani Sakht" post advanced



IMPERIAL MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

128

towards "Kani-Sakht" post in Iran and began shooting, thus laying the cornerstone in their recent intermittent frontier encroachments.

The shooting by the Iraqi intruders, and the confrontations and resistance of the Iranian frontier guards against the forces of the aggressor lasted till 22 hours of the following day and the Iraqis were forced to retreat. At ten o'clock on December 24, 1973, a number of armed Iraqi elements positioned in "Zaloo-Abe" heights launched an attack on Iranian frontier guards who were travelling to "Kani-Sakht" region in Iran. In this incident which lasted till 3 P.M. of the same day, an Iranian frontier guard was shot by the Iraqi assailant in front of "Zaloo-Abe" post in "Mehran".

The Iraqi army, in the meantime, established a large number of soldiers and armoured hardwares in heights facing the Iranian frontier area ready to take offensive action.



IMPERIAL MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

127

At eight o'clock in the morning of December 25, 1973, the Iraqi elements positioned in heights and different points opened fire on the Iranian frontier guards in "Kani-Sakht" region.

The Iraqi aggressors who were armed with "Klashnikov" and "Seminov" machine guns as well as heavy mortars, in the night time had occupied three peaks of the "Zaloo-Abe" mountains overlooking "Reza-Abad" and "Konjan-Cham" Dam frontier posts. However, the Iranian border guards at 12 o'clock the same day (25 December) succeeded to take back the aforesaid occupied heights. In this raid an Iranian frontier guard was fatally wounded.

At eight o'clock in the morning of 26 December, 1973 the Iraqi armed elements positioned around "Dorraji" post in Iraq opened fire on the Iranian frontier guards stationed behind "Zallo-Abe" heights within the Iranian territory. The Iranian guards fired back.

After this incident, the intermittent shooting towards the Iranian frontier guards by armed Iraqi elements



IMPERIAL MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

126

have continued to persist, and in each case they were met with the Iranian resistance and gun fire. The Iraqi border authorities were busy mobilizing their positions and build up of heavy arms in the heights near their border.

The entrenchment operation, fortification and positioning and mobilization of their forces continued for one month.

On the 30th. January 1971, a number of Iranian shepherds grazing their herds on "Koulak" heights were attacked by armed Iraqi elements, and were showered with bullets.

The following day, (31 January 1974) while the Iranian frontier guards were patrolling in the vicinity of the frontier posts in "Mehran" region, the armed Iraqi assailants positioned in heights located in North-west of "Aljabal" post opened machine gun fire on them. The Iranian frontier guards were naturally compelled to do



likewise.

At 10.50 A.M. on Monday February 4th, 1974, the Iranian frontier guards, while taking provisions to frontier posts in "Mehran" region were attacked by a band of armed Iraqi elements using heavy arms and mortars. The assailants intended to trespass upon the Iranian territory. After having made some advances in the Iranian territory the Iranian frontier forces compelled them to pull back.

In this clash which continued till dusk in the following day (February fifth 1974) one Iranian soldier was killed and three others were wounded. The Iraqi aggressors left behind in Iran, one Klashinkov machine-gun, one mortar, four tommy guns, two boxes of hand grenades, two boxes of R. P. G. ammunitions and two telephone units.

Enraged by the defeat and retreat, the Iraqi border guards prepared themselves - at 2 A.M. on Sunday February 10, 1974 - for another attack and began their manoeuvring. At 4.30 A.M. they attacked the Iranian



IMPERIAL MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

124

frontier guards positioned at the Zaloo-Ab- Kami-Sakht heights and the Reza-Abad border post with light and heavy arms and equipment, artillery, tanks and armoured vehicles. They opened fire on the Mehran-Ilam road, bombarding, at the same time, the Jazman base (about 2 kilometers to the South-West of Reza-Abad) and the installations and works at the Konjan Cham Dam. Four Iraqi fighter planes kept violating Iranian air space throughout these operations. Provoked by this dastardly aggression, the most violent of its kind ever launched by the Iraqi frontier authorities in recent years, the Iranian frontier guards counterattacked the aggressors and beat them back.

While this engagement was continuing, the Iranian frontier official at Mehran made a strong protest in writing to his Iraqi counterpart at Badra, seeking to talk with him in order to warn Iraqi frontier officials against the consequences of the aggression. However, the Iraqi frontier official refused to comply.



IMPERIAL MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

123

In the course of the encounter, brought about by the aggression launched by the Iraqi border guards and armed agents against Iranian territory, 42 Iranian guards suffered martyrdom and 80 more were wounded. The Iraqis left behind 14 dead bodies, one rocket-launcher, two Klashnikov and one ordinary machine guns, one colt .38, one gas mask, some equipment and a quantity of ammunitions all of which bear witness to the open invasion on the part of the Iraqi elements against Iranian Territory.

Facts bearing on the said aggression were given in a statement by the Imperial Iranian Army on February 11, 1974. Subsequently the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note of protest to the Iraqi Embassy, pointing out that such aggressions were discordant with the new conditions of relations between the two countries. The Embassy was asked to call the attention of the authorities in Iraq to the disagreeable outcome as well as to the grave consequences of such incidents, and make arrangements for punishment of the aggressors, payment of blood-money in respect of the Iranian martyres, indemnification of damages, and prevention of similar incidents from recurring.



IMPERIAL MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

122

I must mention here that, as far as these intermittent aggressions in the last two months are concerned, the Imperial Embassy in Baghdad has sent three notes to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry; and the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also sent two notes to the Iraqi Embassy in Tehran. However, the Iraqi authorities have so far failed to reply to any of these notes. Indeed it may be said that the aggression has been too undeniable and obvious for them to answer the notes.

The Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs deems it necessary once more to call the attention of the diplomatic missions of the Arab Countries ^{at} ~~with~~ the Imperial Court to the hostility on the part of the Iraqi authorities towards Iran, as manifested in recent aggressions, in contrast to the friendliness of the Imperial Government of Iran. These acts of ~~the~~ aggression have developed to such an extent that Iraqi armed elements choose to raid the Konjan Cham Dam which is a development installation on the border supplying the water requirements of the farmers in the area.



IMPERIAL MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

121

You will agree that with such Iranian installations and works chosen as their targets the border aggressions and invasions assume greater significance.

The Imperial Government of Iran has constantly manifested fortitude and patience in the face of provocations and provocative acts on the part of the Iraqi Government, maintaining that adherence to this policy is in the best interest of the two countries as well as of the region. But there are limits to patience and endurance. Taking this into consideration, we have unequivocally and in plain terms warned the Iraqi authorities that, should they choose once again to invade our territory, the armed forces of Iran will act on the dictates of their national duties and patriotism.

The Iraqi invasion is surprising in the light of the fact that, before it came to pass, conditions tended towards improvement of mutual relations and re-establishment of diplomatic ties, and that a new horizon had opened up in the relationship between the two countries. More surprising still is the fact that the Iraqi authorities sought to make Iranian border guards responsible for bringing the encounter about. What I have already stated to you,



IMPERIAL MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

120

gentlemen, is the real truth of the matter; it is universally known that the Imperial Government of Iran has never intended to violate the territorial integrity of any country. For instance, we have never claimed the territory of Kuwait, neither have we ever attempted furtive shipment of arms to, and secret distribution thereof in other countries, nor have we ever exported subversion.

It is quite in place for me to mention that the Imperial Government of Iran regards the incident merely as a reversible border clash and hopes that aggressions of this nature on the part of the Iraqi Government will not be attempted any more, and that the disputes between the two countries will be settled peacefully.

d
I should like to conclude my statement by informing you that His Imperial Majesty Shahanshah Aryamehr has deigned to receive the new Iraqi Ambassador in audience on Saturday for the latter to present his credentials.



119

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHRAN

In reply quote No. 221/5/9

Memorandum No. 113

25 February, 1974.

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA.

IRAN/IRAQ

Please refer to our telegram No. 161, paragraph 5.

.... Attached is the text of the statement made by
Tajbakhsh, Under-Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to
the Arab Heads of Mission.

2. Copies of this memorandum, with attachment,
are being sent to the Australian Mission to the United Nations
New York and the Australian Embassy Beirut.

(H.D. White)
Ambassador



AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHRAN

118

In reply quote No. 221/5/9

Memorandum No. 100

20 February 1974

The Secretary
Department of Foreign Affairs
CANBERRA

193/11/30

173/11/30



IRAN: RELATIONS WITH IRAQ

Anti-Iraq comment has toned down considerably since the border clash on 11 February. Apart from one lengthy article which explained the alleged Iraqi attack as an attempt to "deal Iran a solid blow" and to establish Iraq as the major military power in the area, most comment has been conciliatory and optimistic. Considerable space has been given to the imminent arrival in Baghdad of the new Iranian Ambassador, Mr Hossein Shahidzade. Most newspapers are predicting that Iraq will withdraw its complaint to the Security Council, and that the dispute will be settled bilaterally.

2. This suggests that some accommodation may have already been reached and that the dispute may soon be temporarily resolved in discussions in Baghdad or Tehran.

Hamilton

(V M Hamilton)
Third Secretary

F. J.

Mr Jackson 28/2




117

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHRANIn reply quote No. 221/5/9
Memorandum No. 100
20 February 1974The Secretary
Department of Foreign Affairs
CANBERRAIRAN: RELATIONS WITH IRAQ

Anti-Iraq comment has toned down considerably since the border clash on 11 February. Apart from one lengthy article which explained the alleged Iraqi attack as an attempt to "deal Iran a solid blow" and to establish Iraq as the major military power in the area, most comment has been conciliatory and optimistic. Considerable space has been given to the imminent arrival in Baghdad of the new Iranian Ambassador, Mr Hossein Shahideade. Most newspapers are predicting that Iraq will withdraw its complaint to the Security Council, and that the dispute will be settled bilaterally.

2. This suggests that some accommodation may have already been reached and that the dispute may soon be temporarily resolved in discussions in Baghdad or Tehran.


(V M Hamilton)
Third Secretary

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

116

APB 12

1.30253

FROM

TOD 28.2.74...1725 LT

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO
UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

TOR 01.3.74...0958 LT

281 UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 281, REPEATED TEHRAN OP.143, BEIRUT 24
WASHINGTON 78.

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE (UNDERLINED)

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE CONSENSUS REFERRED TO IN MY
280.

BEGINS -

1. FOLLOWING THE COMPLAINT PRESENTED ON 12 FEBRUARY 1974 BY THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ, THE SECURITY COUNCIL MET ON 15 FEBRUARY AND
20 FEBRUARY.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS HAD CONSULTATIONS
WITH ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL AND WITH THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAN.

AS A RESULT, THE PRESIDENT HAS FOUND THAT THERE EXISTS
WITHIN THE COUNCIL A CONSENSUS IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS.

2. THE SECURITY COUNCIL, HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENTS OF THE
REPRESENTATIVES OF IRAQ AND IRAN REGARDING THE EVENTS REFERRED
TO IN THE COMPLAINT BY IRAQ, BELIEVES THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO
DEAL WITH A SITUATION WHICH COULD ENDANGER PEACE AND STABILITY
IN THE REGION.

IT DEPLORES ALL THE LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE., IT APPEALS TO THE
PARTIES TO REFRAIN FROM ALL MILITARY ACTION AND FROM ANY MOVE
WHICH MIGHT AGGRAVATE THE SITUATION.

THE COUNCIL REAFFIRMS THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN
THE CHARTER REGARDING RESPECT FOR THE TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY
OF STATES AND THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AND THE DUTY OF
ALL STATES TO FULFIL THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
AS WELL AS THOSE REFERRED TO IN THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CO-OPERATION
AMONG STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

3. FROM THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE COUNCIL, IT APPEARS THAT

-2-

INWARD CABLEGRAM

115

-2-

I.30253

THE CAUSE OF THE EVENTS LIES, INTER ALIA, IN THE FACT THAT THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE DELIMITATION OF THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS CONTESTED.

4. THE COUNCIL HAS NOTED THE RECENT EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS BETWEEN THE TWO STATES AND HOPES THAT THIS COULD CONSTITUTE A CHANNEL THROUGH WHICH PROBLEMS AFFECTING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES MIGHT BE RESOLVED.

5. AS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS REQUIRED, THE SECURITY COUNCIL REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

- TO APPOINT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION OF THE EVENTS THAT HAVE GIVEN RISE TO THE COMPLAINT BY IRAQ AND
- TO REPORT WITHIN THREE MONTHS.

6. THE ABOVE-MENTIONED CONSENSUS WAS REACHED BY MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CHINA, WHICH DISSOCIATES ITSELF FROM IT., THE CHINESE DELEGATION MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

"THE CHINESE DELEGATION HOPES THAT IRAN AND IRAQ WILL ARRIVE AT A FAIR AND REASONABLE SETTLEMENT OF THEIR BOUNDARY DISPUTE THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FIVE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE.

THEREFORE, THE CHINESE DELEGATION DOES NOT FAVOUR UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT IN ANY FORM IN THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ.

IN VIEW OF THIS POSITION, THE CHINESE DELEGATION DISSOCIATES ITSELF FROM THE ABOVE CONSENSUS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL."°°°

ENDS.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
J.I.O.
PM AND C
PM'S

ACTION: UNIA

SEC DEP SECS EX MCO STE FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA) NA WAME
FAS(PW) PC ECSA FAS(DEF) DP IC MR LOVEDAY ICR FAS(10) UNIA
FAS(CL) FAS(MS)

BELGRADE CAIRO JAKARTA LIMA MOSCOW NAIROBI NEW DELHI PARIS PEKING
TELAVIV VIENNA

INWARD CABLEGRAM

KAS7

I.30293

FROM

TOD 28.2.74...1918 LT

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

TOR 1.3.74...1147 LT

280 RESTRICTED PRIORITY

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 280, REPEATED TEHRAN OP.142, BEIRUT 23
WASHINGTON 77

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE (UNDERLINED)

MY 265 AND 276.

THE COUNCIL WOUND UP THE ITEM TODAY 28 FEBRUARY BY AGREEING TO THE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT OF CONSENSUS CONTAINED IN MY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

2. AS A RESULT OF FURTHER CONSULTATIONS LATE YESTERDAY AND AGAIN THIS MORNING CERTAIN MINOR CHANGES WERE MADE IN THE DRAFT IN MY 267.

CHINA TODAY INSISTED ON THE INCLUSION OF AN ADDITIONAL PARAGRAPH 6 GIVING REASONS FOR ITS DISSOCIATION FROM THE CONSENSUS.

3. IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS THIS AFTERNOON MALIK (USSR) EXPRESSED A PREFERENCE FOR A COUNCIL INVESTIGATORY MISSION AND MADE A RITUAL COMPLAINT ABOUT THE FAILURE OF THE AGREED STATEMENT TO PROVIDE THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WAS TO BE MADE IN CONSULTATION WITH THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT., BUT HE DID NOT PRESS HIS COMPLAINT.

PERU WAS UNHAPPY ABOUT PARAGRAPH 3, WHICH HIS GOVERNMENT FEARED WOULD BROADEN THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE HISTORY OF THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE.

4. WHEN THE COUNCIL ASSEMBLED IN OPEN SESSION THE PRESIDENT READ OUT THE CONSENSUS, WHICH WAS IMMEDIATELY ACCEPTED WITHOUT OBJECTION.

CHINA AND PERU STATED THEIR RESERVATIONS., IRAQ BRIEFLY THANKED THE COUNCIL AND REGRETTED THAT CHINA HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO JOIN THE CONSENSUS., IRAN LIKEWISE BRIEFLY EXPRESSED ITS APPRECIATION OF THE COUNCIL'S EFFORTS AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE CHINESE AND PERUVIAN RESERVATIONS., BOTH PROMISED THEIR GOVERNMENTS' CO-OPERATION WITH THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE.

THE PRESIDENT THEREUPON ADJOURNED THE MEETING.

5. THE SELECTION OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WILL HAVE TO AWAIT WALDHEIM'S RETURN TO NEW YORK NEXT WEEK.

MCINTYRE.

.../2

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

113

KAS7

.2.

1.30293

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (173/11/31)
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PM'S

RESTRICTED

ACTION: WAME/UNIA

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO FAS(SA) FAS(NWA) WAME FAS(PW) FAS(DEF) DP IC
ICR FAS(IO) UNIA FAS(CL) FAS(MS)

BELGRADE CAIRO JAKARTA LONDON MOSCOW NAIROBI NEW DELHI PARIS
PEKING TEL AVIV VIENNA

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

CR2

1.29526

FROM

TOD 27.2.74...1805 LT

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

TOR 28.2.74...0934 LT

276 CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE (UNDERLINED)

MY 265.
WHEN HOVEYDA DINED WITH ME LAST NIGHT HE WAS STILL NOT
HAPPY OVER THE DRAFT CONSENSUS REACHED YESTERDAY AND DOUBTFUL
WHETHER HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCEPT IT.
WHEN I SAW HIM AROUND MIDDAY TODAY 27 FEBRUARY HE HAD AGAIN
SEEN DE GUIRINGAUD IN THE LIGHT OF FRESH INSTRUCTIONS FROM
TEHRAN AND SAID HE THOUGHT FINAL AGREEMENT WAS IN SIGHT.
HE HAD SUGGESTED A COUPLE OF SMALL CHANGES WHICH THE PRESIDENT
WAS GOING TO DISCUSS WITH EL-SHIBIB.

2. AS OF LATE THIS AFTERNOON EL-SHIBIB IS STILL WITH THE PRESIDENT
AND WE DO NOT YET HAVE WORD OF FINAL AGREEMENT.
IT HAS REACHED THE STAGE OF AN EXERCISE IN SEMANTICS, E.G.
OVER THE DIFFERENCE IN MEANING OF "INCIDENTS" AND "EVENTS".

MCINTYRE

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (173/11/31)
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PMS

Dr. Mc

ACTION: WAME/UNIA

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO FAS(SA) FAS(NWA) WAME FAS(PW)
FAS(DEF) DP IC ICR FAS(IO) UNIA FAS(CL) FAS(MS)
BELGRADE CAIRO JAKARTA LONDON MOSCOW NAIROBI NEW DELHI
PARIS PEKING TEL AVIV VIENNA

CONFIDENTIAL

173/11/31

INWARD CABLEGRAM

LFG 6

I.28808

FROM

TOD 26.2.74..1842 LT

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

TOR 27.2.74..1001 LT

RESTRICTED

266 RESTRICTED PRIORITY

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 266, REPEATED WASHINGTON 73, BEIRUT 20,
TEHRAN OP.136

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN-IRAQ DISPUTE (UNDERLINED)

OUR 265.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PROPOSED CONSENSUS STATEMENT AGREED
BY THE PARTIES AD REFERENDUM (UNDERLINE TWO):

BEGINS -

1. FOLLOWING THE COMPLAINT PRESENTED ON 12 FEBRUARY 1974 BY
THE REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ, THE SECURITY COUNCIL MET ON 15
FEBRUARY AND 20 FEBRUARY.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS HAD CONSULTATIONS
WITH ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL AND WITH THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAN.

AS A RESULT, THE PRESIDENT HAS FOUND THAT THERE EXISTS WITHIN
THE COUNCIL A CONSENSUS IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS.

2. THE SECURITY COUNCIL BELIEVES THAT THE EVENTS REFERRED TO IN
THE COMPLAINT BY IRAQ COULD ENDANGER THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF
THE REGION AND THAT IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO REMEDY THE
SITUATION.

IT DEPLORES ALL THE LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE., IT APPEALS TO THE
PARTIES TO REFRAIN FROM ALL MILITARY ACTION AND FROM ANY MOVE
WHICH MIGHT AGGRAVATE THE SITUATION.

THE COUNCIL REAFFIRMS THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN
THE CHARTER REGARDING RESPECT FOR THE TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY OF
STATES AND THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AND STRESSES THE
DUTY OF THE PARTIES TO FULFIL THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CO-OPERATION AMONG STATES IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

3. FROM THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE COUNCIL, IT APPEARS THAT
THE CAUSE OF THE EVENTS LIES, INTER ALIA, IN THE FACT THAT THE
LEGAL BASIS FOR THE DELIMITATION OF THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE
PARTIES IS CONTESTED.

4. THE COUNCIL HAS NOTED THE RECENT EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS BETWEEN

...2

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

110

RESTRICTED

LFG 6

1.28808

.2.

THE TWO STATES AND HOPES THAT THIS COULD CONSTITUTE A CHANNEL
THROUGH WHICH PROBLEMS AFFECTING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES
MIGHT BE RESOLVED.

5. AS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS REQUIRED, THE SECURITY COUNCIL
REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO APPOINT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE A
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION OF THE EVENTS
THAT HAVE GIVEN RISE TO THE COMPLAINT BY IRAQ AND TO REPORT WITHIN
TWO (OPEN SQUARE BRACKET) THREE (CLOSE SQUARE BRACKET) MONTHS.

ENDS.

PRIME MINISTER
FREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (173/11/31)
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
J.I.O.
PM'S

ACTION : WAME/UNIA

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO FAS(SA) FAS(NWA) WAME FAS(PW) FAS(DEF)
DP IC ICR FAS(10) UNIA FAS(CL) FAS(MS)

RESTRICTED

173/11/31
109

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

LFG 6

1.28816

FROM

TOD 26.2.74..1830 LT

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

TOR 27.2.74..1038LT

265 CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 265, REPEATED TEHRAN OP.135, BEIRUT 19,
WASHINGTON 72

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE (UNDERLINED)

MY 254.

FOLLOWING ALMOST CONTINUOUS PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS YESTERDAY
AND TODAY THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT HAS LATE THIS AFTERNOON PRODUCED
A CONSENSUS STATEMENT WHICH THE TWO PARTIES HAVE AGREED TO
SUBJECT TO REFERENCE TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS.

2. THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS (EXCEPT IRAQ) MET YESTERDAY AFTER-
NOON 25 FEBRUARY ON THE INITIATIVE OF SANI AND REACHED AGREEMENT
WITHOUT TOO MUCH DIFFICULTY ON A TEXT BASED LARGELY ON THE FRENCH
TEXT (MY 255) BUT WITH CHANGES WHICH SOUGHT TO MEET THE KNOWN
OBJECTIONS OF BOTH PARTIES AND TO COMPROMISE ON DISPUTED POINTS.

WHEN THIS TEXT WAS SHOWN TO BOTH PARTIES LAST EVENING THEY
BOTH RAISED OBJECTIONS TO IT, BUT APPARENTLY SUCCEEDED IN NARROWING
THEIR DIFFERENCES SOMEWHAT AT A LATER PRIVATE MEETING.

3. THIS MORNING SANI, BYELORUSSIAN AMBASSADOR SMIRNOV AND I,
ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS, SAW EL-SHIBIB AND
HOVEYDA SEPARATELY AND BY THE END OF THE MORNING HAD SUCCEEDED
IN PERSUADING BOTH TO ACCEPT YESTERDAY'S TEXT WITH SOME REVISIONS.
THE PRESIDENT SAW THE TWO AMBASSADORS TOGETHER THIS AFTERNOON
AND AFTER A LENGTHY DISCUSSION OBTAINED THEIR PERSONAL ACCEPTANCE
OF THE TEXT CONTAINED IN MY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

4. THE PRESIDENT WILL NOW ATTEMPT TO CLEAR THE TEXT WITH THE
OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS, WHO HAVE GIVEN A GENERAL INDICATION UP
TO NOW THAT THEY WOULD BE READY TO GO ALONG WITH ANY REASONABLE
TEXT ACCEPTED BY BOTH PARTIES.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION COULD HOWEVER STILL
FIND THEMSELVES IN DISAGREEMENT OVER THE FINAL PARAGRAPH, WHICH
EVADES MENTION OF APPOINTMENT OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE EITHER
"IN AGREEMENT" OR "IN CONSULTATION" WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THE
ES

...2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

108

LFG 6

I.28816

.2.

PARTIES AND DOES NOT SPECIFY WHOM THE REPORT SHOULD BE MADE TO.

MCINTYRE.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (173/11/31)
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
J.I.O.
RM'S

ACTION : WAME/UNIA

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO FAS(SAL FAS(NWA) WAME FAS(PW) FAS(DEF)

DP IC ICR FAS(10) UNIA FAS(CL) FAS(MS)

BELGRADE CAIRO JAKARTA LONDON MOSCOW NAIROBI NEW DELHI PARIS
PEKING TEL AVIV VIENNA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

173/11/31
167

CONFIDENTIAL

PM8
FROM
AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHRAN

I.27367
TOD 24.02.74...1345LT
TOR 24.02.74...2241LT

1709 CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 1709 REPEATED AUSTUNAT NEW YORK OP 92
BEIRUT OP93

IRAN/IRAQ

WE HAVE RELIABLE REPORTS THAT SINCE THE INCIDENT ON 10 FEBRUARY
IRAN HAS MOVED ONE DIVISION PLUS ARMoured AND ARTILLERY SUPPORT
TOTALLING ABOUT 15,000 TO KHORRAMSHAHR, AHVAZ AND DEZFUL. THE
GREATER PART CAME FROM THE DIVISION NORMALLY BASED ON QAZIN.

2. THE REASONING IS PROBABLY MORE POLITICAL THAN MILITARY, THAT
IS, IRAQ IS BEING REMINDED THAT, EVEN TOUGH THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR
HAS BEEN RECEIVED, IRAN HAS NOT LOWERED ITS GUARD.

3. THE STATIONING OF INCREASED FORCES IN THIS PARTICULAR AREA
IS PERHAPS MORE A REMINDER TO IRAQ THAT IRAN IS AWARE OF THE
VULNERABILITY OF ABADAN TO A SURPRISE ATTACK THAN AN INDICATION
THAT IT IS BELIEVED THAT THERE IS A REAL THREAT OF SUCH AN ATTACK.
THE IRAQIS FOR THEIR PART MUST KNOW THAT IRAN COULD AND NO DOUBT
WOULD MAKE A SWIFT REPOSTE AGAINST BAGHDAD. HOWEVER, IT IS
DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT EITHER THE IRANIANS OR EVEN THE MOST
IRRESPONSIBLE IRAQIS ARE THINKING IN TERMS OF DEVELOPMENTS
WHICH WOULD RISK THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE MAJOR POWERS.

4. THE IRANIAN AIRFORCE IS ON SEMI ALERT AND THIS, TOGETHER WITH
THE REDEVELOPMENT OF TROOPS, MIGHT SUGGEST THAT THE SHAH WELCOMES
A PRETEXT TO KEEP THE ARMED FORCES ON THEIR TOES.

5. WE HAVE ALSO REPORTS CONFIRMING IRAN'S CLAIM THAT THEIR ONLY
FORCES AVAILABLE INITIALLY ON 1 FEBRUARY WERE GENDARMERIE
SUPPORTED BY LIGHT ARTILLERY.

6. WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR TEXTS OF ALL DRAFT RESOLUTIONS.

.....2

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

106

CONFIDENTIAL

PM8

- 2 -

1.27367

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PM'S

ACTION: WAME/UNIA

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	MCO	MR BODY	FAS(SA)	SEA	MN	FAS(NWA)
NA	WAME	FAS(PW)	PC	ECSA	FAS(DEF)	DP	IC	MR LOVEDAY
ICR	FAS(IO)	EP	UNIA	FAS(CL)	LT	FAS(MS)		

BELGRADE	CAIRO	HONG KONG	JAKARTA	LIMA	LONDON	MOSCOW
NAIROBI	NEW DELHI	PARIS	PEKING	TEL AVIV	VIENNA	
WASHINGTON	WELLINGTON					

CONFIDENTIAL

173/11/31.
105
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

KAS3

1.27356

FROM

TOD 23.2.74...1245 LT

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

TOR 24.2.74...0445 LT

RESTRICTED

255 RESTRICTED PRIORITY

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 255 REPEATED WASHINGTON 71 BEIRUT 18
TEHERAN M132

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN-IRAQ DISPUTE

OUR 254.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT CONSENSUS STATEMENT CIRCULATED BY
COUNCIL PRESIDENT (FRANCE):

BEGINS

FOLLOWING THE COMPLAINT PRESENTED ON 12 FEBRUARY 1974 BY THE
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ, THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL HAS HAD CONSULTATIONS WITH ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL
AND WITH THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAN. THOSE CONSULTATIONS
HAVE LED TO THE DRAFTING OF THE FOLLOWING CONSENSUS.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL BELIEVES THAT THE FRONTIER DISPUTE WHICH
HAS ARISEN BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN IS OF SUCH A NATURE AS TO
ENDANGER THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF THE REGION AND THAT IT IS
THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO REMEDY THE SITUATION. IT DEPLORES ALL THE
LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE. IT APPEALS TO THE PARTIES TO CEASE FORTHWITH
ALL MILITARY ACTION AND TO REFRAIN FROM ANY MOVE WHICH MIGHT
AGGRAVATE THE SITUATION. IT REMINDS THEM OF THE FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN THE CHARTER REGARDING RESPECT FOR THE
TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY OF STATES AND THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF
DISPUTES (CHAPTER VI). IT REAFFIRMS THE DUTY OF EACH STATE TO
FULFIL THE OBLIGATIONS DERIVING FROM INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS.

FROM THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE COUNCIL, IT APPEARS THAT
THE CAUSE OF THE DISPUTE LIES IN THE FACT THAT CERTAIN PROVISIONS
OF AGREEMENTS DELIMITING THE FRONTIER BETWEEN THE PARTIES ARE
CONTESTED.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL ACCORDINGLY REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
TO APPOINT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, IN AGREEMENT WITH THE PRESIDENT,
A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO CARRY OUT AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE
EVENTS WHICH HAVE GIVEN RISE TO IRAQ'S COMPLAINT AND TO REPORT
TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITHIN TWO MONTHS.

ENDS

.../2

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

I.27356

KAS3

-2-

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (173/11/31)
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PM'S

SECURITY COUNCIL & TRANSFER OF POWERS

YOUR 212.

FURTHER DISCUSSION YESTERDAY WITH EL-SHISIE AND HOVEYDA
INDICATED THAT BOTH SIDES ARE STILL SOME DISTANCE AWAY ON THE
KIND OF SECURITY COUNCIL CONSENSUS THAT WOULD BE ACCESSIBLE TO
THEM.

2. BY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A DRAFT JOINT
STATEMENT CIRCULATED BY THE FRESON, WHICH AS YOU WILL SEE COVERS
MOST OF ITS POINTS IN THE IRAQI DRAFT RESOLUTION (NY 2347).
HOVEYDA HAS ALSO CIRCULATED A TEXT WHICH IS THE SAME AS THE
FRESON TEXT EXCEPT TO THE WORDS "AGGRAVATE THE SITUATION" BUT
THESE WORDS EXPRESSES THE OPINION THAT MORE INFORMATION IS
REQUIRED CONCERNING THE RECENT MONTE INCIDENTS AND REQUESTING THE
SECRETARY GENERAL TO APPOINT, "IN CONSULTATION WITH THE PRESIDENT
AND THE PARTIES CONCERNED", A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO MAKE AN
INSPECTION ON THE SPOT OF THE SCENE OF THE INCIDENTS AND REPORT
WITHIN TWO MONTHS.

3. EL-SHISIE YESTERDAY MET WITH AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA AND COSTA RICA
TO WHOM THAT IRAN WOULD ACCEPT NOTHING LESS THAN THE
ACTION: WAME/ UNIA

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO FAS(SA) FAS(NWA) WAME FAS(PW) PC ECSA FAS(DEF)
DP IC ICR UNIA FAS(IO) FAS(CL) LI FAS(MS) DDO

BELGRADE CAIRO JAKARTA LONDON MOSCOW NAIROBI NEW DELHI PARIS PEKING
TEL AVIV VIENNA

4. HOVEYDA SEEMS TO INSIST THAT ANY CONSENSUS SHOULD BE BASED
ESSENTIALLY ON INVESTIGATION OF THE FACTS CONCERNING THE RECENT
CLAIMS. HE HAD BEEN ON THE TELEPHONE TO TOWER AND TOWER HIS
GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE HANGING AGAINST ANY CONSENSUS WHICH IRAN

164
RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

INWARD CABLEGRAM

163

CONFIDENTIAL

PM8

I.27355

FROM

TOD 23.02.74...1225L

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

TOR 24.02.74...0424L

254 CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 254 REPEATED WASHINGTON 70 BEIRUT 17
TEHERAN M131

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE

YOUR 255.

FURTHER DISCUSSION YESTERDAY WITH EL-SHIBIB AND HOVEYDA INDICATED THAT BOTH SIDES ARE STILL SOME DISTANCE APART ON THE KIND OF SECURITY COUNCIL CONSENSUS THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THEM.

2. MY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A DRAFT CONSENSUS STATEMENT CIRCULATED BY THE FRENCH, WHICH AS YOU WILL SEE COVERS MOST OF THE POINTS IN THE IRAQI DRAFT RESOLUTION (MY 234). HOVEYDA HAS ALSO CIRCULATED A TEXT WHICH IS THE SAME AS THE FRENCH TEXT DOWN TO THE WORDS "AGGRAVATE THE SITUATION" BUT THEN MERELY EXPRESSES THE OPINION THAT MORE INFORMATION IS REQUIRED CONCERNING THE RECENT BORDER INCIDENTS AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO APPOINT, "IN CONSULTATION WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THE PARTIES CONCERNED", A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO MAKE AN INSPECTION ON THE SPOT OF THE SCENE OF THE INCIDENTS AND REPORT WITHIN TWO MONTHS.

3. EL-SHIBIB YESTERDAY MET WITH AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA AND COSTA RICA AND STRESSED TO US THAT IRAQ WOULD ACCEPT NOTHING LESS THAN THE FRENCH TEXT. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE IRANIAN DRAFT OMITTED ANY REFERENCE TO RELEVANT CHARTER ARTICLES OR TO FULFILMENT OF OBLIGATIONS OF STATES DERIVING FROM INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS. HE SAID THAT IF IRAN WENT ON BEING OBSTINATE THE COUNCIL SHOULD IGNORE IT AND EXERCISE ITS OWN JUDGMENT, OTHERWISE HE WOULD HAVE TO ASK FOR ANOTHER COUNCIL MEETING AND PERHAPS TABLE HIS DRAFT RESOLUTION. IRAQ COULD NOT PUT UP WITH ANY INDEFINITE DELAY.

4. HOVEYDA SOUGHT TO INSIST THAT ANY CONSENSUS SHOULD BE CONFINED ESSENTIALLY TO INVESTIGATION OF THE FACTS CONCERNING THE RECENT CLASHES. HE HAD BEEN ON THE TELEPHONE TO TEHERAN AND FOUND HIS GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE HARDENING AGAINST ANY CONSENSUS WHICH IRAQ

.....2

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

PM8

- 2 -

1.27355

COULD INTERPRET PUBLICLY AS DIRECTED AGAINST IRAN. HE COULD ACCEPT A REFERENCE TO THE CHARTER PRINCIPLES, THOUGH ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS, BUT HE WOULD HAVE NONE OF ANY REFERENCE TO OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS. (THE IRANIAN CONTENT IS THAT THERE ARE NO VALID (UNDERLINED) BORDER TREATIES IN FORCE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.) HOVEYDA SAID THAT IF THE COUNCIL SHOULD DECIDE THAT THERE MUST BE SOME REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, HOWEVER GENERAL, HE WOULD WASH HIS HANDS OF THE WHOLE THING AND WOULD NOT CARE IF THE IRAQIS WENT AHEAD WITH THEIR DRAFT RESOLUTION (WHICH HE BELIEVED ANYWAY WOULD RECEIVE MUCH LESS THAN FULL SUPPORT).

5. ANOTHER COUNCIL MEETING COULD ONLY RESULT IN A FURTHER ACRIMONIOUS EXCHANGE IN WHICH HOVEYDA IS THREATENING TO PRODUCE NEW CHARGES AGAINST IRAQ. BOTH SIDES ARE DIGGING THEIR TOES IN AT PRESENT, BUT IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO PRODUCE A FORM OF WORDS, PERHAPS CONTAINING A MINIMAL REFERENCE TO TREATY OBLIGATIONS, WHICH BOTH COULD TOLERATE.

6. SANI (INDONESIA) YESTERDAY SUGGESTED A MEETING OF NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS FOR MONDAY AFTERNOON (PARTLY I SUSPECT BECAUSE HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE MATTER CONCLUDED BEFORE HE TAKES OVER AS PRESIDENT NEXT MONTH).. BUT I HAVE JUST HEARD THAT DE GUIRINGAUD WILL BEGIN A FURTHER ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS WITH MEMBERS ON MONDAY MORNING. I SENSE A GROWING FEELING AMONG MEMBERS THAT WHILE THERE ARE FAULTS ON BOTH SIDES AND WHILE ANY COUNCIL CONSENSUS SHOULD BE EVEN-HANDED, IT IS IRAN, ON THE FACE OF IT, THAT MAY NEED TO MAKE SOME CONCESSION.

MCINTYRE

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 173/11/31
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PM'S

ACTION: WAME/UNIA

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO FAS(SA) FAS(NWA) WAME FAS(PW) DP IC
ICR FAS(IO) UNIA FAS(CL) FAS(MS)

BELGRADE CAIRO JAKARTA LONDON MOSCOW NAIROBI NEW DELHI
PARIS PEKING TEL AVIV VIENNA

101
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

HJP 4

1.26487

FROM

TOD 21.2.74...1700 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
BEIRUT

TOR 22.2.74...0851 LT

212 CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 212, REPEATED UN NEW YORK 05, TEHERAN OP.78,
WASHINGTON 07, LONDON 24.
(LONDON PLS PASS)

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN-IRAQ DISPUTE.

OUR 185 AND UN NEW YORK'S 233 TO CANBERRA.

CONVERSATIONS DURING MY VISIT TO BAGHDAD 13-20 FEBRUARY CONFIRMED
THE VIEW IN OUR 185 THAT THE IRAQIS ARE NOT AS CONCERNED ABOUT THE
PRESENT DISPUTE WITH IRAN AS THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS WOULD SUGGEST.

2. HOWEVER, AS IT IS A PUBLIC RELATIONS EXERCISE WITH INTERNAL
IMPLICATIONS, THE IRAQIS WILL BE WATCHING OUR VOTE ON ANY RESOLUTION
THAT MAY EMERGE FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

IT WAS MADE VERY CLEAR TO ME THAT BEFORE IRAQ APPROACHED AUSTR-
ALIA FOR DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION OUR RECENT RECORD IN FOREIGN
RELATIONS AND SPECIFICALLY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD BEEN CAREFULLY
EXAMINED.

THEIR READINESS TO DEVELOP SUBSTANTIALLY OUR TRADE AND ECONOMIC
RELATIONS FOLLOWED (SEE OUR 213 TO CANBERRA ONLY).

IN THIS CONTEXT, THEN, IT WOULD SEEM FROM HERE TO BE UNDESIRABLE
FOR AUSTRALIA TO BE ISOLATED FROM THE MAIN BODY OF COUNCIL MEMBERS.

HUTTON

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PM'S

ACTION: WAME

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO FAS(SA) FAS(NWA) WAME FAS(PW) FAS(DEF)
DP IC MR LOVEDAY ICR FAS(IO) EP UNIA FAS(CL) FAS(MS)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

JW2

I.26437

FROM

TOD 21.02.74...1450

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHERAN

TOR 22.02.74...0742

CONFIDENTIAL

176 CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 176, UN NEW YORK, OP 89, BEIRUT OP 90.

SECURITY COUNCIL: IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE.

REFERENCE NEW YORKS 233 AND 240 TO CANBERRA

WHETHER THE AGGRESSOR OR NOT IN THE RECENT MAJOR CLASH, THE IRANIANS MAY SEE THE PRESENT SITUATION AS PROVIDING AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THEM TO SEEK REVISION OF THE 1937 TREATY, A CONTINUING SOURCE OF FRICTION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

? *Demanded?*

2. PERHAPS WITH SOME REASON, THEY REGARD THE TREATY AS FOISTED ON THEM AND DESIGNED TO SAFEGUARD BRITISH INTERESTS. THEY NOT ONLY CHARGE THAT IRAQ HAS NOT DISCHARGED ITS COMMITMENTS UNDER THE TREATY, BUT, PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANTLY, CONSIDER THAT THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IN THE SHATT AL ARAB AS LAID DOWN BY THE TREATY AS BAD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (AS YOU KNOW THE BOUNDARY SOMETIMES FOLLOWS THE MEDIAN LINE BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRANIAN SHORES AND AT OTHERS THE MEDIUM FIUM AQUAI (UNDERLINE 3) OR NAVIGABLE CHANNEL.

3. INTERVENTIONS BY SOUTH YEMEN AND LIBYA COULD BE STRONGLY RESENTED BY IRAN AND THE REVIVAL OF THE ISSUE OF THE ISLANDS AT THE MOUTH OF THE PERSIAN GULF COULD BE EXPECTED TO HARDEN STILL FURTHER.

4. WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM HERE BBC REPORTS OF AN IRAQI CLAIM THAT IRANIAN FORCES HAVE BEEN BUILDING UP IN THE AREA WHERE THE LAST CLASH TOOK PLACE, HAVE BEEN FURTHER CLASHES YESTERDAY.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dr. Lee

2.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

JW2

2.

1.26437

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (907/20/8)
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PM'S

ACTION: UNIA

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA) NA WAME
FAS(PW) PC ECSA FAS(DEF) DP IC FAS(10) EP UNIA FAS(CL)
FAS(MS)

BELGRADE CAIRO JAKARTA LONDON MOSCOW NAIROBI NEW DELHI PARIS
PEKING TEL AVIV VIENNA

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

AC2

0 23353

TO

TOD 22.2.74...2018 LT

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK...255

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHERAN...182

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
BEIRUT...316

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON...1064

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

ADDRESSED NEW YORK (UN) 255, TEHERAN 182, BEIRUT 316,
WASHINGTON 1064.

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN-IRAQ DISPUTE.

AS INDICATED IN OUR 210 WE ARE SENSITIVE TO THE EFFECT OUR POSITION ON THIS QUESTION COULD HAVE ON OUR RELATIONS WITH BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ. FOR THIS REASON, AND ALSO BECAUSE, ON THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US, IT HAS BEEN DIFFICULT TO FORM A JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS OF THE DISPUTE, WE HAVE NOT FELT THAT AUSTRALIA SHOULD PLAY A LEADING ROLE IN RELATION TO THE HANDLING OF THE DISPUTE IN THE COUNCIL. OUR AIM SHOULD BE TO COORDINATE OUR APPROACH WITH AS LARGE A GROUP OF COUNCIL MEMBERS AS POSSIBLE, WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING A CONSENSUS ON ACTION BY THE COUNCIL WHICH IS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES.

2. OUR EXPECTATION, FROM YOUR ADVICE SO FAR, WOULD BE THAT THE IRAQI DRAFT RESOLUTION WOULD NOT BE BROUGHT TO A VOTE, AND THUS THAT WE AND OTHERS WOULD NOT HAVE TO TAKE A POSITION ON ITS TERMS, SOME OF WHICH (E.G. PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH 6 AND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3) WOULD NOT APPEAR LIKELY TO BE ACCEPTED BY IRAN.

3. WE APPRECIATE YOUR REPORTS ON DEVELOPMENTS SO FAR AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD CONTINUE TO KEEP US INFORMED.

.../2

CONFIDENTIAL 98

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

97

CONFIDENTIAL

ACB

2.

0.23353

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (173/11/31)
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PMS

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: WAME/UNIA

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	MCO	FAS(SA)	FAS(NWA)	WAME	FAS(PW)
FAS(DEF)	DP	IC	ICR	FAS(IO)	UNIA	FAS(CL)	FAS(MS)

BELGRADE	CAIRO	JAKARTA	TEL AVIV	LONDON	MOSCOW
NAIROBI	NEW DELHI	PARIS	PEKING	VIENNA	

173/11/31

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

96

GDD12

1.25833

FROM

TOD 20.02.74...1851 LT

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

TOR 21.02.74...1003 LT

240 RESTRICTED PRIORITY

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 240 REPEATED WASHINGTON 68 BEIRUT 16
TEHERAN M126

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN-IRAQ DISPUTE

MY 233.

THIS AFTERNOON'S COUNCIL MEETING WAS ADDRESSED BY DEMOCRATIC
YEMEN AND LIBYA, BOTH SUPPORTING IRAQ AND CHARGING IRAN WITH
AGGRESSION, AND BY UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, REASSERTING ITS CLAIM
TO PERSIAN GULF ISLANDS., AFTER WHICH IRAQ AND IRAN TRADED
FAMILIAR CHARGES IN A PROTRACTED EXERCISE OF RIGHTS OF REPLY.

2. THE PRESIDENT ADJOURNED THE MEETING AFTER INDICATING THAT
FURTHER INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE AND THAT HE MIGHT
CONVENE A FURTHER MEETING AT A TIME TO BE DECIDED IN THE LIGHT OF
PROGRESS TOWARDS AGREEMENT.

3. WORK HAS BEGUN ON THE DRAFTING OF A POSSIBLE CONSENSUS
STATEMENT. THE FRENCH HAVE CIRCULATED A FIRST DRAFT WITH WHICH
HOVEYDA TELLS ME HE IS NOT HAPPY AND WHICH IS ALREADY UNDERGOING
CHANGES. WE SHALL SEND IT TO YOU WHEN IT BEGINS TO TAKE MORE
DEFINITIVE SHAPE.

MCINTYRE

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (907/20/8)
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PM'S

ACTION: UNIA
SEC DEPSECS EX MCO FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA) NA WAME FAS(PW)
PC ECSA FAS(DEF) DP IC ICR FAS(IO) EP UNIA FAS(CL) FAS(MS)

BELGRADE CAIRO JAKARTA LONDON MOSCOW NAIROBI NEW DELHI PARIS PEKING
TEL AVIV VIENNA

Mr Greenham
a. File Iran/Iraq.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

173/11/31
95

JAG2

1.25665

FROM

TOD 20.02.74...1332

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

TOR 21.02.74...0503

233 CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 233, REPEATED BEIRUT 14, TEHRAN OP.123
WASHINGTON 66

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN-IRAQ DISPUTE (UNDERLINED)

MY 223.

SINCE THE WEEKEND I HAVE SPOKEN YESTERDAY WITH HOVEYDA AND
THIS MORNING WITH RAOUF (SENIOR IRAQI OFFICIAL AND FORMER MEMBER
OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA VISITING MISSION, WHO HAS COME FROM BAGHDAD
FOR COUNCIL MEETINGS ON THE DISPUTE), AND WE HAVE BEEN IN
CONSULTATION WITH OTHER MISSIONS.

2. AS EXPECTED, HOVEYDA INSISTED THAT IRAQ WAS THE AGGRESSOR AND
CLAIMED THAT IRAN HAD LONG BEEN PATIENT IN THE FACE OF REPEATED
IRAQI TRANSGRESSIONS.

HE JUSTIFIED IRAN'S DENUNCIATION OF THE 1937 BOUNDARY TREATY
IN 1969 ON THE GROUND OF IRAQ'S FAILURE TO CARRY OUT ITS
OBLIGATIONS IN RESPECT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE SHAIT-AL-ARAB.

HE SAID THAT IRAN WOULD REGARD AS UNFRIENDLY THE ADOPTION BY
THE COUNCIL OF ANY RESOLUTION., HOWEVER EVEN-HANDED IT MIGHT BE,
THE IRAQIS WOULD BE BOUND TO CITE IT FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES
AS CONDEMNATION OF IRAN.

HOWEVER, IRAN WOULD BE PREPARED TO RESPECT A STATEMENT ADOPTED
BY CONSENSUS AND APPEALING TO BOTH PARTIES TO SETTLE THEIR
DIFFERENCES PEACEFULLY.

AS A GESTURE, IRAN WOULD ALSO ACCEPT INCLUSION IN THE STATE-
MENT, IF IRAQ WANTED IT, OF A DECISION TO SEND OUT EITHER A COUNCIL
MISSION OR A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO INVESTIGATE
THE DISPUTE ON THE SPOT AND REPORT BACK -- PROVIDED ALWAYS THAT
THIS DECISION REFLECTED A CONSENSUS.

3. LAST EVENING IRAQ DISCUSSED A DRAFT RESOLUTION WITH SOME OF
THE NON ALIGNED MEMBERS.

IT ENCOUNTERED SOME OPPOSITION ALONG WITH LESS THAN
ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORT.

INDONESIA STATED THAT IT FAVOURED A CONSENSUS AND WAS INSTRUCTED
TO ABSTAIN ON ANY DRAFT RESOLUTION., MAURETANIA AND CAMEROON SAID
THEY COULD SUPPORT.

... 2 Mr Greenberg

2. Fite

Mr Kuper
De Lee
McIntyre will be told
to go all out for a consensus
4/2

INWARD CABLEGRAM

94

JAG2

.... 2

1.25665

FROM

JAG 20 02 74 11347

4. THIS MORNING RAOUF GAVE ME A COPY OF THE RESOLUTION (TEXT IN MY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM).

I SAID I WOULD HAVE TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS ON IT.

I AGREED THAT IT WAS MILD AND NOT OSTENSIBLY DIRECTED AGAINST EITHER PARTY, BUT DOUBTED WHETHER IT WOULD ATTRACT AS MUCH SUPPORT AS A CONSENSUS STATEMENT INCORPORATING MOST IF NOT ALL OF ITS POINTS.

RAOUF HINTED THAT IRAQ MIGHT BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER A CONSENSUS PROCEDURE.

5. COUNCIL PRESIDENT DE GUIRINGAUD HAS TALKED THIS MORNING TO IRAQI AMBASSADOR EL-SHIBIB AND URGED STRONGLY FOR A CONSENSUS STATEMENT.

HE BELIEVES HE MAY HAVE SUCCEEDED, BUT MORE TIME WILL BE NEEDED FOR CONSULTATION WITH BAGHDAD.

MEANWHILE THE COUNCIL WILL MEET THIS AFTERNOON AS DECIDED, BUT WILL PROBABLY DO LITTLE MORE TODAY THAN LISTEN TO INTERVENTIONS BY DEMOCRATIC YEMEN AND POSSIBLY OTHERS WHO MAY WISH TO SPEAK.

6. APART FROM ITS OPPOSITION IN PRINCIPLE TO ANY COUNCIL ACTION BY RESOLUTION, IRAN CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO REFERENCES IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION TO OBLIGATIONS EMANATING FROM INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND ESPECIALLY BOUNDARIES AGREEMENTS WITH WHICH IT IS DISSATISFIED.

NEVERTHELESS IF THE DRAFT WERE TO BE PRESSED TO A VOTE WE MIGHT ALL HAVE DIFFICULTY IN WITHHOLDING SUPPORT FOR IT.

MCINTYRE. ENDLY RELATIONS AND

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (907/20/8)
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PM'S

ACTION: UNIA

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO MR BODY STE FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA)
NA WAME FAS(PW) PC ECSA FAS(DEF) DP IC MR LOVEDAY ICR
FAS(IO) EP FAS(CL) FAS(MS)

BELGRADE CAIRO JAKARTA LONDON MOSCOW NAIROBI NEW DELHI PARIS
PEKING TEL AVIV VIENNA

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

93

LRC8

I.025666

FROM

TOD 20.02.74...1345LT

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

TOR 21.02.74...0511LT

234 UNCLASSIFIED PRIORITY

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 234, REPEATED BEIRUT 15, TEHRAN OP.124
WASHINGTON 67

SECURITY COUNCIL: IRAQ-IRAN DISPUTE (UNDERLINED)

OUR 233.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF IRAQI DRAFT RESOLUTION:

BEGINS -

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

HAVING CONSIDERED THE AGENDA CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT S/AGENDA/....

HAVING NOTED THE CONTENTS OF DOCUMENTS S/11216 AND S/11218

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF
IRAQ AND IRAN

RECALLING (UNDERLINED) THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND
CO-OPERATION AMONG STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CONTAINED IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION
2625 (XXV) OF 24 OCTOBER, 1970,

DEEPLY CONCERNED (UNDERLINED) OVER (SQUARE BRACKET) RECENT
INCIDENTS ALONG THE IRAQI-IRANIAN BORDERS (CLOSE SQUARE BRACKET)

AFFIRMING (UNDERLINED) THE SANCTITY OF VALID AND DULY
RATIFIED TREATIES AND THE DUTY OF EVERY STATE TO FULFILL THE
OBLIGATIONS EMANATING FROM INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND SPECIALLY
TREATIES DELIMITING BOUNDARIES OF STATES,

1. REGRETS (UNDERLINED) THE LOSS OF LIFE.

2. CALLS UPON (UNDERLINED) THE TWO PARTIES TO CEASE FORTH-
WITH ALL MILITARY OPERATIONS AND TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES IN
STRICT RESPECT TO THEIR SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

.2/...

INWARD CABLEGRAM

92

.2.

1.025666

3. CALLS UPON (UNDERLINED) BOTH PARTIES TO FULFILL THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE CHARTER AND THE RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS.

4. REQUESTS (UNDERLINED) THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO APPOINT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO INVESTIGATE THE IRAQI-IRANIAN DISPUTE AND TO REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BUT NOT LATER THAN ONE MONTH FROM THE DATE OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION.

ENDS.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PMS

ACTION: UNIA

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO MR BODY STE FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA)
NA WAME FAS(PW) PC ECSA FAS(DEF) DP IC MR LOVEDAY ICR
FAS(10) EP UNIA FAS(CL) FAS(MS)

BELGRADE CAIRO JAKARTA LONDON MOSCOW NAIROBI NEW DELHI
PARIS PEKING TEL AVIV VIENNA

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

173/11/31

9/

JADIO

I.23872

FROM

TOD 17.2.74...1450 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHERAN

TOR 17.2.74...2329 LT

161

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 161 AUSTUNAT NEW YORK OP86 BEIRUT OP87
SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE
REFERENCE OUR 151 AND NEW YORKS 223

I HAVE SPOKEN AGAIN TO UNDER SECRETARY NADIM AND SUBSEQUENTLY
TO TAJBAKHSH UNDER SECRETARY POLITICAL AFFAIRS.

2. BOTH MADE IT CLEAR THAT IRAN WOULD OPPOSE NOT ONLY A RESOLUTION
BUT ALSO A PRESIDENTIAL APPEAL WHICH WAS ADDRESSED TO BOTH PARTIES.
EITHER WOULD EQUATE THE TWO AND IMPLY THAT IRAN WAS THE AGGRESSOR,
SINCE IRAQ HAD TAKEN THE MATTER TO THE COUNCIL.

3. THE OUTCOME ACCEPTABLE TO IRAN AT THIS STAGE WOULD BE A REQUEST
THAT IRAQ AGREE TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH IRAN, SO WORDED TO TO
INDICATE THAT THE PROPER VENUE FOR TALKS WOULD BE IRAN. IT WAS
RECALLED TO ME THAT THE LAST INITIATIVE IN REGARD TO THE 1937
TREATY ON THE SHATT AL ARAB WAS TAKEN BY IRAN IN 1969 WHEN IRAQ
REBUFFED THE APPROACH.

4. THE IRANIANS CLAIM THAT THERE IS PROOF THAT THE IRAQIS HAD
PLANNED THE ATTACK IN THAT THEY HAD TELVEVION CREWS IN THE AREA
AND FILMS WERE SHOWN IN BAGHDAD THE FOLLOWING DAY.

5. REFERENCE PARA 5 OF OUR 151. TAJBAKHSH TOLD ME THAT AT
HIS MEETING WITH THE ARAB HEADS OF MISSION THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION
BUT ONLY HIS PRESENTATION OF THE "FACTS" OF THE INCIDENT. THE
HEADS OF MISSION WERE RELIEVED TO BE TOLD THAT THE SHAH STILL PLANNED
TO RECEIVE THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR AS ARRANGED (HE PRESENTED HIS LETTERS
ON 16TH FEBRUARY).

6. LATER EDITORIALS THAN THE ONE ALREADY REPORTED ARE Milder IN
TONE BUT I SHOULD THINK THAT THERE IS UNLIKELY TO BE MUCH FLEXIBILITY
ON THE IRANIAN SIDE UNLESS THERE IS A SIMILAR DISPOSITION ON THE
OF THE IRAQIS.

WHITE

RECEIVED THE NAME PARSONS TO LCM PARSONS OF 15 10
PARSONS UNIT PARSONS LT PARSONS

CABLES CANBERRA LONDON PARIS TEL AVIV TORONTO WASHINGTON
/2...

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

90

JAD10

- 2 -

I.23872

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PMS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: WAME

SEC	DEP	SECS	EX	MCO	MR	BODY	FAS(SA)	SEA	MN			
FAS(NWA)	NA		WAME	FAS(PW)	PC	ECSA	FAS(DEF)	DP	IC	ICR		
FAS(IO)	UNIA		FAS(CL)	LT	FAS(MS)							
CAIRO	GENEVA		LONDON	PARIS	TEL	AVIV	TOKYO	WASHINGTON				

173/11/31

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

89

GEP10

I.23309

FROM

TOD 15.2.74...0836 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
BEIRUT

TOR 15.2.74...1933 LT

185 CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 185, REPEATED TEHERAN OP66, UN NEW YORK 04.

IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE.

EXPERIENCED OBSERVERS IN BEIRUT ARE NOT ATTACHING MUCH IMPORTANCE TO LATEST BORDER CLASH WHICH IS BEING SEEN AS JUST ANOTHER INCIDENT IN THE LONG SIMMERING DISPUTE.

THE FACT THAT IRAQ AND IRAN RESUMED RELATIONS LAST OCTOBER WAS NEVER INTERPRETED HERE AS MOVEMENT TOWARDS A BORDER SETTLEMENT.

2. CONVERSATION WITH IRAQI EMBASSY MINISTER KARAGHOLI 14 FEBRUARY HINTED THAT IRAQ IS NOT REALLY AS CONCERNED AS ITS PUBLIC STATEMENTS SUGGEST.

SUCH STATEMENTS ARE FOR HOME CONSUMPTION.

HE HAD NO INFORMATION AS TO WHETHER IRAQ WOULD BE PRESSING FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
J10
PMS

ACTION: WAME

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO MR BODY FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA)
NA WAME FAS(PW) PC ECSA FAS(DEF) DP IC FAS(IO)
FAS(CL) FAS(MS)

CAIRO LONDON TEL AVIV WASHINGTON

1. Mr Greenham (Rup)
2. File Iraq/Iran.

INWARD CABLEGRAM

GEP 10

I.23309

FROM

TOD 15.2.74...0836 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
BEIRUT

TOR 15.2.74...1933 LT

185 CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 185, REPEATED TEHERAN OP 66, UN NEW YORK 04.
IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE.

EXPERIENCED OBSERVERS IN BEIRUT ARE NOT ATTACHING MUCH IMPORTANCE TO LATEST BORDER CLASH WHICH IS BEING SEEN AS JUST ANOTHER INCIDENT IN THE LONG SIMMERING DISPUTE.

THE FACT THAT IRAQ AND IRAN RESUMED RELATIONS LAST OCTOBER WAS NEVER INTERPRETED HERE AS MOVEMENT TOWARDS A BORDER SETTLEMENT.

2. CONVERSATION WITH IRAQI EMBASSY MINISTER KARAGHOLI 14 FEBRUARY HINTED THAT IRAQ IS NOT REALLY AS CONCERNED AS ITS PUBLIC STATEMENTS SUGGEST.

SUCH STATEMENTS ARE FOR HOME CONSUMPTION.
HE HAD NO INFORMATION AS TO WHETHER IRAQ WOULD BE PRESSING FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PMS

ACTION: WAME

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO MR BODY FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA)
NA WAME FAS(PW) PC ECSA FAS(DEF) DP IC FAS(IO)
FAS(CL) FAS(MS)

CAIRO LONDON TEL AVIV WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

EOB2

I.23738

FROM

TOD 15.02.74...1918 LT

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO U.N.
NEW YORK

TOR 16.02.74...1049 LT

223 CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 223, REPEATED BEIRUT 13, TEHERAN OP.119
WASHINGTON 63

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN-IRAQ DISPUTE (UNDERLINED)

MY 219.

THE COUNCIL MET THIS AFTERNOON 15 FEBRUARY.
IN LINE WITH AN AGREEMENT REACHED PRIOR TO THE MEETING, ONLY
IRAQ AND IRAN MADE STATEMENTS, FOLLOWING WHICH THE PRESIDENT
ADJOURNED THE MEETING UNTIL WEDNESDAY 20 FEBRUARY.

2. THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR, AS HE HAD DONE IN A MEETING WITH ME
EARLIER IN THE DAY, TRACED THE HISTORY OF THE PRESENT BORDER FROM
ITS ORIGINS IN THE TREATY OF CONSTANTINOPLE IN 1913, THROUGH THE
CHANGES RATIFIED BY BOTH PARTIES IN THE 1937 BOUNDARY AGREEMENT
(UNDER WHICH IRAQ CEDED TO IRAN SOME SEVEN KILOMETRES OF
SHATT-AL-ARAB) TO THE SUBSEQUENT ABOGATION OF THAT AGREEMENT BY
IRAN IN 1969.

HE CALLED ON IRAN TO CLARIFY ITS ATTITUDE TO THE 1937 BORDER
AGREEMENT AND INVITED THEM TO TAKE WHATEVER GRIEVANCES THEY HAD
IN REGARD TO THAT AGREEMENT TO THE WORLD COURT.

3. HE WENT ON TO ALLEGE IRANIAN TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS IN THE
AREA AND CITED THE IRANIAN MILITARY BUILD-UP (SUPPORTED BY THE
UNITED STATES) AS A SOURCE OF TENSION AND INSTABILITY IN THE
REGION.

HIS VERSION OF THE RECENT BORDER CLASHES REPEATED THE
ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE EARLIER IRAQI LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE COUNCIL (MY 199).

4. THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR (HOVEYDA) LARGELY AVOIDED HISTORY AND
CONCENTRATED ON THE IRANIAN VERSION OF THE RECENT INCIDENTS AS SET
OUT IN THE NOTE DELIVERED TO THE IRAQI EMBASSY IN TEHERAN (MY 211).
HOVEYDA CLAIMED THAT IRAQI TERRITORIAL VIOLATIONS WERE BUT ONE
ASPECT OF A WIDER IRAQI POLICY WHOSE BASIC AIM APPEARED TO BE THE
SUBVERSION AND OVERTHROW OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT.

IRAN, HE SAID, DID NOT WANT CONFRONTATION AND CALLED ON IRAQ
TO AVAIL ITSELF OF THE NEWLY OPENED DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL BETWEEN
THEM TO NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY ON THE QUESTIONS AT ISSUE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

86

CONFIDENTIAL

EOB2

-2-

I.23738

REGARDING THE BORDER HOVEYDA INDICATED THAT IRAQ'S FAILURE TO NEGOTIATE A TREATY ON NAVIGATION RIGHTS ON THE SHATT-AL-ARAB, AS CALLED FOR IN THE 1937 AGREEMENT, WAS THE REASON WHY IRAN COULD NO LONGER UPHOLD THAT AGREEMENT.

6. IT IS NOT CLEAR AT THIS STAGE JUST WHAT THE OUTCOME OF WEDNESDAY'S MEETING WILL BE, IN PARTICULAR WHETHER THE IRAQIS WILL PRESS FOR THE ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION.

THEY HAVE NOT YET CIRCULATED A TEXT BUT REMAINED ADAMANT TODAY THAT A SIMPLE PRESIDENTIAL APPEAL WOULD NOT SATISFY THEM.

IRAN OF COURSE IS EQUALLY ADAMANT THAT IT COULD NOT ACCEPT A RESOLUTION, BUT MAY IN THE EVENT BE REQUIRED TO SHOW A LITTLE MORE FLEXIBILITY.

MCINTYRE.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (907/20/8)
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PM'S

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION : UNIA

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO MR BODY STE FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA)
NA WAME FAS(PW) PC ECSA FAS(DEF) DP IC MR LOVEDAY ICR
FAS(10) EP UNIA FAS(OL) FAS(MS)

BELGRADE CAIRO JAKARTA LONDON MOSCOW NAIROBI NEW DELHI
PARIS PEKING TEL AVIV VIENNA

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

85

JADIO
FROM
AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHERAN

I.23872
TOD 17.2.74...1450 LT
TOR 17.2.74...2329 LT

161 CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 161 AUSTUNAT NEW YORK OP86 BEIRUT OP87
SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE
REFERENCE OUR 151 AND NEW YORKS 223

I HAVE SPOKEN AGAIN TO UNDER SECRETARY NADIM AND SUBSEQUENTLY
TO TAJBAKSH UNDER SECRETARY POLITICAL AFFAIRS.

2. BOTH MADE IT CLEAR THAT IRAN WOULD OPPOSE NOT ONLY A RESOLUTION
BUT ALSO A PRESIDENTIAL APPEAL WHICH WAS ADDRESSED TO BOTH PARTIES.
EITHER WOULD EQUATE THE TWO AND IMPLY THAT IRAN WAS THE AGGRESSOR,
SINCE IRAQ HAD TAKEN THE MATTER TO THE COUNCIL.

3. THE OUTCOME ACCEPTABLE TO IRAN AT THIS STAGE WOULD BE A REQUEST
THAT IRAQ AGREE TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH IRAN, SO WORDED TO TO
INDICATE THAT THE PROPER VENUE FOR TALKS WOULD BE IRAN. IT WAS
RECALLED TO ME THAT THE LAST INITIATIVE IN REGARD TO THE 1937
TREATY ON THE SHATT AL ARAB WAS TAKEN BY IRAN IN 1969 WHEN IRAQ
REBUFFED THE APPROACH.

4. THE IRANIANS CLAIM THAT THERE IS PROOF THAT THE IRAQIS HAD
PLANNED THE ATTACK IN THAT THEY HAD TELVEVION CREWS IN THE AREA
AND FILMS WERE SHOWN IN BAGHDAD THE FOLLOWING DAY.

5. REFERENCE PARA 5 OF OUR 151. TAJBAKSH TOLD ME THAT AT
HIS MEETING WITH THE ARAB HEADS OF MISSION THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION
BUT ONLY HIS PRESENTATION OF THE "FACTS" OF THE INCIDENT. THE
HEADS OF MISSION WERE RELIEVED TO BE TOLD THAT THE SHAH STILL PLANNED
TO RECEIVE THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR AS ARRANGED (HE PRESENTED HIS LETTERS
ON 16TH FEBRUARY).

6. LATER EDITORIALS THAN THE ONE ALREADY REPORTED ARE Milder IN
TONE BUT I SHOULD THINK THAT THERE IS UNLIKELY TO BE MUCH FLEXIBILITY
ON THE IRANIAN SIDE UNLESS THERE IS A SIMILAR DISPOSITION ON THE
OF THE IRAQIS.

WHITE

D. G. H.

/2...

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

84

JAD 10

- 2 -

I.23872

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PMS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: WAME

SEC	DEP	SECS	EX	MCO	MR	BODY	FAS(SA)	SEA	MN			
FAS(NWA)	NA	WAME	FAS(PW)	PC	ECSA	FAS(DEF)	DP	IC	ICR			
FAS(IO)	UNIA	FAS(CL)	LT	FAS(MS)								
CAIRO	GENEVA	LONDON	PARIS	TEL AVIV	TOKYO	WASHINGTON						

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

MDR 12

I.23080

FROM

TOD 14.02.74...1927 LT

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

TOR 15.02.74...1047 LT

219 CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 219, REPEATED WASHINGTON 59, TEHERAN OP.114,
BEIRUT 11.

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN-IRAQ DISPUTE (UNDERLINED)

MY 210.

THE PRESIDENT (FRANCE) HAD CONSULTATIONS INDIVIDUALLY WITH
MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TODAY 14 FEBRUARY.

BY THE TIME HE SAW ME LATE THIS AFTERNOON AMBASSADOR
DE GUIRINGAUD HAD SPOKEN WITH MOST OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL.

2. HE CONFIRMED MY OWN IMPRESSION THAT MOST MEMBERS HOPED THAT
A MEETING COULD BE AVOIDED BUT WERE WILLING TO MEET IF IRAQ
INSISTED.

THERE WAS A GENERAL FEELING, HOWEVER, THAT ACRIMONY SHOULD BE
KEPT TO A MINIMUM, THAT SPEECHES SHOULD IF POSSIBLE BE LIMITED
TO THE TWO PARTIES CONCERNED AND THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD AIM
TO WIND UP WITH AN APPEAL TO BOTH, IN THE NAME OF THE COUNCIL, TO
SETTLE THE DISPUTE PEACEFULLY.

3. I TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT WE TOO WERE NOT ANXIOUS TO HAVE THE
DISPUTE AIRED IN THE COUNCIL BUT THAT WE REALISED A MEETING WAS
PROBABLY INEVITABLE, IN WHICH CASE WE SHARED THE GENERAL PREFERENCE
FOR A LIMITED DEBATE AND A PRESIDENTIAL SUMMING-UP, THUS AVOIDING
A RESOLUTION.

4. DE GUIRINGAUD SAID HE HAD EARLIER SEEN THE AMBASSADORS OF BOTH
IRAQ AND IRAN, WHO HAD PREDICTABLY DIFFERED ON THE NEED FOR A
MEETING.

THE IRAQIS ARE SAID TO HAVE PREPARED A DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH
INCLUDES A RECOMMENDATION THAT A FACT-FINDING MISSION SHOULD BE
ESTABLISHED, BUT NO TEXT HAS YET APPEARED.

THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR HAS ASKED TO SEE ME TOMORROW.

5. WE CAN PROBABLY EXPECT A MEETING TO BE CALLED TOMORROW
AFTERNOON.

MCINTYRE.

.../2

McIntyre

83
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

-2-

1.23080

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (907/20/8)
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
J10
PM'S

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: UNIA

SEC DEP SECS EX MCO FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA) NA WAME FAS(PW) PC ECSA
FAS(DEF) DP IC ICR FAS(10) UNIA FAS(CL) FAS(MS)

BELGRADE CAIRO JAKARTA LONDON MOSCOW NAIROBI NEW DELHI PARIS PEKING
TEL AVIV VIENNA

INWARD CABLEGRAM

81

CONFIDENTIAL

BG 12

1.22201

FROM

TOD 13.2.74...1830 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHERAN

TOR 14.2.74...0819 LT

151 CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

ADDRESSED AUSTUNAT NEW YORK OP.83, CANBERRA 151, BEIRUT OP.84.

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE
REFERENCE OUR 146.

BEFORE RECEIPT OF NEW YORK'S OP.100 AND OP.101 I HAD SPOKEN TO NADIM, FOREIGN MINISTRY UNDER SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, WHO IS NOT ONLY CLOSE TO THE MINISTER BUT ALSO THE FRANKEST AND MOST FORTHCOMING SENIOR OFFICER IN THE MINISTRY.

2. HE SEEMED TO BE QUITE RELAXED AND WAS FAIRLY CONFIDENT THAT IRAQ WOULD NOT PRESS FOR A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THAT EVEN IF IT DID IT WOULD NOT HOPE FOR A CONDEMNATORY RESOLUTION. HE FELT THAT IRAQ WAS FOLLOWING A COMMON PRACTICE WHEREBY THE WEAKER OF THE TWO DISPUTING PARTIES COULD GAIN THE NECESSARY SATISFACTION FROM A MEETING, THE OUTCOME OF WHICH WAS NO MORE THAN EXPRESSIONS OF REGRET AT THE LOSS OF LIFE AND THE HOPE THAT THE TWO PARTIES WOULD SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCE PEACEFULLY.

3. THE SUBSTANTIVE POINTS HE MADE WERE:

(A) IT PROBABLY COULD NOT BE PROVED THAT THE IRANIANS HAD NOT FIRED THE FIRST SHOT: SINCE THERE HAD BEEN A SUCCESSION OF INCIDENTS IN THIS AREA IT WAS CONCEIVABLE THAT IT WAS IRAN'S TURN TO FIRE THE FIRST SHOT, WITHOUT ANY EXPECTATION THAT THE CLASH WOULD DEVELOP INTO ONE OF RELATIVELY MAJOR PROPORTIONS.,

(B) AT THE HEIGHT OF THE CLASH APPROXIMATELY 1500 HAD BEEN ENGAGED ON EACH SIDE.,

(C) THE DAM, A SMALL ONE ABOUT TWO OR THREE KILOMETRES FROM THE BORDER, HAD BEEN COMPLETED SOME THREE YEARS AGO BUT CONSTRUCTION HAD NOT BEEN PRECEDED BY AGREEMENT WITH IRAQ BECAUSE RELATIONS HAD BEEN BROKEN OFF EARLIER. NADIM THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT THE DAM WOULD DENY IRAQ A FAIR SHARE OF THE WATERS.,

CONFIDENTIAL

.../2

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

BG 12

-2-

I.22201

(D) THE IRANIANS ARE ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTING A ROAD CLOSE TO THE BORDER AND THE WORKERS HAVE BEEN HARASSED REPEATEDLY BY IRAQI FORCES.,

(E) THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES WAS DUE TO THE FACT THAT A HILL OF SOME STRATEGIC VALUE, PARTICULARLY IN RELATION TO THE ROAD, WAS TAKEN AND RETAKEN SEVERAL TIMES - IT IS NOW IN IRANIAN HANDS.,

(F) THE BORDER HAS NEVER BEEN DEMARCATED - (BORDER COMMISSION SET UP IN 1913 "BEFORE THERE WAS ANY IRAQ") HAD NEVER MET.,

(G) NADIM DOUBTED REPORTS THAT THE DAM HAD BEEN BOMBED OR STRAFFED FROM THE AIR - THERE MAY HAVE BEEN AN IRAQI AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA BUT HE THOUGHT IT MORE LIKELY THAT ARTILLERY FIRE HAD BEEN DIRECTED AT THE DAM. NADIM DENIED REPORTS THAT IRANIAN AIRCRAFT HAD VIOLATED IRAQI AIR SPACE, BUT MENTIONED THAT THERE WAS AN AIR FORCE BASE AT DEZFUL, ABOUT 200 KILOMETRES FROM MEHRAN. IF A SMALL FORCE OF IRAQIS HAD FIRED THE FIRST SHOT, THIS COULD HAVE BEEN WITHOUT OFFICIAL SANCTION, BUT OFFICIAL SANCTION MUST HAVE BEEN NECESSARY FOR A SUBSEQUENT BUILDUP OF FORCES.

4. WE HAVE HEARD FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY THAT A NUMBER OF HELICOPTERS HAVE BEEN MOVED INTO THE AREA UNDER DISPUTE.

5. WHILE I WAS WITH NADIM, TAJBAKSH, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, WAS SPEAKING TO ALL THE ARAB HEADS OF MISSION, TO WHOM HE WOULD HAVE GIVEN COPIES OF A MAP "CONFIRMING" THE BORDER LINE AS CLAIMED BY IRAN.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PMS

ACTION: WAME

SEC DEP SECS EX MCO MR BODY FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA)
NA WAME FAS(PW) PC ECSA FAS(DEF) DP IC ICR FAS(IO)
UNIA FAS(CL) LT FAS(MS)

CAIRO GENEVA LONDON PARIS TEL AVIV TOKYO WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

79

KJB10

I.22250

FROM

TOD 13.2.74...1750 LT

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

TOR 14.2.74...0956 LT

211 UNCLASSIFIED PRIORITY

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 211, REPEATED TEHRAN OP.109, BEIRUT 09
WASHINGTON 55

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN-IRAQ DISPUTE (UNDERLINED)

OUR 210.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF IRANIAN NOTE AND ENCLOSURE OF 12
FEBRUARY TO SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT:

BEGINS -

"I HAVE THE HONOUR TO ENCLOSE HERewith THE TEXT OF THE NOTE
DELIVERED TO THE IRAQI EMBASSY IN TEHRAN BY THE IMPERIAL
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON 11 FEBRUARY 1974 IN CONNEXION
WITH THE ARMED INCURSIONS OF THE IRAQI FORCES INTO IRANIAN
TERRITORY.

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO REQUEST THAT THIS LETTER, TOGETHER WITH
ITS ENCLOSURE, BE CIRCULATED AS AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL.

ENDS.

ENCLOSURE (UNDERLINED):

BEGINS -

THE IMPERIAL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS PRESENTS ITS
COMPLIMENTS TO THE EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ IN
TEHRAN AND PURSUANT TO ITS NOTE REFERENCE NO. 28994/2/1 OF
1 JANUARY 1974, HAS THE HONOUR TO STATE THE FOLLOWING:

ACCORDING TO INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM APPROPRIATE IRANIAN
OFFICIALS, THE INCURSION OF IRAQI FRONTIER GUARDS AND ELEMENTS
OF IRAQI ARMED FORCES INTO IRANIAN TERRITORY IN THE REGION OF
MEHRAN HAS NOT CEASED AND HAS, OF LATE, BEEN INTENSIFIED:

.../2

INWARD CABLEGRAM

78

KJB10

2.

I.22250

1. ON 0 JANUARY 1974, WHILE THE IRANIAN HERDSMEN WERE TAKING THEIR LIVESTOCK FOR GRAZING IN KULAK HEIGHTS ALONG THE FRONTIER LINE, THEY WERE ATTACKED BY IRAQI ARMED FORCES.

2. ON 31 JANUARY 1974, WHILE IRANIAN FRONTIER GUARDS WERE ENGAGED IN A PATROL MISSION WITHIN IRANIAN TERRITORY, THEY WERE FIRED UPON WITH MACHINEGUNS BY IRAQI ARMED ELEMENTS FROM THE NORTH-WESTERN HEIGHTS OF AL-JABIL.

3. AT 10.50 HOURS LOCAL TIME MONDAY, 4 FEBRUARY, WHILE IRANIAN FRONTIER GUARDS WERE TRANSPORTING SUPPLY MATERIALS ALONG THE SUPPLY ROUTES IN MEHRAN REGION, THEY WERE SHELLLED BY IRAQI FORCES.

THE IRANIAN FRONTIER GUARDS RETURNED FIRE AND PUSHED THE INTRUDERS BACK.

AS A RESULT OF THIS ENCOUNTER, WHICH LASTED UNTIL THE EVENING OF 5 FEBRUARY, ONE IRANIAN SOLDIER WAS KILLED AND THREE FRONTIER GUARDS WERE WOUNDED.

THE FOLLOWING AMMUNITION BELONGING TO IRAQI INTRUDERS WAS SEIZED INSIDE IRANIAN TERRITORY:

ONE MACHINE-GUN
ONE BATTERY OF MORTAR
FOUR ROUNDS OF AMMUNITIONS
TWO BOXES CONTAINING HAND GRENADES
FOUR BATTERIES OF ARTILLERY
TWO BOXES OF R.P.G. AMMUNITION
TWO TELEPHONE SETS

4. AT 16.30 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON SUNDAY, 10 FEBRUARY, IRAQI ARMED ELEMENTS USING LIGHT AND HEAVY WEAPONRY, ARTILLERY, TANK AND ARMoured CARRIERS SHELLLED IRANIAN FRONTIER POSTS AT ZALUAB HEIGHTS - KANISAKHAT, REZA ABAD - (ALONG THE ROUTE BETWEEN MEHRAN AND ILAM) JAZMAN (SITUATED AT TWO KILOMETRES SOUTH-WEST OF THE REZA ABAD POST) AS WELL AS THE KAN-JAN-CHAM DAM.

FACED WITH THESE COWARDLY ATTACKS BY IRAQI ARMED FORCES, THE IRANIAN BORDER GUARDS RETURNED FIRE AND FORCED THE INTRUDERS TO WITHDRAW.

NEVERTHELESS, THE MANOEUVRING OF THE IRAQI FRONTIER GUARDS AND ARMED ELEMENTS AND SHELLING OF IRANIAN FRONTIER POSTS HAS, SINCE, CONTINUED.

DURING THIS PERIOD, FOUR IRAQI FIGHTERS HAVE INTRUDED INTO IRANIAN AIR SPACE.

.../3

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

77

KJB10

3.

I.22250

DURING THIS PERIOD THE FRONTIER GUARDS COMMANDER OF MEHRAN TRIED, IN VAIN, TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH HIS IRAQI COUNTERPART. A CLAIM TO THE CONTRARY MADE BY THE IRAQI GENERAL STAFF IN THE COMMUNIQUE BROADCAST ON RADIO BAGHDAD ON 11 FEBRUARY IS THUS UTTERLY UNFOUNDED.

AS A RESULT OF THE ABOVE INCURSIONS, A NUMBER OF IRANIAN FRONTIER GUARDS HAVE BEEN KILLED AND WOUNDED. THE IRAQI INTRUDERS LEFT BEHIND 14 DEAD AND SOME ARMS AND AMMUNITION, WHICH PROVIDE IRREFUTABLE EVIDENCE OF THE FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE IRANIAN TERRITORY BY THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES.

IN REGISTERING A STRONG PROTEST AGAINST SUCH PERSISTENT ACTS OF VIOLATION, WHICH ARE CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT OF THE RECENTLY DEVELOPED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, THE IMPERIAL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS REQUESTS THE EMBASSY TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ TO THE DIRE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH VIOLATIONS.

IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THE PUNISHMENT OF THE INTRUDERS AND PROVIDE ADEQUATE COMPENSATION FOR HUMAN AND MATERIAL LOSSES INCURRED BY IRAN AND MAKE SURE THAT SUCH VIOLATIONS AND INCITEMENTS ON THE PART OF THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES SHALL NOT BE REPEATED.

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WOULD APPRECIATE TO BE APPRISED OF THE RESULTS OF SUCH STEPS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

THE IMPERIAL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS FINDS IT NECESSARY TO EMPHASIZE THAT IT HOLDS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONSEQUENCES THAT MIGHT ENSUE AS A RESULT OF SUCH VIOLATIONS.

THE IMPERIAL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AVAILS ITSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW TO THE EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ THE ASSURANCES OF ITS HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

ENDS.

.../4

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

76

KJB10

4.

1.22250

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (907/20/8)
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
J.I.O.
PM'S

ACTION: UNIA

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA)
NA WAME FAS(NWA) NA WAME FAS(PW) PC ECSA FAS(DEF)
DP IC ICR FAS(IO) UNIA FAS(CL) FAS(MS)

BELGRADE CAIRO JAKARTA MOSCOW NAIROBI NEW DELHI PARIS
PEKING TEL AVIV VIENNA

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

75

CONFIDENTIAL

DKM4

1.22270

FROM

TOD 13.2.74...1725

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

TOR 14.2.74...1008

210 CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 210, REPEATED TEHERAN OP.108, BEIRUT 08
WASHINGTON 54

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN-IRAQ DISPUTE (UNDERLINED)

MY 199 AND YOUR 210.

HOVEYDA'S LETTER DELIVERED LAST NIGHT 12 FEBRUARY TO
SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT ENCLOSING TEXT OF NOTE DELIVERED
TO IRAQI EMBASSY IN TEHERAN IS CONTAINED IN MY FOLLOWING
TELEGRAM.

2. HOVEYDA ASKED TO SEE ME THIS MORNING AND REAFFIRMED HIS
HOPE THAT COUNCIL MEMBERS WOULD AGREE THAT NO FORMAL MEETING
WAS NECESSARY, OR THAT AT ANY RATE IF THERE HAD TO BE A FORMAL
MEETING THE MATTER COULD BE DISPOSED OF WITHOUT ADOPTION OF
A RESOLUTION BUT SIMPLY BY A STATEMENT FROM THE CHAIR RECORDING
A UNANIMOUS APPEAL BY THE COUNCIL TO THE TWO PARTIES TO SETTLE
THEIR DISPUTE PEACEFULLY.

3. FROM ENQUIRIES SO FAR I HAVE FOUND NO COUNCIL MEMBER WHO
WANTS THE DISPUTE BROUGHT TO PUBLIC DEBATE, BUT I SHALL KNOW
BETTER AFTER TOMORROW MORNING'S INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS.

MCINTYRE.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (907/20/8)
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PM'S

ACTION: UNIA

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA) NA WAME
FAS(PW) PC ECSA FAS(DEF) DP IC ICR FAS(IO) UNIA FAS(CL)
FAS(MS)

BELGRADE CAIRO JAKARTA LONDON MOSCOW NAIROBI NEW DELHI
PARIS PEKING TEL AVIV VIENNA

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

74

PM4

0.018983

TO

TOD 13.02.74...2328

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK...210

REPEATED

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHRAN...151

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
BEIRUT...266

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON...896

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED UN NEW YORK 210 REPEATED TEHRAN 151 BEIRUT 266
WASHINGTON 896

SECURITY COUNCIL - IRAN IRAQ

THANKS YOUR 199 AND 200

ON THE BASIS OF THE INFORMATION SO FAR AVAILABLE WE ARE
INCLINED DEPARTMENTALLY TO SHARE THE FEELING OF COUNCIL MEMBERS
THAT THE MATTER MIGHT BEST BE DISPOSED OF BY A PRESIDENTIAL
CONSENSUS CALLING UPON BOTH PARTIES TO SETTLE THEIR DISPUTE
PEACEFULLY. WE ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO OUR DEVELOPING RELATIONS
WITH IRAN AND IRAQ AND WOULD HOPE TO AVOID ANY ACTION IN NEW YORK
WHICH COULD CREATE PROBLEMS FOR US WITH EITHER COUNTRY.

PLEASE KEEP US INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS. WE WILL BE INTERESTED
OF COURSE IN SEEING TEXT OF IRANIAN STATEMENT AND WOULD BE
GRATEFUL FOR ADVICE CONCERNING THE ATTITUDES BEING FORMULATED BY
OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL AND THE TERMS OF ANY CONSENSUS
STATEMENT.

*Mr. Cogh M Flanagan.
Good.*

.....2

*This was sent
late yesterday evening.
after consultation with
me. F 17/2*

D. J. G.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

PMA

- 2 -

0.018983

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 907/20/8
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PM'S

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: UNIA

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	MCO	FAS(SA)	SEA	MN	FAS(NWA)	NA
WAME	FAS(PW)	PC	ECSA	FAS(DEF)	DP	IC	ICR	FAS(IO)
UNIA	FAS(CL)		FAS(MS)					

BELGRADE	CAIRO	JAKARTA	TEL AVIV	LONDON	MOSCOW	NAIROBI
NEW DELHI	PARIS	PEKING	VIENNA			

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

FILE No.

DATE

72

SUBJECT

Iran / Iraq

FOR

Mr. Lytle

Discussed
will
be. with

13/2

We still need some further advice from N.Y. about the Iranian reaction to the Iraqi complaint and about taking S.C. action.

Subject to this, N.Y.'s suggestion in the last para. of their 199 seems to be the best way to handle this matter. Our interest is to damp down the dispute without becoming more involved than necessary.

We will coordinate any instructions with UN 114 which has the main carriage.

WF 13/2

12968/73-L

INWARD CABLEGRAM

71

LEH2

I.21501

FROM

TOD 13.02.74...1222LT

AUSTRALIAN CONSULATE GENERAL
NEW YORK

TOR 13.02.74...1011LT

RESTRICTED PRIORITY

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 200, REPEATED WASHINGTON 50, TEHERAN OP.10
BEIRUT 07

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN-IRAQ DISPUTE (UNDERLINED)

OUR TELEGRAM 199.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF IRAQI DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE'S
LETTER OF 12 FEBRUARY TO SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT:

BEGINS -

UPON INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY GOVERNMENT, I HAVE THE HONOUR TO
REQUEST AN URGENT MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONSIDER
THE CONTINUING ACTS OF AGGRESSION LAUNCHED BY IRANIAN ARMED
FORCES AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF IRAQ.

THE SITUATION ON THE FRONTIER IS DETERIORATING RAPIDLY AS
THE IRANIAN AGGRESSION CONTINUES AND HEAVY MASSING OF IRANIAN
TROOPS ON THE BORDERS IS STILL IN PROGRESS.

ENCLOSED IS A RESUME OF THE IRANIAN VIOLATIONS WHICH
CULMINATED IN THE LATEST IRANIAN AGGRESSION.

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO REQUEST THIS COMMUNICATION TO BE
CIRCULATED AS AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

ENDS.

ENCLOSURE (UNDERLINED):

BEGINS -

1. ON 24 JANUARY 1974, IRANIAN FORCES VIOLATED IRAQ'S TERRITORIAL
INTEGRITY IN THE BADRA COUNTY AREA AND WERE REPULSED BY IRAQI
FRONTIER FORCES.

2. ON 4 FEBRUARY 1974 IRANIAN FORCES SUPPORTED BY HEAVY ARTILLERY
LAUNCHED A PREMEDITATED ATTACK ON IRAQI BORDER POSITIONS WHICH
RESULTED IN TEN CASUALTIES, DEAD AND WOUNDED.

3. THE IRANIAN VIOLATIONS OF IRAQI TERRITORY CONTINUED THEREAFTER
AND IRAQI FORCES WERE COMPELLED TO RETALIATE.

4. IN THE EARLY MORNING OF 10 FEBRUARY 1974 A CLASH OCCURRED

...2

INWARD CABLEGRAM

LEH2

2.

I.21501

BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN WHICH THE IRANIAN ARMED UNITS WERE SUPPORTED BY HEAVY ARTILLERY AND ARMORED VEHICLES.

THE IRAQI FORCES CONFRONTED THEM IN A BATTLE THAT RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF ONE OFFICER, THE WOUNDING OF ANOTHER, AND TWENTY-ONE OTHER CASUALTIES, DEAD AND WOUNDED.

THERE WERE MORE THAN SEVENTY CASUALTIES, INCLUDING DEAD AND WOUNDED, ON THE IRANIAN SIDE.

5. THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES IN BADRA SEVERAL TIMES ASKED FOR A MEETING WITH THEIR IRANIAN COUNTERPARTS TO DISCUSS THE IRANIAN TRESSPASSES AND VIOLATIONS AND TO ARRIVE AT A SOLUTION TO THESE PROBLEMS THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS.

THE IRANIAN SIDE PROCRASTINATED AND HAS REFUSED TO HOLD A MEETING TO THIS DAY.

6. IRANIAN FORCES AT DIFFERENT LEVELS ARE CONCENTRATED ON THE BORDER AREA AND CONTINUE THEIR MILITARY ACTIONS OPENLY VIOLATING IRAQI TERRITORY IN A PLANNED MANNER WHILE IRANIAN AIRFORCE FIGHTERS VIOLATE IRAQI AIRSPACE THREATENING IRAQ'S NATIONAL SECURITY AND SOVEREIGNTY.

ENDS.

A/PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PM'S

MACTION: UNIA

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA) NA WAME
FAS(PW) PC ECSA FAS(DEF) DP IC ICR FAS(10) UNIA
FAS(Q) FAS(MS)

BELGRADE CAIRO JAKARTA LONDON MOSCOW NAIROBI NEW DELHI PARIS PEKING
TEL AVIV VIENNA

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

INWARD CABLEGRAM

69

LEH2

I.21531

FROM

TOD 13.02.74...1325LT

AUSTRALIAN CONSULATE GENERAL
NEW YORK

TOR 13.02.74...1053LT

RESTRICTED PRIORITY

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 199, REPEATED WASHINGTON 49, TEHERAN OP.100
BEIRUT 06

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN-IRAQ DISPUTE (UNDERLINED)

THE AUSTRALIAN PRESS WILL NO DOUBT HAVE REPORTED CLASHES
IN RECENT DAYS ALONG THE FRONTIER IRAN-IRAQ.

2. AFTER SOME DAYS OF SPECULATION HERE AS TO WHETHER THERE
MIGHT BE AN IRAQI COMPLAINT TO THE UNITED NATIONS, THE IRAQI
DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE HANDED A LETTER TO THE SECURITY
COUNCIL PRESIDENT (FRANCE) AT TODAY'S MONTHLY COUNCIL LUNCH.
THE LETTER, WHICH WITH ITS ATTACHMENT IS CONTAINED IN MY
FOLLOWING TELEGRAM, REQUESTS 'AN URGENT MEETING OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL TO CONSIDER CONTINUING ACTS OF AGGRESSION LAUNCHED BY
IRANIAN ARMED FORCES AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF IRAQ'.

3. THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT'S CURRENT INTENTION IS TO CALL MEMBERS
TOGETHER FOR INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON THURSDAY 14 FEBRUARY WITH
A VIEW TO CONVENING A FORMAL MEETING ON FRIDAY 15 FEBRUARY.

4. THIS IS OF COURSE A LONG-STANDING TERRITORIAL DISPUTE WHICH
ISMAT KITTANI, ASST. SECRETARY-GENERAL AND EXECUTIVE
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (HIMSELF AN IRAQI), REMINDED
ME TODAY HAD ONLY EVER BEEN PARTIALLY SETTLED.

KITTANI NATURALLY SUPPOSED THAT IRAN, AS THE PRESUMED AGGRESSOR
IN THIS LATEST SERIES OF FRONTIER INCIDENTS AND HAVING APPARENTLY
SUFFERED SIGNIFICANT CASUALTIES, WOULD WANT TO RETURN TO THE ATTACK,
AND THAT IRAQ, AS THE ACKNOWLEDGED WEAKER PARTY, WOULD WANT TO
SEEK WHATEVER PROTECTION IT COULD OBTAIN FROM THE UNITED NATIONS.

5. IRANIAN AMBASSADOR HOVEYDA TELLS ME THAT ON SUNDAY 10 FEBRUARY
HE SENT A NOTE TO THE IRAQI REPRESENTATIVE PROTESTING AGAINST
IRAQI BORDER AGGRESSION.

HE CLAIMS TO HAVE BEEN ASSURED SUBSEQUENTLY THAT IRAQ DID NOT
INTEND TO BRING THE MATTER TO THE UNITED NATIONS, AND CONSEQUENTLY
HE DID NOT SEEK INSTRUCTIONS FROM TEHERAN.

IN THE LIGHT OF TODAY'S IRAQI ACTION, HOWEVER, HE WILL BE
CIRCULATING TOMORROW A NOTE SETTING FORTH THE IRANIAN CASE, WHICH
HE REGARDS AS COMPLETELY CONVINCING.

...2

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

68

RESTRICTED

LEH2

2.

1.21531

HE WILL DENY ANY CHARGE OF AGGRESSION BY IRAN, AND WILL POINT TO THE PRESENCE OF 14 IRAQI BODIES ON THE IRANIAN SIDE OF THE BORDER.

HE INSISTS THAT THE IRAQI CHARGES ARE PROPAGANDIST, THAT THESE INCIDENTS OFFER NO THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND THAT THERE IS THUS NO CASE FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.

HE HOPES TO OBTAIN SUPPORT FROM ARAB COLLEAGUES TO THIS END AND WILL CONTACT ME AGAIN TOMORROW.

6. THE COMMON FEELING AMONG COUNCIL MEMBERS TODAY WAS THAT THE MATTER COULD BEST BE DISPOSED OF BY RESOLUTION OR PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT OF CONSENSUS CALLING UPON BOTH PARTIES TO SETTLE THEIR DISPUTE PEACEFULLY.

MCINTYRE.

A/PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PM'S

RESTRICTED

ACTION: UNIA

SEC DEPSECS EX MOO FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA) NA WAME
FAS(PW) PC ECSA FAS(DEF) DP IC ICR FAS(IQ) UNIA
FAS(OL) FAS(MS)
BELGRADE CAIRO JAKARTA LONDON MOSCOW NAIROBI NEW DELHI PARIS PEKING
TEL AVIV VIENNA

INWARD CABLEGRAM

KAS3

I.21274

FROM

TOD 11.2.74... 1423 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHRAN

TOR 13.2.74... 1410 LT

146 RESTRICTED

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 146 REPEATED BEIRUT OP 68

IRANIAN - IRAQI RELATIONS

YOUR WILL HAVE SEEN AGENCY REPORTS OF A BORDER CLASH AT MEHRAN, ALMOST DUE-EAST OF BAGHDAD. THIS IS THE LATEST IN A NUMBER OF INCIDENTS RECENTLY IN THIS AREA BUT IT IS MUCH LARGER IN SCALE. IRAN ADMITS TOTAL CASUALTIES OF 102 INCLUDING 41 DEAD AND CLAIMS 14 IRAQIS KILLED AND THE CAPTURE OF "A LARGE CACHE OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION".

2. THE IRAQI FORCE ENGAGED APPARENTLY COMPRISED INFANTRY SUPPORTED BY TANKS AND ARTILLERY AND AT LEAST ONE AIRCRAFT WHICH STRAFFED A DAM. THE PLACE OF THE ATTACK MAY BE EXPLAINED BY THE PROXIMITY OF THE DAM AND ALSO BY THE FACT THAT MEHRAN IS AT THE CENTRE OF A DOUBLE SALIENT PROTRUDING INTO IRAQ.

3. IRANIANS, WHO DO NOT EXPECT LOGICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR IRAQI ACTIONS, OFFER AS EXPLANATION "TYPICAL IRAQI UNPREDICTABILITY AND IRRESPONSIBILITY". THIS COULD APPLY TO THE REGIME OR EVEN TO DISSIDENT FACTIONS WISHING TO EMBARRASS THE REGIME. THE TIMING WOULD SUPPORT THE LATTER AS THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE ARRIVED IN TEHRAN TEN DAYS AGO AND WAS EXPECTED TO PRESENT HIS CREDENTIALS SOON AFTER THE SHAH'S RETURN.

4. THE IRANIAN MILITARY REACTION SO FAR HAS BEEN SIMPLY TO "REPULSE THE ATTACK" AND, DIPLOMATICALLY, A STRONGLY WORDED PROTEST HAS BEEN DELIVERED, BUT PERHAPS WITH LITTLE HOPE OF RESPONSE FROM BAGHDAD, SINCE EARLIER PROTESTS HAVE GONE UNANSWERED.

5. EDITORIAL COMMENT CRITICISES THE IRAQI REGIME AND, BY IMPLICATION, OTHER ARAB STATES FOR SUBMITTING TO IRAQI BLACK MAIL. "OBVIOUSLY THERE IS A LIMIT TO IRAN'S TOLERANCE. IRAQI MURDERERS WILL HAVE TO PAY."

*Dr. [unclear] 1. Mr Greenham
2. file .../2
16/11/2*

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

66

KAS3

.2.

1.21274

A/PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PM'S

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

ACTION: WAME

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO MR BODY FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA) NA WAME FAS(PW)
PC ECSA FAS(DEF) DP IC ICR FAS(IO) UNIA FAS(CL) LT FAS(MS)

CAIRO GENEVA LONDON NEW YORK (UN) PARIS TEL AVIV TOKYO
WASHINGTON

12/11/74

M. Flanagan

173/11/31

MIDDLE EAST

Iraq, Iran clash on border

BAHRAIN, Monday (AAP-Reuters). — Iraq has alleged that Iran is gathering more forces on the border after a frontier clash between the two countries yesterday in which more than 90 were reported killed or wounded.

A military statement broadcast by Bagdad radio

and monitored in Bahrain last night, said an Iranian force, backed by artillery and armour, lost 70 dead or wounded when it clashed with Iraqi forces early yesterday.

The Iraqi side suffered 23 casualties.

The Iranians were gathering more forces and continuing their attacks and their jet fighters were crossing deep into Iraqi airspace, threatening national security, the statement said.

Reports reaching Tehran last night said Iraqi armoured units had opened fire with heavy armament on an Iranian border village and an Iraqi military aircraft had strafed the Kan-Jan-Cham dam.

Iranian frontier guards had returned the fire and sporadic fighting continued, these reports said.

The communiqué from the Iraq Army High Command, quoted by Bagdad Radio, said the latest fighting followed clashes in the Badra area, about 100 miles east of Bagdad, on December 24 and February 4.

Iraq and Iran have frequently clashed in their long-standing dispute over navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab River which runs along the border between the two countries.

They severed diplomatic relations in 1971 after Iraq accused Britain and Iran of collusion in the Iranian occupation of three small islands in the gulf.

Relations were formally re-established at embassy level last October. The initiative came from Iraq just before the Baathist Government there announced that its troops were to be used in the fourth Arab war against Israel.

1. M. Flanagan
2. file

M. Flanagan

12/12



CONFIDENTIAL 61

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHRAN

In reply quote No. 300/55

Memorandum No. 771

18 October 1973

The Secretary
Department of Foreign Affairs
CANBERRA

173/11/31

IRAQ: NEW SOVIET MILITARY AIRCRAFT

Please refer to Washington's memorandum 2962 of 3 October 1973 and the "Washington Post" article attached to it.

2. American press reports of the delivery of 12 Tu-22 "Blinder" bombers to Iraq have been carried in the Tehran newspapers. The only official Iranian comment has been to claim that the Iranian Government knew about the delivery of the aircraft, and had also been aware that a deal had been negotiated "as far back as March 1972".

3. Anti-Iranian propaganda from Iraq has virtually ceased following the announcement on 8 October that diplomatic relations are to be restored between the two countries (our telegram 614 refers); the Iraqi Embassy reopened under a Charge d'Affaires a i, a First Secretary, Khaled al Samarai. Nonetheless, the Shah must be concerned that the Soviet Union may have chosen to give these highly sophisticated and very fast aircraft to Iraq: his fears would not be dispelled by reports that the aircraft will remain under Soviet controls. In response, he will probably press ahead as rapidly as possible with procurement of the American F 14 and F 15 aircraft.

4. Copies of this memorandum have been sent to Beirut, Cairo and Washington.

(R P Broinowski)
First Secretary

→ Mr Cordell
F.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Jackson 2/11

Iraq Incl. Reft 70

173/11/31

17. At the beginning of September the Iranian press published lists of Soviet military equipment arriving in the Iraqi port of Basra, including parts for MiG and Sukhoi fighters. Later in the month appeared reports that Iraq had taken delivery of several TU 22 "Blinder" supersonic bombers. Predictable expressions of condemnation (of the Iraqis not the Russians) were made.

18. As reported in our telegram 618 Iraq and Iran re-established diplomatic relations on 9 October.

Sept 1973 Sawingram.



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
D.E.A.

15 18:43 AM

INDEX SUMMARY

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHRAN

In reply quote No. 201/2/2/5

Memorandum No. 725

4 October 1973

The Secretary
Department of Foreign Affairs
CANBERRA

McConnell

*Anything - interest
in this?*

IRAN: SOME VIEWS OF THE SHAH

During an audience he granted Jean Mauriac of AFP on 27 September, the Shah made a number of comments about the fight against terrorism in Iran, and Iran's relations with Iraq, the Soviet Union and India.

2. He said that all terrorist gangs in Iran had been wiped out, and the security situation was very good: he said he had recently driven 32 kilometres from Mehrabad Airport to Sa'adabad Palace at 20 kilometres an hour in an open car (ie on his return from a visit to the United States - our Savingsgram 10 of 8 August refers). "Do you think I would have exposed myself in this manner in a country of guerillas and terrorists?" To Mauriac's comment that in the West there was much talk of repression and terror in Iran, the Shah retorted "We see terrorists everywhere in the world - in Turkey, in South America with the Tupamaros, in Germany with the Baeder Meinhoff gang, in England with letter bombs, even in Switzerland with the Jurassien autonomists. With us, these terrorists are directed by remote control from Baghdad - but who directs Baghdad by remote control? (Iranian inspired and sponsored terrorism in Iraq, which a senior Foreign Ministry official had once indiscreetly admitted to us existed, was of course left unmentioned.)

3. The Shah added that terrorist gangs in Iran were finished. "The unfortunate incident of the assassination of an American officer in Tehran (Colonel Hawkins, killed in June - our memorandum 411) might be repeated two or three times a year, but such incidents can occur anywhere in the world. Fundamentally, the situation is calmer in Iran than anywhere else in the world."

4. The Shah denied that Iran's relations with the Soviet Union were going through a difficult phase. He referred to the communique following Prime Minister Roveyda's visit to Moscow in August as clearly recognising Iranian policy in the Persian Gulf - that the Gulf will remain under the authority of the littoral states free from intervention from outside powers.

McTear 1/10/73

5. On Iran/Indian relations, the Shah said that during Swaran Singh's visit to Tehran (August) each side had convinced the other that Iran and Indian foreign policies were not directed against each other. "But Iran cannot take any risks. History has taught us that we must defend ourselves and not send an SOS to the Americans."

6. As regards Iraq, the Shah was more than usually contemptuous: from a military point of view, Iraq could attempt nothing more than an act of temporary folly ... Iraq's recourse to armaments does not frighten Iran. Iraq is a "poor fragmented country, lacking cohesion, with a barbaric regime. Iraq can of course fire a few cannonballs at Abadan, but even if they armed themselves further, could they utilise their equipment?" (On the other hand, the Iranians have claimed on another occasion that if Abadan was even attacked, Iran could occupy Baghdad in three days.)

7. The Shah then talked about Iran's role and potential "in ten years, relative to the size of the two populations, Iran will be the France of today. The world must take account of a country with such potential in the far west of the Orient. We are Easterners, but we are Aryans. This Middle East, where is it? One can no longer find us there. But Asia, yes: We are an Asian Aryan power whose mentality and philosophy are close to those of the European states, above all those of France."

8. The timing of the Shah's comments about the final destruction of terrorist gangs in Iran is hard to understand in view of the disclosure three days later of the arrest of 12 terrorists who had planned to kill HIM and kidnap members of the Royal Family. We hope to learn more about this in due course.

R P Broinowski
(R P Broinowski)
First Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL



WAM 57
CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
NATIONAL BANK BUILDING
CIVIC CENTRE
ISLAMABAD
PHONE 22111 P.O. Box 104

File No. 202/1

Memo. No. 483/73

6 June 1973

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA.

Baluchistan and Iraqi Arms

I attach a record of conversation on the above subjects which may be of some interest to you.

2. A copy of the record of conversation is also being sent to the Australian Embassy, Tehran.

(T. B. McCarthy)
Charge d'Affaires

CONFIDENTIAL

→ McCull
F. 24/6

West 20/6

189/2/11
189/11/30
25/6

CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, ISLAMABAD

56

ORD OF CONVERSATION

: Mr. R. H. Hobden, Charge d'Affaires of Britain
: 1 June 1973

Officers present : T. B. McCarthy

Subjects discussed :

I had a very long conversation with Hobden on a wide range of issues during the evening, but feel perhaps the following are the only ones worth recording:-

Baluchistan

2. We discussed the situation in Baluchistan and the difficulties involved in finding out the degree of seriousness of the troubles there because in Islamabad we were forced to rely almost entirely on the Government-controlled press. We all, of course, had taken the opportunity to discuss the issue with various MLA's and Government officials, but in each case one only got a particular point of view.

3. Hobden said that he had not allowed any of his political officers to go to Quetta. He felt the British situation in Pakistan and they were watched very carefully. The Government had said that there was no serious problem in Baluchistan and if a series of British diplomats were to visit Quetta it might tend to give the impression that they (the British) thought the situation was serious. He said this had caused great concern in his own political section.

4. Hobden said that he was allowing his Services Attache, Brigadier McDonald, to visit Quetta to see the students in the Staff College and interview the Commandant there. However, he was insisting McDonald return as soon as this business was completed.

5. He said he would welcome news or advice that we could give them on the situation in Baluchistan. However, I told him that permission for my own travel to Quetta had been refused from Canberra, though I thought because of different motivations to the British.

Iraqi Arms

6. In discussing the Iraqi arms, Hobden shared my view that there was a rather surprising white-wash of the whole affair in the recent joint communique between Iraq and Pakistan.

7. Hobden said the British were sure the arms were primarily from Czechoslovakia with an unknown quantity from the USSR. He said that the British were sure that the episode was so clumsy it was not planned by the Russians and they were uncertain of the degree of involvement by the Russians in this affair. In response to a question

..... 2

Canberra
Baluchistan File
28/7/1

Distribution :

Report prepared by :

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, ISLAMABAD

55

RECORD OF CONVERSATION

with :

on :

Officers present :

Subjects discussed :

-2-

from him I explained that we shared the view that the Russians had certainly not planned the arms supply and that we believed the situation was handled in such an incredibly clumsy manner that any story about it would seem ridiculous. Hobden said he was sure that the Iraqi Government was at the back of the arms supply which was intended for the Baluchistan area. The purpose of this was to cause trouble for the Iranians along the Baluchistan border, and thus embarrass the Iranian Government. Hobden said the Iraqis had planned to send the arms to its Consulate in Karachi and thence by road to Baluchistan. It had begun the supply of arms even before the Consulate had been established in Karachi and it became necessary therefore for them to forward the arms onto Islamabad. Even when they became aware of this they continued to send arms to Islamabad. The Iraqi Ambassador was not aware of the details. Hobden put the whole affair down to "typical ham-fisted Arab-Iraqi type administration".

8. Hobden agreed with my view that no matter what had been the origin of the arms and the motivations for them, Bhutto had used it to what he thought was his best advantage and dismissed two governments, one in Baluchistan and one in NWFP. It would appear that the dismissal of the first was a blunder and that Bhutto may have been successful in manipulating Government loyalty in NWFP.

Distribution :

(T. B. McCarthy)

Report prepared by : Charge d'Affaires

ZCZC HAA253 281416 XHB102
00 HCA HTD

143/11/31

54

IRAN 5-28

TEHRAN, MAY 28 (UPI)--A FIRING SQUAD AT THE AHWAZ MILITARY GARRISON IN SOUTHERN IRAN TODAY EXECUTED EIGHT +SPIES AND TRAITORS+, THE GOVERNMENT SAID.

THE EIGHT, ALL IRANIANS, WERE ARRESTED AFTER AUTHORITIES DISCOVERED THEY HAD GIVEN VITAL INFORMATION TO +FOREIGN AGENTS+ BELIEVED TO BE WORKING FOR IRAQ, THE ANNOUNCEMENT SAID.

THEY GAVE THE AGENTS INFORMATION ON MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND BRIDGES, AND ALSO MINED ROADS RESULTING IN THE DEATH AND INJURIES OF GENDARMES, IT SAID.

AUTHORITIES CONFISCATED ANNUMBER OF RIFLES, MORTARS, ROCKET LAUNCHERS AND AMMUNITION, THE GOVERNMENT SAID.--(UPI)

F-2315/OLN104

NNNN

4. Clashes on Iran border

According to military spokesmen in Baghdad, two Iraqi soldiers were killed and four others wounded in border clashes at Mendali and Sanfaba after Iranian troops opened fire at Iraqi border patrols on 31 December.

-0-

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

173/11/31

INWARD SAVINGRAM

Banking

19. Two new banks are shortly to be established in Iran. One will provide working capital for local industries and the other finance for production of locally made goods. The new banks will operate as stock companies, allowing the public to contribute to the initial capital, but with the main working capital provided by other banks.

C. FOREIGN RELATIONSPakistan

20. The Shah visited Pakistan privately from 16th - 18th January. We understand he discussed regional problems with President Bhutto, including the future of the Organisation for Regional Co-Operation and Development (Turkey, Iran, Pakistan).

21. A BBC report from Tehran (16th January) claimed that the Shah had also discussed "recent unrest" in Pakistan Baluchistan and had driven home to Mr. Bhutto his preoccupation about the importance of maintaining stability there in the interests of the defence of Iran's south-eastern frontiers. As if to underline this problem, reports reached Tehran in late January of an armed revolt in that Province, supported by Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, a cabinet minister in Mr. Bhutto's government. The Pakistan Ambassador, Hamid Nawaz Khan, later told us the reports were untrue but this would hardly dispel Iranian anxiety.

173/11/31

Iraq

22. After an uneventful December, Iran/Iraq relations deteriorated in January. There were several border clashes and an Iranian H43 rescue helicopter landed, force-landed or was shot down in Iraq and its military crew of three captured by Iraqi authorities. The Iranians were particularly outraged at Iraqi claims that the crew defected, and have demanded the aircraft and the crew back. To date there has been no response from Iraq either through the Swiss, who represent Iran in Baghdad, or the Red Cross. After an initial bout of bluster ("we must attack Iraq - march on Baghdad - pay the Ba'athists back in kind"), the press had calmed down by the end of the month.

23. The situation is however, still uneasy and a miscalculation by either side could escalate a minor border clash into a more serious incident. A senior Foreign Ministry official claims that one of the three captured crew members has already died under torture. If true, this could provoke Iranian reprisals.

Romania

24. President Ceausescu paid a short visit to Iran on 13th January, following a five-day official visit to Pakistan. He was accompanied by Foreign Minister George Macoveanu. The Shah accepted an invitation to make a return visit to Romania

CONFIDENTIAL

173/11/31

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Current annual expenditure is \$US 1.22 billion, 20 percent of the total government budget.

INWARD SAVINGRAM

7. On 4th October the Chief of the Navy, Admiral Farajbollah Rasai was abruptly dismissed by the Shah. He was replaced by the third ranking officer, Rear Admiral Abbas Ramzi Atai. Although Rasai had passed retiring age, his dismissal caused some confusion and perhaps temporary loss of morale in the Navy. It is not unlikely that the change was due to the connivance of the Shah's young nephew, Commander Shahryar, who by promoting the career of his friend Atai may hope to pave the way for his own succession in four or five years' time.

8. Following Rasai's retirement (face has been saved by his appointment to the Senate) there have been persistent, but yet unconfirmed, rumours of "wholesale" sackings or "retirements" of senior officers in the Army and gendarmerie. If there is any substance in the rumours, the upper figure of 220 is likely to prove exaggerated.

Terrorism

9. The Tehran police announced they had captured one of the two assassins of the former deputy Police Chief Brigadier General Taheri (our Savingram No. 9 refers). No information has yet appeared about the alleged killer's political associations (if any) or the date for his trial. Otherwise, October was as peaceful a month as September and no major terrorist incidents were reported.

B. FOREIGN RELATIONSSoviet Union

10. The Shah made a successful visit to the Soviet Union from 10th - 21st October. He was accompanied by the Shahbanou, Foreign Minister Khalatbari, various officials and an unusually large press party which provided saturation coverage to the Tehran media throughout the visit.

11. The main aim of the Russians was probably to quieten the Shah's fears about "encirclement" and about a possible increase in Iraqi hostility towards Iran following the conclusion of the Soviet-Iraqi agreement. Radio Baghdad toned down their anti-Iranian broadcasts during the visit and it is likely that the Shah was given suitable assurances although he is unlikely to lower his guard so far as regards both Iraq and what he sees as Soviet ambitions in the Indian Ocean.

12. A fifteen year economic agreement outlining the future shape of Soviet-Iran technical co-operation was signed during the visit, and a communique issued at its end. Both sides expressed concern about the war in Asia and how to preserve peace in the Middle East. It was noted in the communique that matters concerning the Persian Gulf "should be dealt with by

.... 4

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

the countries of the region" (Interpreted by the Iranian press as Soviet endorsement for Iranian Gulf policy), and that peace in Europe would be assisted by a conference on security. Although during a speech Podgorny raised (and the Shah echoed) the Soviet concept of a collective Asian security system, there was no elaboration of this idea in the communique.

Eastern Europe

13. a) The Bulgarian President Stanko Todorov visited Iran as a guest of Prime Minister Hoveyda from 16th - 22nd October. He was received by the Shah and had talks with senior Cabinet members.
- b) The Minister of Economy (Houshang Ansary) visited Romania and signed a five-year protocol to an existing trade agreement. The value of Iranian oil exports to Romania will increase from \$21 million in 1973 to \$26 million in 1977. Non-oil exports to Romania and imports from Romania will also increase.
- c) An Iranian Parliamentary delegation visited Czechoslovakia during the month.
- d) The Yugoslav Premier (Bijedic) is due to visit Iran in November.

Federal German Republic

14. The West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel stopped briefly in Tehran on 15th October en route to Bonn from Peking. He was met by the Deputy Foreign Minister Ahmad Mirfendereski and gave a press conference, at which he spoke optimistically about a new era in German-Iranian relations. A West German trade mission also visited Iran during the month. There were discussions about the current imbalance of trade in Germany's favour, and the possibility of German investment in joint ventures in Iran. No commitments about these were made.

India

15. The Indian Army Chief of Staff (General Manekshaw) was due to visit Iran as a guest of the Iranian Chief of the Armed Forces, but postponed his visit several weeks due to problems over the Indo-Pakistan delineation talks in Kashmir.

Australia

16. On 27th October the Iranian Ambassador-designate to Australia (Hossein Eshragi) was presented to the Shah. Custom dictates that he should leave Tehran to take up his appointment about two weeks after presentation.

17. Favourable publicity was given to the beginning of the "first Iran-Australia joint venture" (actually the second - the first is between Lysaghts and an Iranian company) between Ralph McKay and Iran Agroparts to make disc ploughs in Iran. The joint venture was arranged during the September trade display (see our Savingram No. 10).

.... 5

CONFIDENTIAL



→ 173/11/31
173/11/52

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
MOSCOW
File No. 225.6
Memo No. 909

26 October 1972

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA.

USSR/IRAN

The Shah visited the USSR from 10 to 21 October. A 15-year treaty on the development of economic and technical cooperation was signed early in the visit. Agreement was reached on a 5-year plan for cultural exchanges. A joint communique was issued after the Shah's departure.

2. If it was one of the Shah's objectives to obtain reassurance that the Soviet Union's policies towards Iraq and Afghanistan were not directed towards the strategic encirclement of Iran, the public record gives no indication of success or failure. The record does, however, suggest a Soviet concern for Iran's survival as a sovereign state. Podgorny, at the Moscow banquet on 10 October, spoke of a Soviet policy of "friendship, neighbourliness and fruitful cooperation" towards "its southern neighbours" Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey. He did not mention respect for frontiers or Soviet policy in the Persian Gulf. The Shah, in his speech, raised the frontier question in a reference to "a border of peace and friendship" and a statement that "we are opposed to the use of force to acquire territorial rights". On the following day, a minor Moscow newspaper stated that "the Soviet people sincerely wish that their southern neighbour will become ... a country with a constantly strengthening sovereignty ...". The treaty, signed on 12 October, recited the usual principles of peaceful coexistence, including mutual respect for sovereignty. The communique published on 22 October affirmed devotion to the principle of "... peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems", and stated that "... peace and tranquility on the frontier ... is conducive to stability in this area of Asia and to stronger peace throughout the world." On the following day Izvestia spoke with approval of "... the intention of both neighbouring states to build their relations on a solid legal basis."

J/10
punged
nged - e
EAS
EE

signed on 173/11/52

.../2. 1299/200/000
173/11/52

2.

3. As to the question of whether the littoral powers should have a sole or a primary responsibility for settling the affairs of the Persian Gulf area, the joint communique stated that "... questions relating to the Persian Gulf area should be settled in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter by the states of the area themselves without any interference from outside."


4. On the subject of overland transportation for goods in transit across Iran, there were references in the Shah's speech at the Moscow banquet, and in Article 5 of the treaty, but nothing very concrete.

5. If the Shah hoped to negotiate a more favourable price for Iranian natural gas piped to the USSR, nothing on this subject surfaced in the public record.

6. It may be of interest to list Soviet aid projects in Iran in the order of importance that seems to be accorded to them by the USSR authorities :

- (i) the trans-Iran gas pipeline
- (ii) the metallurgical plant at Isfahan
- (iii) the machine building plant and training centre at Arak
- (iv) the dam, bridge and hydro station on the Araks River
- (v) other projects such as iron ore mines at Chogart, and coal mines at Kerman, Shahriyar and Zibar.

7. A copy of this memorandum is being minuted to
Tehran.


(M.D.P. Hill)
Counsellor

In a speech on 17 July, President Bakr said: "We emphasise our respect for the historical relations which bind us with the friendly Iranian people. We wish to establish neighbourly relations with them based on fruitful co-operation serving our mutual interests. Over the past three years we have exercised a policy of restraint in the face of the policy of the Iranian government.....While emphasising an adherence to our legitimate national and pan-Arab rights, we assert our preparedness to solve problems by peaceful means if the rulers of Iran will follow a policy of good neighbourliness with Iraq and the rest of the Arab nation." These are the first friendly words from Iraq on relations with Iran since the breaking off of diplomatic

47

DELETED

...../3

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

RESTRICTED
INWARD SAVINGRAM

46

relations after the Iranian occupation in November 1971 of the
three Gulf islands.

Tehran Saw. 7.

CONFIDENTIAL 173/11/31

B. FOREIGN RELATIONS

7/5/72

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Iraq

2. Small scale clashes continued to occur throughout the month between Iraqi and Iranian troops along the western border and there were further reports of Iranian residents being expelled from Iraq, although in diminishing numbers. The Iranians were annoyed and scornful about Iraqi broadcasts claiming the existence of an "Arab National Liberation Front" based in Ahwaz. According to the Iranians, the Front comprises a few Iraqi soldiers who have infiltrated the Ahwaz area disguised as "fedayees".

3. The Shah's statement in London that he could reach agreement with Iraq "in the shortest time" over navigation rights, and his support for Iraq's nationalisation of the Iraq Petroleum Company, prompted speculation in Tehran that tensions between the two countries would shortly diminish and that Saudi Arabia or Kuwait might be chosen to mediate a settlement. There is no hard evidence that this will occur, or that negotiations might take place.

Pakistan

4. President Bhutto visited Tehran from 8th - 10th June. The communique emphasised the "love and affection" binding the two countries, hoped for the success of the Indo-Pakistan summit and appealed for the repatriation of Pakistan P.O.W.S from Bangladesh. It also supported the Arab cause in Palestine and the growth of Islamic co-operation.

5. At a press conference, Mr. Bhutto claimed that India had abandoned non-alignment through its treaty with the Soviet Union. Pakistan had as a result gained renewed interest in CENTO, although it would withdraw from CENTO if India renounced its treaty with the U.S.S.R. He would be flexible and realistic about Bangladesh in his talks with Mrs. Gandhi.

6. The Governor of Pakistan Baluchistan (Sardar Khan Bizenjo) arrived in Tehran during Mr. Bhutto's visit. Accounts vary whether the Governor came on his own volition and was hurriedly fitted into the entourage, or was summoned by Mr. Bhutto. The Iranian explanation was that his visit was a goodwill gesture similar to Princess Ashraf's visit to Quetta in May. Its main purpose was to underline that there was no conflict between Pakistan and Iran over Baluchistan. The Governor talked about the possibilities of economic collaboration across the Baluch border. He refused to discuss security problems, played down rumours of civil disturbances in Quetta and denied allegations of Soviet penetration into the area.

..../3

CONFIDENTIAL

→ EAME original on 173/11/31

→ 173/11/31

RM/41
M. Tringlove 7/7

JUL 4 2 16 PM '72

EX. SUBJECT

CONFIDENTIAL

(last page on 45
173/11/52) 44
Cray / McCr. Reltin)

193/11/51 156/5/1

193/12/1

193/11/147

193/11/52

193/11/0

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHRAN

In reply quote No. 201/2/7

Memorandum No. 449

1st July, 1972.

193/2/1

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA.

Iran : The Shah's Press Conference, London

In memorandum No. 447 of 1st July we commented on the questions and answers about oil in the Shah's press conference in London on 24th June. The following is a resume of the other matters covered by the Shah :

a) Armaments

Iran must have the best military equipment, short of nuclear weapons, available in the world today. Prospects for the purchase of British equipment were good, including a laser beam guidance system for the guns on Iran's British Chieftain tanks (of which Iran has ordered 775 - our memorandum No. 200 of 16th March, 1972, refers).

b) Aviation

The purchase of three Concorde by Iran Air was confirmed. As a mid-way point between London and Tokyo, and with extensive uninhabited desert areas to transit, a supersonic corridor could be established over Iran without inconvenience to the people and at commercial advantage to Iran.

c) India/Pakistan

The Shah expressed the hope that Mrs. Gandhi and President Bhutto could find common ground for talks which will bring peace. India, which was primarily to blame for the war, should be magnanimous. The disintegration of Pakistan would hit India as well as Iran. Iran could not tolerate a situation of military chaos or disintegration on its south eastern borders.

M. Haddad
His secret copies to
DIO
CPS
EAME
D.P.
and file as
appropriate

5/7

sh. coll. 5/7

Mr. CORDELL

CONFIDENTIAL

...12/1/72 see
had have this on
relevant files

5/7

CONFIDENTIAL

43

d) The Persian Gulf

In the Shah's opinion, the Soviet presence in the Gulf area did not present as much of a threat to the stability of the area as the subversive activities of some of Iran's neighbours in the Gulf, principally Iraq. The Shah turned aside a question whether he saw any threat to the security of the Gulf through the recent treaty between Iraq and the Soviet Union: "Any action within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its charter cannot be discussed by others. Anything done outside the Charter (by Iran's neighbours) allows Iran to reserve for itself the same prerogatives".

e) CENTO

CENTO never had any military strength, but as a forum for discussion it was still better to have the organisation than not. It was gratifying to see that Pakistan, after having boycotted almost all recent CENTO meetings, should now send a cabinet minister to the London meeting.

f) Iraq

Iran was prepared to settle its differences with Iraq very quickly, provided Iraq agreed to abandon the present border arrangement which unjustly gave that country control over all the waters of the Shatt. This arrangement was a legacy of British colonialism. It was forced on Iran, and was not a modern agreement entered into freely between equal partners.

g) Subversives

The subversive and terrorist movement in Iran was not a purely local problem, but part of an international Marxist conspiracy. The three Japanese terrorists at Lod, who were gunmen disinterested in the issues of the country in which they had been hired to operate, showed the international characteristics of the movement.

Comment

2. The Shah's concern to obtain sophisticated military equipment has been a consistent feature of his defence policy. The danger he faces is that he will over-reach the reservoir of technical man power available in Iran to maintain it. As reported in our memorandum 200 of 16th March, military observers in Tehran already believe the Iranian Air Force is less effective now than at a point two years ago when it was not burdened with the job of flying and keeping operational its several squadrons of F-4's. Judging from comments he made to the Ambassador (our memorandum 441 of 1st July, 1972) the Shah may now be contemplating the purchase of some F.111's. These could compound his problems.

CONFIDENTIAL

..../3

Mr. Loughlin 14/6

RECEIVED
14/6/72



IMPERIAL EMBASSY OF IRAN
DJAKARTA

NO. 588

7173/11/31
42

An Alimian has been pressing me about this. He is going to my to speak to the Minister this afternoon.

The Imperial Embassy of Iran presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and has the honour to inform that esteemed Ministry of the following :-

Further to the Imperial Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' note dated May 1972, addressed to the Australian Embassy in Teheran, regarding the loans to the Government of Iraq by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). It would be appreciated if your esteemed Ministry would inform this Embassy of the steps that have been taken in this matter.

A photo-copy of the telegram sent by the Minister of Finance of Iran to the President of the IBRD is attached hereto.

The Imperial Embassy of Iran avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia the assurances of its highest consideration.

Djakarta, 6th June, 1972.

Mr. Foulkes has advised Iranian Ambassador that he has handed note to me and that I will consider it immediately. Pls pass it to the relevant authorities.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Government of the
Commonwealth of Australia,
CANBERRA A.C.T. 2600,
AUSTRALIA.

B. W. P.

→
Deft
CW 13/6

MIN-50
1. Mr. [unclear] 15/6
2. Mr. [unclear] 16/6 - pre
ppa on file



وزارت امور خارجه

INTERAIRMAIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. (U.S.A.)
FOR THE HONOURABLE ROBERT S. MACNAMARA, PRESIDENT

THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THE BANK'S INTENTION TO NEGOTIATE THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE BANK'S LOAN FOR THE LOANER TRAILS PROJECT IN IRAQ. STOP I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT THERE ARE SEVERAL OTHER BANK PROJECTS FOR IRAQ WHICH ARE AT DIFFERENT STAGES OF PREPARATION AND FINALIZATION FOR SUBMISSION TO THE BOARD STOP I AM INSTRUCTED BY MY GOVERNMENT TO BRING TO THE BANK'S ATTENTION THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ HAS CAUSED THE MASS DEPORTATION OF IRANIAN CITIZENS RESIDING IN THAT COUNTRY STOP THESE DEPORTEDS WHO NUMBER ABOUT 60,000 HAVE LOST SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF PERSONAL FURNITURE AND FINED ASSETS IN ADDITION TO THEIR JOBS STOP THE DETAILED LIST OF SUCH PROPERTIES AND ASSETS ARE BEING FORWARDED AND WILL BE READY SHORTLY STOP THE MATTER HAS BEEN BROUGHT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF

- 2 -

IRAQ SO FAR WITHOUT ANY RESULT STOP IN VIEW OF
THE B.N.A.'S POLICIES IN THESE MATTERS COMMA BY
GOVERNMENT EFFECTS THAT THE BANK POSTIONS
CONSIDERATION AND APPROVAL OF ANY LOAN TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT PROPER
CONSENTATION HAS BEEN ARRANGED FOR STOP

2201 - 11.5.1972

WITH BEST REGARDS
JAMSHID AMOULGAR
MINISTER OF FINANCE

- 2 -

IRAQ SO FAR WITHOUT ANY RESULT STOP IN VIEW OF
THE B.N.A.'S POLICIES IN THESE MATTERS COMM. BY
GOVERNMENT EXPECTS THAT THE BANK POSTIONS
CONSIDERATION AND APPROVAL OF ANY LOAN TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT PROPER
CONSENTATION HAS BEEN ARRANGED FOR STOP

2201 - 11.5.1972

WITH BEST REGARDS
JAMSHID AMOULGAR
MINISTER OF FINANCE

39

I.59648
TOD 09.06.72...1721 LT
TOR 10.06.72...0900 LT

173/11/31

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS REPRESENTED TO THE BANK THAT, IN VIEW OF THESE EVENTS, IT SHOULD NOT GO FORWARD WITH LOANS TO IRAQ.

3. ON THE BASIS OF THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE, INCLUDING LAST SENTENCE OF ABOVE QUOTE, THERE DOES NOT SEEM TO BE A BREACH OF BANK'S POLICY ON EXPROPRIATION WARRANTING POSTPONEMENT OF THE PROJECT AND I WOULD PROPOSE, THEREFORE, TO SUPPORT THE MANAGEMENT'S JUDGMENT IN THE MATTER.

3. ON THE BASIS OF THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE, INCLUDING LAST SENTENCE OF ABOVE QUOTE, THERE DOES NOT SEEM TO BE A BREACH OF BANK'S POLICY ON EXPROPRIATION WARRANTING POSTPONEMENT OF THE PROJECT AND I WOULD PROPOSE, THEREFORE, TO SUPPORT THE MANAGEMENT'S JUDGMENT IN THE MATTER.

.../2

13/11/2017

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

38

2.

I.59648

A/PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
DEPT FOREIGN AFFAIRS (706/22/7)
MIN AND DEPT T AND I
TREASURER AND TREASURY T/T
DEPT PM AND C
PMS

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

ACTION: EP

SEC	A/DEPSEC(A) (B)	PR	MR BODY	FAS(A)	SA	FAS(PW)
PC	EAME	FAS(DVP)	AID	ICR	FAS(IO)	EP UNIA FAS(LGL)
LTB	UNL	FAS(MS)	DDO			

173/11/31

37

From
Memo 306
ca Beirut
22/5/72
Original on
173/2/1
GWB 5/16

11. The Minister and the Director-General of the International Division of the Ministry said that the problem of the border with Iran was one of the most pressing for Iraq. According to the Minister, Iran, which was closely tied in with the imperialist powers seeking to maintain their domination of the area, had expansionist designs on Iraq and these must be resisted at all cost. In unilaterally abrogating the border agreement Iran had acted in a way which was quite contrary to all concepts of international law. The Director-General of the International Division claimed indeed that it was without precedent for a treaty regulating borders to be so abrogated. The Minister said Iraq had been quite prepared to discuss the disagreement over the Shatt El Arab border with Iran or even to agree to take the question to the International Court of Justice, but had insisted that while the matter was awaiting decision the treaty regulating the border should remain in effect. It could not discuss it in the light of Iran's abrogation of the treaty. Iraq now had good relations with its other neighbours - the Kuwait border was no longer a problem - and wanted at least "normal" relations with Iran, but the aggressive Iranian attitude had made a normal relationship impossible.

30
CONFIDENTIAL



173/11/31

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHRAN

221/5/9

In reply quote No.

343

Memorandum No.

18th May, 1972.

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA.

Tour of Gulf by Iraqi Foreign Minister

In early May the Foreign Minister of Iraq, Mr. Murtada Sa'id Abel-Baqi al Hadithi visited Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the Union of Arab Emirates and Oman. In their public treatment the Iranians were initially anxious to play down the visit, but became incensed at a Kuwait-Iraq press statement and an Iraq-UAE communique which condemned Iran's seizure in 1971 of the Gulf islands of the Tumbs and Abu Musa. The islands were characterised as "part of the Arab Homeland". Both Kuwait and the Union of Arab Emirates have been soundly condemned by the Tehran media for allowing themselves to become pawns in Iraq's propaganda war against Iran. There have also appeared a number of editorials calling for Iranian reprisals against such "unfriendly acts".

2. According to the American Embassy in Kuwait (we have discussed their report with the American Embassy, Tehran), the Kuwaitis received little advance notice of the Iraqi Foreign Minister's visit. Their feelings about it were mixed but the results on balance appeared to them to have been worthwhile. On the negative side, the islands issue which by now might have been buried is very much still a public issue. Iran is correspondingly even more offside than before, and the chances of restoring the exchange of Ambassadors in the near future have receded. On the other hand, Kuwait's relations with Iraq were improved and the joint statement over the Gulf islands has helped to reinforce Kuwait's Arab credentials. The Kuwaitis also claimed that they used the visit to advantage by warning a receptive Mr. al-Hadithi against

.... /2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

a repetition of some recent Iraqi excesses in the Gulf.
These included :

- a) the discovery of Iraqi weapons, destined for subversives, in Bahrain,
- b) the uncovering of Iraqi propaganda in Qatar,
- c) the attempt by the Iraqi Ambassador-designate in Oman to present his credentials before agreement has been given.

3. As for the Iraqi-UAE communique, the Iranians' existing irritation with the President, Sheikh Zayed, can only have been aggravated. According to an Iranian contact, the Iranians were particularly annoyed that the communique followed on the heels of another communique Sheikh Zayed signed with President Numeiry of the Sudan during the latter's state visit to Abu Dhabi earlier in May. President Numeiry "had not really been interested in who owned the Tums or Abu Musa", and had in fact declined to mention the subject in the communique he signed with Sheikh Zayed in Khartoum earlier this year. But when Mr. Numeiry visited Abu Dhabi, the issue was prominently raised and Iran condemned at Sheikh Zayed's initiative.

4. We think that the Iraqi Foreign Minister's tour has further polarised in Iranian minds the "good" Arab Gulf states from the "bad". Kuwait and the Union of Arab Emirates are for the present categorised as bad, either as malicious and willing partners of Iraq, or at least as that state's dupes. Qatar and Bahrain on the other hand remain in Iran's good books since they did not, as seen here, succumb to Iraqi threats or blandishments to allow Mr. al-Hadithi to use his visit to attack Iran. The Bahraini Minister of Finance and Economy (Mr. Sayed Mahmoud al-Alwai) has just completed a visit to Tehran to complete the agreement on delineation of the continental shelf in the Persian Gulf between Bahrain and Iran and was most cordially received. Oman, which apparently refused to receive the new Iraqi Foreign Minister, is also in good grace. Its new Charge d'Affaires has settled in well in Tehran. Qatar, similarly, has got away to a good start with the establishment of its diplomatic mission in Tehran. Today's press speaks of a likely early visit by the new Ruler.

5. A copy of this memorandum has been sent to the Australian Embassy, Beirut for information.

(R.P. Broinowski)
First Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

MG 7

1.51660

FROM

TOD 20.5.72...1210 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHERAN

TOR 22.5.72...1914 LT

337 RESTRICTED

173/11/31

RESTRICTED

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 339

REPEATED WASHINGTON FOR INFORMATION OP.72

IRAN: IRAQ - IBRD LOAN

FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS SENT USA NOTE FORMALLY
REQUESTING AUSTRALIAN SUPPORT IN OPPOSING
THE ISSUE OF AN IBRD LOAN TO IRAQ FOR ITS LOWER KHALIS PROJECT.

ATTACHED WAS THE TEXT OF A TELEGRAM FROM THE IRANIAN
FINANCE MINISTER TO BANK PRESIDENT MACNAMARA SEEK-
ING POSTPONEMENT OF CONSIDERATION OF THE LOAN UNTIL IRAQI GOVERNMENT
COMPEN-SATES 60,000 IRANIAN NATIONALS CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN EXPELLED
FROM IRAQ RECENTLY.

2. AMERICANS, BRITISH AND CANADIANS HAVE RECEIVED IDENTICAL NOTES
AND HAVE CABLED FOR INSTRUCTIONS. GLAD EARLY ADVICE AS TO REPLY WE
SHOULD MAKE TO MINISTRY.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT T AND I
TREASURER AND TREASURY
PM AND C
PMS

AFTER SLEEPING WITH MY COOPER I TOLD
MR OAKLEY (EISC SURSECTION) THAT WE FELT
AUSTRALIA SHOULD TAKE ITS POSITION ON
THE FINANCIAL, DEVELOPMENT ETC MERITS OF
THE CASE AND NOT BE INVOLVED IN THE IRAQI
IRAN POLITICAL QUARREL, ~~WE DID NOT WANT TO INTERFERE~~

ACTION - EP/EAME

SEC DEP SEC(A) (B) PR FAS(A) SEA FAS(PW) PC EAME
FAS(DVP) AID ICR FAS(IO) EP UNIA FAS(MS)

RESTRICTED

WBS 29/5
WBS 29/5
/IRAQ - IRAN RELO

Please also place Ministry
copy: IRAQ - Reins with
Aest.
WBS 24/5

From Savingsgram 22 cc Beirut
Original on 173/1/7

173/11/31

33

3. Iraq/Iran Border Clashes

173/11/31

The Iraqi and Iranian governments have exchanged charges over border skirmishings between 11 and 14 April. The Iraqi government has said that Iranian forces started the affray by firing on an Iraqi police truck inside Iraqi territory near the border town of Khansakine (about one hundred and twenty miles north-east of Baghdad on the main Baghdad/Tehran road). We understand that an Iranian communique (15 April) says that the trouble began with the abduction of three Iranian policemen at Nafti-Shah just to the south of Khansakine, but on the Iranian side of the border.

The Iraqis reported a further clash on 20 April in the Wasef area, the scene of clashes in mid-January.

Restricted

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

RG 6

0.46384

TO

TOD 26.05.72...2258 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHERAN...369AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON...2190

173/11/31

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

ADDRESSED TEHERAN 369, REPEATED WASHINGTON 2190.

IRAN: IRAQ- IBRD LOAN

YOUR 339.

WE SUGGEST THAT YOUR REPLY TO THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY
BE ALONG THE LINES THAT CONSIDERATION OF THE IBRD LOAN TO IRAQ
SHOULD REST ON THE ECONOMIC MERITS OF THE PROPOSAL, AND BE IN
ACCORD WITH THE BANK'S ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT AND ESTABLISHED
POLICY. ON THIS BASIS AND ON THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US WE
WOULD NOT EXPECT THE BANK TO BE AN APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR THE AIRING
OF THE DISPUTE.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
DEPT FOREIGN AFFAIRS (706/22/7)
MIN AND DEPT T AND I
TREASURER AND TREASURY
PM AND C
PM'S

RESTRICTED

ACTION: EP

SEC DEPSEC(A) (B) PR FAS(A) SA FAS(PW) PC EAME FAS(DVP)
AID ICR FAS(IO) EP UNIA FAS(MS)

01/11/72
No. 1/11/72

1/11/72 IRAN RELMS

Extract From Savingsgram Nos
E. Tehran 12-5-72
100B-1015

Iraq

10. Iran's relations with Iraq deteriorated further during April. On 14th, Baghdad Radio claimed that Iranian military forces, including tanks and artillery, had initiated several serious border attacks over the previous three days. On the same day an allegedly pro-Iraqi Beirut newspaper (al-Nahar) published a statement by Iraq's Vice-President Saddam Hussein Takriti, who claimed that although Iraq was a victim of Iranian aggression and injustice, he was prepared to visit Tehran for talks to settle differences at any time.

11. The Iranian reaction to both Iraqi statements was predictable and caustic. There had been border clashes, but these were without exception caused by Iraqi forces. None had been of the scale suggested by Iraq. Seriously enough, however, three Iranian gendarmes had been kidnapped and the Swiss Embassy in Baghdad (which represents Iran) had been asked to secure their return. The Foreign Minister, Mr. Khalatbari, said that he would negotiate at any time with the Iraqi nation, but not with the Ba'athists. He would not accept a visit to Tehran by Mr. Takriti until Iraq took positive steps to improve relations with Iran.

12. On 29th April reserve officers and NCO's were called up in the western border provinces of East and West Azerbaijan, Kurdistan and Kermanshahan, though this action was not officially connected with the border situation. Iraqi units were at the same time reported to have increased their strength along the border. No new incidents were reported during the rest of the month.

Comment

13. The official Iranian attitude has been scornful of Iraqi military "pretensions" and as reluctant as the Ba'athists appear to be in finding some way to defuse the situation. At the same time there has been comment in Tehran about the Iraqi/Soviet friendship treaty signed on 6th April when Mr. Kosygin visited Baghdad for the opening of the Romaila oilfields, and speculation of what it would mean in the event of open Iran/Iraq hostilities. (The treaty calls for "immediate consultations" if peace is threatened). Foreign Ministry officials

-5-

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

have been tight-lipped about the treaty, but the press consensus, at least, is that the Soviet Union has too much at stake in Iran to risk open support for Iraq, and might even use its new influence in Iraq to restrain irresponsible actions against Iran.

CONFIDENTIAL

14

30

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHRAN

In reply quote No. 221/5/9

Memorandum No. 300

4th May, 1972.

(1) 173/11/31

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

IRAN: RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. *Fi2* *F11*

Please refer to our memoranda 266 and 273 of 18th and 24th April respectively.

2. Iran's relations with Iraq have remained at a low level since the final break of diplomatic relations last year, and the mass expulsion of Iranian nationals in late December. This month has seen a further deterioration due to an increase in the frequency of border clashes. On 14th April, Baghdad Radio claimed that Iranian military forces, including tanks and artillery, had initiated several serious border incursions over the previous three days. Also on 14th April, an allegedly pro-Iraqi Beirut newspaper (al-Nahar), published a statement by Iraq's Vice-President Saddam Hussein Takriti, who claimed that Iraq was the victim of Iranian aggression and injustice. Although Iraq could put an end to such belligerence through retaliation by its own forces, Mr. Takriti declared himself prepared to visit Tehran at any time for talks with Iranian leaders to settle the differences.

3. The Iranian reaction to both Iraqi statements was predictable and caustic. Iran agreed that there had been border clashes in early April, but claimed that Iraq had initiated them all. None had been of the scale suggested by Iraq. Seriously enough, however, three Iranian gendarmes had been kidnapped and the Swiss Embassy in Baghdad (which represents Iranian interests) had been asked to secure their return. The Foreign Minister, Mr. Khalatbari, made a public reply to Vice-President Takriti, claiming that he would negotiate at any time with the Iraqi nation, but there are doubts about the sincerity of the offer. He would not accept a visit to Tehran by Mr. Takriti until Iraq took positive steps to improve relations with Iran.

the narrow western Shatt al-Arab, through

CONFIDENTIAL

16/5
173/11/31
DUPLICATE TO MR
AS BARRER V. MINISTRY
OF DEFENCE
TO MR. PETERSON PLEASE
15/5

4. On 29th April, Iranian reserve officers and NCO's were called up in the western border provinces of East and West Azerbaijan, Kurdistan and Kermanshahr. Officially this is part of an army programme to call up previously-trained national servicemen for refresher courses throughout Iran (a knowledgeable foreign military attache claims that many are "off the rolls" and have to be traced to calculate Iran's real reserve strength of Army manpower). It is hardly coincidental, however, that recruits in the provinces facing Iraq were the first selected for re-mobilisation. Iraqi units were at the same time reported to have increased their strength along the border. More incidents have been reported this week although the border areas on both sides remain fairly calm. Meanwhile Iraq has protested to the Security Council about alleged Iranian incursions. Iran has lodged a counterclaim.

Comment

5. The official Iranian attitude has been scornful of Iraqi military "pretensions", and as unhelpful as the Ba'athists in finding some way to defuse the situation. At the same time there is no doubt that there has been private concern in Tehran about the possible effect on Iraqi actions of the Iraq/Soviet friendship treaty signed on 6th April, when Mr. Kosygin visited Baghdad for the opening of the Romaila oilfields.

6. For one thing, the treaty calls for "immediate consultations" if peace is threatened. There has been some speculation that this could imply Soviet assistance, or at least moral support, for whatever actions Iraq might choose to take. This does however appear to be a minority view. Although senior Iranian Foreign Ministry officials have been tight-lipped about the treaty, we believe the consensus is that the Soviet Union has too much at stake in Iran to risk open support for Iraq, and might even use its influence there to restrain irresponsible actions against Iran. We see from Moscow's memorandum 374 of 14th April, 1972 (paragraph 3) that this view is in line with the one expressed by the Iranian Ambassador in Moscow on 10th April. Washington's memorandum 1109/72 of 24th April is also relevant.

7. We would add a further comment to Moscow's memorandum. Paragraph 2 states that the Iraqi/Soviet treaty provides the basis for an effective Soviet presence at the entrance to the Persian Gulf, and for Soviet influence and intervention in the question of Iraqi oil supplies to the West. The Soviet position may have strengthened at the narrow western Shatt al Arab end, through access to the

14/6
Iraqi ports of Basra and Um Kasr, rather than at the eastern entrance. The Straits of Hormoz are becoming subject to increasing surveillance by Iran through development of their naval base at Bandar Abbas (see our memorandum 287 of 4th May), and Iranian occupation last year of the islands of Abu Musa and the Tumbs, between which run the deep water channel into the Gulf. At the same time, regular access to Iraqi ports for Soviet naval vessels would increase their frequency of passage through the Straits of Hormoz. This would hardly quieten Iranian anxieties to keep the Gulf free from the influence of non-littoral states. The Iranians were not happy about the visit to Basra of a Soviet naval squadron to mark the opening of the Romaila oil fields. We understand from the British Embassy that the ships did not immediately leave the Gulf after the opening, but dropped anchor on the Gulf side of the Straits for several days before resuming their voyage into the Indian Ocean. Neither the Iranians nor the British appear to know the reason for this.

8. We are sending copies of this memorandum to Beirut and Moscow.

R.P. Broinowski
(R.P. Broinowski)
First Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

S/10615
24 April 1972

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Handwritten: 13
S
file 173/11/31
27

LETTER DATED 18 APRIL 1972 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring the following to your attention for the information of the members of the Security Council.

On 11 April 1972, at about 7.15 p.m., an armed group of Iranian forces which had infiltrated into Iraqi territory opened fire on a police vehicle returning to Khanaqin after having taken a number of Iraqi policemen, who had been on leave, back to their border post at the Mohammed Khidr area. A policeman, Kadhim Matar, was hit in the shoulder by a bullet, and the vehicle was set on fire.

On 12 April, when another vehicle was sent to tow away the burnt car, the Iranian aggressors again fired from inside Iraqi territory on the second police vehicle. The attack was not confined to machine-gun fire; the Iranian forces also used artillery and mortar shells, and Iraqi forces in the area had to intervene in order to rescue the besieged police vehicles. The exchange of fire continued from 5 p.m. on 13 April until noon the following day. In their act of aggression the Iranian forces, in addition to regular infantry units and mercenary irregulars, sent a tank unit into action, supported by artillery and mortar fire. An Iraqi soldier and two policemen were wounded as a result of the Iranian aggression.

It is noteworthy that the Iranian Government has consistently followed a policy of provocation and aggression along the Iraqi-Iranian borders since April 1969, when Iran unilaterally and illegally abrogated the Iraqi-Iranian Boundary Treaty of 1937. Iran's unilateral denunciation of that valid and binding Treaty was but another step in the incessant attempts of the Iranian Government to further its expansionist ambitions at the expense of Iraqi territories. The Iranian Government's repeated violations and aggressions have led to a critical deterioration of the situation in the whole area.

The latest Iranian act of aggression is not only another example of Iran's aggressive and expansionist intentions but is also a blatant violation of the rules of international law and of the principles of the Charter and constitutes a serious threat to peace and security in the area.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Karim AL-SHAIKHLY
Permanent Representative

72-08541



Handwritten: AW SPENCER
IRAQ/IRAN RULERS

12
26
RESTRICTED

APR 21 2 18 PM '72

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHRAN

NOV. INDEX, SUBJECT

In reply quote No. 221/5/9

Memorandum No. 266

18th April, 1972.

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

IRANIAN RELATIONS WITH IRAQ.

The Iranian reaction to the conclusion of the Iraqi-Soviet treaty signed during Mr. Kosygin's visit early this month (of which we do not have the actual text), has so far been relatively mild. The press reported the visit, and that of a Soviet naval group to the Iraqi port of Umm-al-Qasr, without emotion. According to a BBC comment, Tehran observers expressed the view that the treaty had to be seen in the context of the Arab-Israeli dispute and not as touching on Iraqi-Iranian relations. The same source claimed that the USSR had assured the Iranian Government the treaty was not directed against this country.

2. Whatever the truth of these comments, there was a sharp reaction here to incidents on the border starting on 11th April, in which three Iranian gendarmes were "kidnapped" and firing took place over several days. Each side has claimed that the other is to blame and there is no way of confirming which started the shooting.

3. The Iranian Government has lodged an official protest through the Swiss, the protecting power in Baghdad and warned against further provocations. The usual photographs have appeared of Iraqi shells and shell damage on Iranian territory. While the incidents have not been directly linked with the Iraqi-Soviet treaty, the Iranian press has produced a series of scornful editorials on pretensions of the Iraqi leaders and a new wave of reports has appeared on the breakdown of the arrangements reached in March, 1970, between the Iraqi Government and the Kurdish leader Barzani.

4. Copy of this memorandum is being forwarded to the Australian Embassy, Beirut.

Mr. F. B. Hall
(F.B. Hall)
Ambassador.

RESTRICTED



REGISTRY
A.A.
APR 28 11 51 AM '72

NON-INDEX SUBJECT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHRAN

In reply quote No. 221/5/9

Memorandum No. 273

24th April, 1972.

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

IRANIAN RELATIONS WITH IRAQ.


Further to ^{our} ~~my~~ memorandum 266 of 18th April, 1972, the Foreign Minister has told the press, in the course of an outline of relations between the two countries, that Iran is ready to negotiate with Iraq on current issues, in accordance with prevailing international principles. Mr. Khalatbary, however, expressed his doubts about the proposal, apparently put through the Beirut press, that the Vice-President of Iraq, Saddam Hossein al-Takriti, come to Tehran for negotiations. The Minister felt that good faith was lacking in the suggestion, at a time of border provocations by Iraqi forces and the kidnapping and non-return of Iranian gendarmes.

2. The Minister added that border incidents initiated by the Iraqis were of frequent occurrence and he wondered why the Baghdad Government had suddenly chosen to publicise the matter. According to the press report, the Minister indicated his opinion that the Iraqi regime's offer of negotiations was meant to divert attention from its recently signed treaty with the Soviet Union, and put it in a better light with other neighbours.

3. Reports of another border clash have come from Baghdad Radio in the past two days, but are not yet confirmed from the Iranian side.

4. Copy of this memorandum is being forwarded to the Australian Embassy, Beirut.

R.P. Broinowski
(R.P. Broinowski)
First Secretary.



Max SPENCER
Please send copy
to Mr. Henderson
4/2/72

Mr. Tinsley 2/2

ZCZC HAA094 201943 XHBO46
00 HCA

173/11/31
IRAQ 4-21

BEIRUT, APRIL 20 (UPI)--AN IRANIAN FORCE CROSSED THE IRANIAN-
IRAQI BORDER TODAY TO ATTACK AN IRAQI POLICE STATION, BAGHDAD
RADIO SAID TONIGHT.

QUOTING A MILITARY SPOKESMAN, THE RADIO SAID IRAQI POLICEMEN
OPENED FIRE ON THE IRANIANS FORCING THEM TO RETREAT.

+AT 1300 (1000 GMT) TODAY, AN IRANIAN FORCE INFILTRATED INTO
IRAQ TERRITORY IN ORDER TO ATTACK THE JEBEL POLICE STATION IN THE
WASSIF GOVERNORATE, + THE RADIO SAID.

+THE ALERT FORCE AT THE STATION OPENED FIRE, FORCING THE
IRANIANS TO RETREAT+ ACROSS THE BORDER, THE RADIO ADDED.--(UPI)

PL432A/LNA171/MLBO69

NNNN



ZCZC HAA105 202012 XHBD51
OO HCA

IRAQ 4-21

1ST ADD IRAQ BEIRUT XHBD46 XXX RADIO ADDED.

IT WAS THE SECOND INCIDENT ALONG THE BORDER IN SEVEN DAYS.
LAST FRIDAY, THE RADIO REPORTED A 19-HOUR BATTLE WITH TANKS,
MORTARS AND SMALL ARMS, BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. THE
IRAQIS CLAIMED INFLECTING HEAVY CASUALTIES AND MATERIAL DAMAGE
ON THE IRANIANS.

RELATIONS BETWEEN BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN DETERIORATED IN 1969
WHEN THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT UNILATERALLY ABROGATED A TREATY
WITH IRAQ ON NAVIGATION RIGHTS IN SHATT AL ARAB, THE ESTUARY
MAKING UP PART OF THE BORDER BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.
IRANIAN TROOPS ALSO LANDED LAST NOVEMBER ON THREE ISLANDS STRATEG-
ICALLY LOCATED AT THE ENTRANCE OF THE PERSIAN GULF.

THE BAGHDAD PRESS HAS ESTABLISHED A CONNECTION BETWEEN THE
LATEST BORDER CLASHES AND THE SOVIET-IRAQI TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP
AND COOPERATION SIGNED APRIL 9.

+THE TREATY HAS FILLED THE HEARTS OF THE IRANIAN RULERS WITH
FRIGHT, + THE SEMI-OFFICIAL BAGHDAD NEWSPAPER AL JUMHOURIA SAID.
PL507A/LNA172/MLB070

NNNN

178/11/31



21

V. 17 Apr 72

I R A N

K 1



(F) 173/11/31

20

BORDER GUARDS CLASH WITH IRAQI ELEMENTS 10-14 APRIL

Initial Report

Teheran Domestic Service in Persian 1035 GMT 15 Apr 72 M

[Text] Imperial Iranian Armed Forces sources have revealed that between 10 and 14 April Iraqi forces opened fire on Imperial Iranian border posts in an attempt to occupy them. The attacks were resisted by the defenders of the posts. Imperial Iranian Armed Forces sources said that the Iraqi Government continues its provocations on the Iranian border and its aggressive and subversive activities. The sources revealed that 14 shells have been found near a border post. Correspondents can see these shells for themselves.

Further Details

Teheran Domestic Service in Persian 1100 GMT 15 Apr 72 M

[Text] At 2225 last night, Baghdad radio interrupted its normal program to announce what it called a military statement in which Iran was accused of aggression against the Iraqi territory. In this statement, the Iraqi Government claimed that Iranian border guards opened fire on an Iraqi police car on 11 April and also fired on Iraqi elements inside Iraqi territory on 12 April, resulting in clashes between the two countries' forces which eventually ended at 1200 on 14 April. Baghdad radio also claimed that Iranian units were supported by tanks, field guns, ground forces and border guards. Our reporters contacted Imperial Iranian Armed Forces sources today about the statement. It transpires that the facts are as follows:

At 0600 on 10 April, three members of the gendarmery going from Naft-E Shah to Qasr-E Shrin were kidnaped by Iraqi agents 11 kilometers from Naft-E Shah and were taken inside Iraq. Following this, at 2230 on 11 April, Iraqi armed elements, supported by tanks and artillery, opened fire on the Iranian Amineh post, between Zarrinkosh and Khan Leyli, in an attempt to occupy Iranian positions. The Iraqi forces met stiff resistance from the Iranian forces guarding the post and thus were forced to retreat.

Iraqi armed forces on 12 April first attacked the Amineh post and later brought (T)Tappenkar, Rezaabad and Heydarabad under heavy artillery and machinegun fire. Iranian forces returned the fire and silenced the opposing forces. But at 2000 the same day, Iraqi subversive elements again tried to infiltrate into Iran 6 kilometers from Naft-E Shah and opened fire on Iranian patrol cars. Gendarmery elements immediately responded and the aggressors were forced to retreat. They left a considerable amount of empty shells from bullets and other signs of aggression for all to see.

Sporadic firing and aggressive acts by the Iraqi forces against Iranian positions continued on 13 April. From 0600 on 14 April, the Iraqis again attacked the Amineh and [name indistinct] posts with heavy artillery. The courageous forces guarding the posts put up strong resistance and thus forced the Iraqi forces to retreat. Losses have been sustained by Iranian civilians in the border region as a result of the clashes and one civilian has been injured. The Iraqi Government continues its acts of provocation on the Iranian border as well as its subversive and aggressive activities. According to reports by Imperial Iranian Army sources, 14 artillery shells have been found at the Amineh post near the border. Two of them are still intact and reporters can see them for themselves on the spot.

V. 17 Apr 72

K 2

True Love
14/1 IRAN

Teheran Radio Comment

Teheran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 16 Apr 72 M

[Unattributed talk]

[Excerpts] Any type of aggression against Iranian territory will be replied to severely. This is the lesson which the agents of the united forces of colonialism in Baghdad should have learned from the recent border incidents.

Iran's political and military position is based on peaceful coexistence and the solution of border problems on the basis of international regulations. It helps all the littoral Persian Gulf nations in their economic growth, and it withstands any type of political and military adventurism in this area.

Iraq needs border clashes. It needs to start wars and border disputes so it can put its disorderly domestic situation into some kind of order. The Ba'thist agents of colonialism in Iraq will not be forgiven by the Iraqi people. They will not be forgiven by all those respectable Iraqis who were harmed by the economic bankruptcy and political defeat faced by Iraq, and who have become involved in the plunderings of a group of adventurists who have been named "incapable gendarmes" in the Arab world. Iraq, the reactionary messenger of pan-Arabism which has placed its territory before international bidding, now in the middle of Arab nations does not have any type of respect and its discordant objectives have become obvious that it was respectfully thrown out of the Arab-Israeli war front.

The agents of neocolonialism in Iraq of today have started a new mission in the Persian Gulf in order to draw this region into fire and in order to destroy the political stability and security so that they can act according to their interests in Iraq. By starting a new game they are trying to further the objectives of neocolonialism in the Middle East. These agents are condemned to a decline. All the Middle East nations know that only with the help of peace and peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation can they avoid falling into the traps of the big powers. But this will be possible only when the self-interests and bullying of these new wicked elements--the existence of whom is a violation of international regulations--is ended.

Let the bitter experience of the colonialist agents in Iraq during these border adventures be a lesson and let all the nations in this area know that powerful Iran is the guard of peace and economic progress.

AYANDEGAN Reaction

Teheran Domestic Service in Persian 0400 GMT 16 Apr 72 M

[Press review]

[Excerpts] In its editorial today entitled: "Play-Acting on Baghdad Radio," discussing Iraq's recent provocations and the Ba'thists' acts of turning facts around, AYANDEGAN newspaper says: Radio Baghdad interrupted its news to announce the aggression against Iraqi territory by Iranian tanks, artillery and field guns, and claimed that this attack took place 6 days ago. It also spoke about the incomparable heroism of the "courageous Iraqi Army" and about the fact that a new page has been added to the book of that army's glories.



RESTRICTED

19

6

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHRAN

In reply quote No. 221/5/9

Memorandum No. 266

18th April, 1972.

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

IRANIAN RELATIONS WITH IRAQ.

The Iranian reaction to the conclusion of the Iraqi-Soviet treaty signed during Mr. Kosygin's visit early this month (of which we do not have the actual text), has so far been relatively mild. The press reported the visit, and that of a Soviet naval group to the Iraqi port of Umm-al-Qasr, without emotion. According to a BBC comment, Tehran observers expressed the view that the treaty had to be seen in the context of the Arab-Israel dispute and not as touching on Iraqi-Iranian relations. The same source claimed that the USSR had assured the Iranian Government the treaty was not directed against this country.

2. Whatever the truth of these comments, there was a sharp reaction here to incidents on the border starting on 11th April, in which three Iranian gendarmes were "kidnapped" and firing took place over several days. Each side has claimed that the other is to blame and there is no way of confirming which started the shooting.

3. The Iranian Government has lodged an official protest through the Swiss, the protecting power in Baghdad and warned against further provocations. The usual photographs have appeared of Iraqi shells and shell damage on Iranian territory. While the incidents have not been directly linked with the Iraqi-Soviet treaty, the Iranian press has produced a series of scornful editorials on pretensions of the Iraqi leaders and a new wave of reports has appeared on the breakdown of the arrangements reached in March, 1970, between the Iraqi Government and the Kurdish leader Barzani.

4. Copy of this memorandum is being forwarded to the Australian Embassy, Beirut.

F.B. Hall
(F.B. Hall)
Ambassador.

CHECKED

8/28/4

RESTRICTED

ZCZC HAA142 142158 XHB053

UL CA

CLASH 4-15

BEIRUT, APRIL 14 (UPI)--IRAQI AND IRANIAN TROOPS FOUGHT A 19-HOUR BATTLE TODAY WITH TANKS, MORTARS AND SMALL ARMS, OFFICIAL BAGHDAD RADIO ANNOUNCED.

THE IRAQIS INFLECTED +HEAVY CASUALTIES AND MATERIAL DAMAGE ON THE ATTACKING IRANIANS+ AND SUFFERED THREE MINOR CASUALTIES THEMSELVES, THE RADIO SAID IN A BROADCAST MONITORED HERE.

THE LATEST BORDER BATTLE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WHOSE RELATIONS HAVE BEEN STRAINED FOR YEARS, BEGAN AT 5 P.M. (1400 GMT) THURSDAY AND ENDED AT NOON (0900 GMT) TODAY, THE RADIO SAID. IT FOLLOWED TWO DAYS OF MINOR SKIRMISHING.

IN THE 19-HOUR BATTLE, THE RADIO SAID, +THE ATTACKING IRANIAN UNITS CONSISTED OF ONE BATTALION OF TANKS, SUPPORTED BY MORTARS AND INFANTRYMEN.

+OUR UNITS SUCCEEDED IN INTERCEPTING THE AGGRESSIVE FORCES AND INFLECTING HEAVY CASUALTIES ON THEM. VEHICLES WERE SEEN ABLAZE AND AMBULANCES REMOVED THEIR CASUALTIES.+

THE RADIO DID NOT MAKE CLEAR IF THE IRANIANS ATTACKED INTO IRAQI TERRITORY OR IF THE TWO SIDES DUELLED WITH WEAPONS ACROSS THE BORDER.--(UPI)

F-0600/MLB025

NNNN

173/11/31

5

18

Takriti 1002
10-3-72

-3-

173/11/181
CONFIDENTIAL 17
1:24710

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

8. A current rumour is that the demonstration was held without the Shah's approval. The Shah (who is on holiday in Switzerland until early March). Nevertheless a second round of demonstrations took place in country districts in Iran on 1st March, this time without bomb incidents or disturbances.

B. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

Civil Aviation

9. Speaking at Iran Air's tenth anniversary celebration on 22nd February, the Managing Director Ali Mohammed Khademi said the airline was seeking to expand its operations over the Atlantic and to Australia and the Far East including Tokyo and Peking. He said a decision would probably be taken shortly to buy two or three Concorde for introduction in 1976. His announcement followed a visit this month by a Concorde sales team from B.A.C. and the Societe National Industrielle Aerospatiale.

10. Preparations for Iran Air's expansion over the Atlantic routes have been under way for some time. The airline is now operating offices in New York and Los Angeles and will shortly open an office in Chicago.

C. FOREIGN RELATIONS

Iraq

11. The Iranian Government closely followed the visit to Moscow during the month by Saddam Hussein al-Takriti, deputy president of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council. Takriti's visit began on 10th and extended to 17th February. He was accompanied by the Iraqi Foreign Minister and Minister in charge of oil and mineral development. A communique broadcast by Tass on 17th February reaffirmed joint intentions to develop Soviet-Iraqi political, economic and defence co-operation, and mentioned that Messrs. Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin had all accepted invitations to visit Baghdad in return.

12. The Tehran press treated Takriti's visit with scorn, and anxiety was also expressed that it would lead to more Soviet military aid and possibly a Soviet-Iraq treaty similar to the treaties of friendship with Egypt and India. Although the communique avoided any mention of Iran/Iraq relations, several editorials forecast that the Ba'athists would exploit the propaganda value of the visit against Iran.

Pakistan

13. The former Foreign Minister Ardeshir Zehedi made a three day "private" visit to Pakistan from 13th to 15th February. According to an Iranian contact the visit was made at the Shah's request to demonstrate Iran's continuing interest and concern.

.... /4

CONFIDENTIAL

→ 173/11/87

Origin on 173/11/87
193/2/1

3

CONFIDENTIAL 16



RECEIVED
D.E.A.
FEB 19 11 32 AM '72

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHRAN

NON-INDEX. SUBJECT

In reply quote No. 201/2/2/4
Memorandum No. 109

10th February, 1972.

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA.

193/2/1

IRAN : STATE SECURITY AND THE TERRORIST TRIALS

On 16th January the State Security Organisation of Iran (SAVAK) staged another of its periodic televised press conferences to disclose the capture of Iranian terrorists. This time, all 120 members of three separate subversive organisations were alleged to have been captured over the last ten months. Public trials before a military tribunal began on 23rd January and by 7th February, 23 defendants had been sentenced to terms of imprisonment varying between three years and life. The trials will continue throughout February.

2. The three subversive groups run to ground by SAVAK were identified as the Iran Liberation Organisation, the Revolutionary Organisation of the Tudeh Party and the Revolutionary Organisation of Iranian Communists.

3. The Iran Liberation Organisation is described by SAVAK as an extreme group which had been expelled from the National Front. It was credited with the hijack of an Iranian aircraft in December 1970, the attempted kidnapping of the Shah's nephew, Prince Shahram and other prominent figures, and an explosion during the 25th Centenary Celebrations which damaged a Tehran electric power plant. The group was accused of having contact with the left wing and illegal Confederation of Iranian Students Abroad (which allegedly has 1,500 radical members who propagandize against the Shah among the 25,000 Iranian overseas students) and of obtaining arms and financial support from the Iraqi regime. The SAVAK spokesman stated that all the Organisation's leadership had been arrested together with a total of 100 people associated with the group. Of these associates 30 were released as they were said to have been simply misled and not seriously involved. He indicated that a number were still at large but SAVAK was taking steps to arrest them.

on 17/2/72
Copy 310
NAM
EE

CONFIDENTIAL

1809/11/87
AHL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. The Revolutionary Organisation of the Tudeh (Communist) Party, which separated from the Tudeh Party in 1964 claiming that the parent organisation had blindly followed the Soviet Government's "appeasement policy" towards Iran. This break away group has been active amongst Iranian students in Western Europe and America, and is alleged to be in close co-operation with the Iraqi Ba'athists. The group was alleged to have been involved in General Bakhtiar's plot in 1970 (our memorandum 5 of 2nd January, 1971) and according to the SAVAK spokesman is still active. Cyrus Rahavandi, who led a bank robbery and an unsuccessful attempt to kidnap the United States Ambassador in November 1970, is alleged to be the main activist inside Iran. The Tudeh group was also said to have established farms in Khorrasan and Rezaieh and a brick kiln near Tehran to enable them to establish closer contacts with peasant farmers and workers.
5. The third group, the Revolutionary Organisation of Iranian Communists (SARA), which has not come to our attention before, was said to have been established in 1969. It was supposedly some disagreement within the group as to whether violent tactics should be used. A part of the group stole some weapons and then failed in an attempted bank robbery. Other robberies and sabotage work were said to have been planned. They were alleged to have been in contact with Iraq and "certain Soviet organisations" in Tehran. The total arrested from this group was 50, with 20 subsequently released.
6. During SAVAK's television broadcast in Tehran, a quantity of weapons and equipment alleged to have been used by the three groups were displayed, and their activities described in some detail. Most of the incidents involving the groups have from time to time been reported separately in the press, or otherwise become known to us. One incident, the attempted kidnapping in November, 1970, of the United States Ambassador (Douglas MacArthur) had however been successfully kept quiet until the SAVAK disclosure. An American Embassy contact has subsequently filled in the details for us. The Ambassador's car had been stopped at a roadblock whilst returning from a late night dinner party. Four men had attempted to break open the locked rear door with an axe and drag out the Ambassador. The car had managed to reverse and get away but not before shots had been fired. The Ambassador and his wife were both uninjured.
7. A series of minor bomb incidents at American establishments in Tehran on 17th January (the night after the SAVAK disclosures on television) underlined the fact that a number of urban terrorists still remain active. Two bombs exploded at the Embassy's restaurant and one each at the Peace Corps headquarters, the Iran-American Cultural Centre and the Iran-American Club. Fortunately the attacks were amateurish and no-one was seriously hurt. SAVAK has not disclosed yet whether it has a lead on those responsible for these latest attacks or whether arrests have been made.

.... /3

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Comment

8. The trials in Tehran of the 120 defendants have been continuing marked by unusually frank presscoverage and comment. Most newspapers have condemned the terrorists as misguided youths who have caused unnecessary damage and personal sufferings. There has been no suggestion that the movements to which they belonged enjoyed any degree of popular support, and editorials have expressed confidence that their colleagues still at large will eventually be caught. In an interview he granted several foreign journalists on 21st January, the Shah added that the terrorists' activities were all in vain. Iran's social structure was changing with the aid of the White Revolution into a classless society and armed revolution was essentially irrelevant to the process. He expressed confidence that all the remaining rebels would soon be rounded up.

R.P. Broinowski
(R.P. Broinowski)
First Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

1
CABLE ADDRESS
AUSTONAT, NEW YORK
TELEPHONE
YUKON 6-7676



FEB 13 12 16 PM '72

NON INDEX SUBJECT

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
750 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

FILED No. 2

13

14 February 1972

In reply quote No. 606/3
Memorandum No. 288/72

→ 173/11/31
The Secretary
Department of Foreign Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

Iranian Relations with Iraq

Further to our memorandum No. 41/72 of 6 January 1972, we attach for your information a copy of a note dated 4 February 1972 from the Permanent Mission of Iraq, concerning the problem of Iranian nationals expelled from Iraq.

2. A copy of this memorandum with attachment has been sent to Teheran.

1) Mr. [Signature] 173/11/31

2) File 173/11/31

RSM/fdb

[Signature]
R.S. Morrillees
First Secretary

→ 173/11/31



PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
14 EAST 75TH STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10021

12

The Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representatives and Observers to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the Note circulated by the Permanent Representative of Iran on January 5, 1972.

The Permanent Representative of Iraq categorically rejects the baseless allegations contained in the Iranian note. The accusations levelled against the Iraqi authorities are so obvious and inconsistent that they are in fact self-defeating.

The nature of the problem of the Iranian nationals illegally residing in Iraq, and the measures taken by the Iraqi authorities to cope with that problem, have already been defined in a previous Iraqi note dated November 11, 1971. No State would tolerate the presence of illegal entrants nor would it extend residency or work permits to such foreigners. The deportation of any foreigner illegally residing in any country is the sovereign right of the government of that country; it is a purely internal



PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
14 EAST 75TH STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10021

12

The Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representatives and Observers to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the Note circulated by the Permanent Representative of Iran on January 5, 1972.

The Permanent Representative of Iraq categorically rejects the baseless allegations contained in the Iranian note. The accusations levelled against the Iraqi authorities are so obvious and inconsistent that they are in fact self-defeating.

The nature of the problem of the Iranian nationals illegally residing in Iraq, and the measures taken by the Iraqi authorities to cope with that problem, have already been defined in a previous Iraqi note dated November 11, 1971. No State would tolerate the presence of illegal entrants nor would it extend residency or work permits to such foreigners. The deportation of any foreigner illegally residing in any country is the sovereign right of the government of that country; it is a purely internal

measure and is fully in accord with international law and practice. The Iraqi authorities, therefore, had every right to take legal action, including the imposition of fines and prison sentences against the illegal entrants. The Iranians illegally residing in Iraq, however, were neither fined nor thrown into gaols. They were granted the necessary facilities and escorted to the borders of their own country.

Since the Iranian Foreign Minister himself, as quoted in the New York Times of January 9, 1972, admitted that Iraq may have "had legal grounds" for the expulsion of the Iranian nationals, the Iranian government is desperately trying to mount a campaign of hostility against Iraq by resorting to a non-existent question of human rights. The deportation of Iranians illegally residing in Iraq is not a novel event. Because of the long boundary between Iraq and Iran and because of the Iranian authorities' refusal to shoulder their international responsibilities in controlling illegal traffic across the borders, Iraq has always been faced with the problem of large numbers of illegal Iranian immigrants who are drawn to Iraq for various reasons, the most important of which are the employment opportunities to be found in Iraq. The Iranian government, however, has made a habit of raising the question of the deportation of

Cont/.

Iranian nationals from Iraq whenever that government tries to divert world attention from its policies of aggression and other illegal actions towards Iraq and other Arab States in the Arabian Gulf.

The contradictions and glaring discrepancies which abound in the declarations made by the Iranian official sources expose the frailty of the Iranian allegations.

There are, for example, significant discrepancies in the number of those expelled from Iraq as reported by the Iranian press and official spokesmen, who finally seem to have settled for a number approximating 60,000 deported over a period of three and a half months; half of them are said to have been expelled, incredibly, in one night! The number of those deported on that single night had undergone a sharp decrease within three days, all according to information emanating from a single source; namely, the Permanent Representative of Iran. On January 4, he told a correspondent of The New York Times that the number was 36,000 (as quoted in The New York Times of January 6, 1972). In his note circulated also on January 5, the number mentioned by the Permanent Representative was 33,000; then in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General on January 6, (contained in document E/CN.4/10092

Cont/.

dated January 11, 1972) the number is brought down to 30,000).

The following discrepancies are even more astonishing. The Iranian Permanent Representative in his Note of January 5, states that "almost 3,800 Iraqis including some non-commissioned officers of the Iraqi Army were secreted among Iranian expellees." The international edition of the Tehran daily "Kayhan" of January 8, on the other hand, quotes the Shah as follows: "the Monarch also told newsmen that 300 suspected Iraqi spies had infiltrated among the expellees. They will be tried and if convicted executed shortly. He also confirmed that some of them had explosives and arms when they were captured." "The Times" of London, of January 17th, reports from Teheran however that a group of 120 Iranians will go on trial before a military court on charges of espionage, sabotage and subversion. According to "The Times" a security spokesman "alleged at a press conference that the group arrested during the past five months, had been trained in Iraq and East Germany." The government of Iraq has officially and categorically rejected the allegation that there were Iraqi nationals among those deported to Iran. The attempt to implicate Iraqis in the whole affair is obviously devised to detract attention from the internal troubles the Iranian authorities are having

Cont/.

with their own nationals.

The Iranian pretext in raising the issue of human rights is neither valid nor relevant. The allegations of the "ill-treatment of the deportees" is denied by the "deportees" themselves - as reported in The New York Times of January 31, 1972.

As to the so-called "atrocities" listed in the Iranian note, they are utterly refuted by the very presence of Iranian residents in Iraq. Had the Iraqi authorities been really guilty of all the wild accusations contained in the notes circulated by the Permanent Representative of Iran; had the large Iranian community living in Iraq been as badly treated and abused over the years as the Iranian notes falsely claim, those Iranians would themselves have had left Iraq, long ago. Yet, it is the Iraqi government which is now being criticized for deporting them.

The Iranian authorities, on the other hand, are keeping their nationals in enclaves at the border posts looking for all the world like a concentration camp of tents, exploiting the inmates for propaganda purposes and, as may be gathered from the Shah's declarations quoted in "Kayhan" and the news item from "The Times" of London, for what appears to be an expedient way of dealing with Iranian dissidents. If

Cont/..

there were questions of human rights involved it would be more appropriate to call upon the Government of Iran to explain its actions. As far as Iraq is concerned, the question of the illegal immigrants is not humanitarian; it is a political, juridical and economic question directly related to the principle of sovereignty and the legitimate right of a State to safeguard its internal security.

Finally, the Permanent Representative of Iran in his note of January 5, states that he would like "to expose the hypocrisy and hollowness of the Iraqi pretensions as to its policy of good-neighbourliness." This statement must have been quite incomprehensible to anyone who read the note and was aware of the fact that Iraq had amply demonstrated, since 1969, its displeasure with the aggressive policies of the Iranian Government. The Government of Iraq had genuinely tried to improve the relations with Iran, but the Iranian Government responded by intensifying its hostile policy and increased its interference in the internal affairs of Iraq. The unilateral abrogation by the Iranian Government of the Iraqi - Iranian Boundary Treaty of 1937 and the subsequent Iranian attempts to engage in subversive activities inside Iraq led the Iraqi Government, in 1970, to the decision to demote its diplomatic representation in Teheran.

Cont/.

Iraq eventually severed all diplomatic relations with the Iranian Government last year upon Iran's armed aggression against, and occupation of, the three strategical Arab Islands in the Arabian Gulf.

It was the Iranian Government, and not Iraq, which unilaterally and illegally declared the valid and mutually binding "Boundary Treaty of 1937, between Iraq and Iran" as null and void. It was Iran who refused to refer the dispute over the Boundary Treaty to the International Court of Justice as Iraq had repeatedly offered. It was the Iranian policies of encroachment and aggression which have led to the deterioration of good-neighbourly relations, and now threaten peace and security in the area.

Iraq is by no means the only Arab country in the region which faces a large illegal influx of Iranian nationals annually. The people of Iraq have for centuries welcomed their Iranian neighbours, to whom they are bound with the closest historical and religious ties, granted them shelter and employment opportunities. The unmitigated hostility of the Iranian regime towards Iraq, which was demonstrated most recently by the incursion of Iranian armed units across the border into Iraq on January 15, 1972,

Cont/.

has made the Iraqi authorities extremely vigilant to all illegal crossings of Iraq - Iranian borders. The authorities, furthermore, had to investigate and to deport the illegal Iranian residents in Iraq. The presence of those Iranians became an intolerable security risk for Iraq because of the Iranian Government's hostile policies and aggressions against Iraq. The Iranian authorities' allegations concerning the so-called Iraqis "secreted" among those deported from Iraq, would actually enable the Iraqi authorities to make a far more valid counter-claim concerning Iranian agents who may be secreted among the large number of Iranians illegally entering Iraq every year.

The measures taken by the Iraqi authorities are in no way directed against Iran or the people of Iran. This has been reaffirmed as recently as January 14, by Mr. Saddam Hussain, Deputy Secretary of the Regional Leadership of the Arab Baath Socialist Party and Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, at a public rally in Baghdad. He declared that Iraq's attitude in this regard is not motivated by any aggressive intent nor does it proceed from a policy of racialism or enmity towards a people. It is rather based on the inherent rights of sovereignty under international law. The breaking of diplomatic relations with the Iranian Government does not mean, as Mr. Hussain pointed out, that Iraq


Cont/.

4

is against the people of Iran, but rather that Iraq is against the imperialistic policies of the Iranian government which aim at the humiliation and exploitation of peoples and the usurpation of their sovereign rights.

It is the Iranian Government which is wholly responsible for the deterioration of the relations between Iraq and Iran. It is, therefore, within the power of the Iranian Government to re-establish good-neighbourly relations with Iraq by renouncing Iranian aspirations to inherit the role of the erstwhile imperial power in the area and to seek instead cooperation and understanding with Iran's neighbours on a basis of true equality and mutual respect.

The Permanent Representative of Iraq avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Permanent Missions and Observers to the United Nations the assurances of his highest consideration.


New York City, February 4, 1972



3

CABLE ADDRESS
AUSTUNAT, NEW YORK
TELEPHONE
YURON 6-7676

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
750 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

14 February 1972

In reply quote No. 604/3

Memorandum No. 288/72

The Secretary
Department of Foreign Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

Iranian Relations with Iraq

.....
Further to our memorandum No. 41/72 of 6 January 1972, we attach for your information a copy of a note dated 4 February 1972 from the Permanent Mission of Iraq, concerning the problem of Iranian nationals expelled from Iraq.

2. A copy of this memorandum with attachment has been sent to Tehran.

DEL R. S. MERRILLIES
R.S. Merrillies
First Secretary

RSK/rdh

Pakistan

173/11/31

15. The Shah visited President Bhutto in Islamabad on 8th January. Mr. Bhutto returned the visit on 24th January when he called briefly at Tehran for talks with the Shah and Prime Minister Hoveyda en route to Ankara and other points in the Middle East.

16. A joint communique was issued by the two leaders. It requested members of the United Nations to seek early formalisation of a durable cease fire between Pakistan and India and the withdrawal of Indian armed forces to their own side of the border. The Shah agreed with Mr. Bhutto that the future relationship "between the two parts of Pakistan" should be resolved through negotiation between their elected leaders. Precipitate steps by other States would, the communique suggested, tend further to complicate the present situation.

*Pakistan
Sec 2
14.2.72*

Iraq

17. The Shah, members of the Majlis (Parliament) and the media continued to condemn the Iraqi Government for the expulsion of Iranians resident in Iraq, which reached a peak at the beginning of the month and then suddenly eased. About 60,000 are thought to have been expelled from October - January. The Shah and Empress accompanied by Ministers visited the border town of Khosravi to direct relief operations, and a Senate Committee held an investigation, condemning Iraq in its findings for inhumanity. The complaint was also publicised by Iran at the United Nations and placed on the agenda of the Human Rights Commission.

18. Iran continues to see Iraq's actions as retaliation for Iranian occupation early in December of the Tumbs and Abu Musa in the Persian Gulf. As supporting evidence, an Iraqi Revolutionary Council Member was quoted by the Tehran Press as having said that expulsion was directly due to Iran's actions in the Gulf. Although this has been denied in other Iraqi quarters, it seems the most likely explanation. This instalment of large scale removal of what Baghdad claims to be "illegal residents", though many are Iraqi born or have lived there many years, only began after Iran's occupation of the Gulf islands.

.... /6

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

14613
RESTRICTED

INWARD SAVINGRAM

19. Later in the month, the Shah publicly warned Iraq not to push its "policy of provocation" any further, but the situation seems to have eased for the time being and resettlement of those expelled is proceeding.

RESTR